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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 
This Enlargement Paper brings together into a single document the Directorate General for 
Economic and Financial Affairs evaluations of the fourth1 Pre-Accession Economic 
Programmes (PEPs) of the acceding countries, Bulgaria and Romania, and candidate countries, 
Croatia and Turkey.   
One of the economic priorities of the 1999 and 2000 Accession Partnerships was the 
establishment of an annual fiscal surveillance for the candidate countries.  This gave birth to the 
so-called Pre-Accession Fiscal Surveillance Procedure, which aims at preparing countries for 
the participation in the multilateral surveillance and economic policy co-ordination procedures 
currently in place in the EU as part of the Economic and Monetary Union. The Pre-Accession 
Economic Programmes (PEPs) are part of this 
procedure. 
The PEPs have two objectives.  First, to 
outline the medium-term policy framework, 
including public finance objectives and 
structural reform priorities needed for EU 
accession. Second, they offer an opportunity 
to develop the institutional and analytical 
capacity necessary to participate in EMU 
with a derogation from the adoption of the 
euro upon accession, particularly in the areas 
of multilateral surveillance and co-ordination 
of economic policies.  The development of 
the institutional capacity to co-ordinate 
between the various ministries, government 
agencies and the central bank is a particularly 
important aspect ensuring the success of the 
Pre-Accession Fiscal Surveillance Procedure. 
The PEPs were to be submitted between mid 
October and 1 December 2004, which all 
countries complied with.  In addition, as 
towards the end of the year Romania got a 
new government with a different agenda as 
regards economic policy, the country 
submitted a revised PEP by mid February.   
                                                   
1
 In the case of Croatia it was the first Pre-Accession Economic Programme, as the country was recognized as 
candidate country, and thereby included in the Pre-accession Fiscal Surveillances Procedure, in June 2004. 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Bulgaria 4.3 5.0 5.3 5.3 5.5
Romania 5.2 8.3 6.0 6.1 6.3
Croatia 4.3 3.9 4.4 4.5 4.6
Turkey 5.8 9.6 4.8 5.1 5.1
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Bulgaria -0.1 0.1 -0.5 0.0 -1.3*
Romania -2.0 -1.3 -0.7 -0.9 -1.9
Croatia -6.3 -4.5 -3.7 -3.2 -2.9
Turkey -10.1 -6.3 -4.4 -2.1 -0.5
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Bulgaria 48.4 40.8 37.4 34.2 32.5
Romania 21.0 18.4 17.5 19.0 19.8
Croatia 51.6 53.8 52.5 52.5 52.0
Turkey 80.2 78.4 75.3 72.2 68.3
Pre-accession Economic Programmes 
2004:  key figures
- Real GDP growth (% change)     
- General government balance (% of GDP) 
- Government gross debt (% of GDP)     
* according to the Bulgarian authorities, this figure was 
based on wrong accounting for EC funds in 2007 (pre-
financing of CAP).  The correct figure would be, instead of 
a deficit of 1.3%, a surplus of 0.8%.
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They have been made public by the countries and can be found on the web under following 
addresses: 
Bulgaria http://aeaf.minfin.government.bg/cms/docs/en/operative/pi_progr/PIP_2004_en.zip 
Croatia http://www.mfin.hr/download.php?id=508 
Romania http://www.cnp.ro/en_PEP.html 
Turkey http://www.dpt.gov.tr/files/Pep30112004i.pdf 
 
Overall, the submissions show that 
- all PEPs are based on a fairly consistent macroeconomic and fiscal framework.  In the light 
of the recent very positive economic development in all countries, the PEPs are overall only 
mildly optimistic.   
- The fiscal frameworks foresee a continued budget close-to balance for Bulgaria or a further 
decline of general government deficits in the other countries. 
- The structural reform agendas, as presented in the PEPs, are vast and partly ambitious.  
Often, however, the PEPs only describe ongoing activities, and the links to the 
macroeconomic and fiscal frameworks within the PEPs are often less clear. The four PEPs 
provide overall for consistent and party ambitious policy frameworks for economic 
stabilization, fiscal policy and structural reform.  Their methodology and presentation has 
improved vis-à-vis previous years (not for Croatia, which submitted its first PEP). 
On 12 July 2005, the Ministerial Meeting between the ECOFIN and their counterparts from 
acceding and candidate countries adopted (a) for the two acceding countries “joint opinions” on 
their respective PEPs and (b) for the two candidate countries within the meeting’s “joint 
conclusions” conclusions on their PEPs.  Excerpts from the documents mentioned under (a) and 
(b) are contained in this document (Paragraphs 2 of the respective countries’ sections).  
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PRE-ACCESSION ECONOMIC PROGRAMME OF BULGARIA 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The Bulgarian authorities have submitted the 2004 Pre-Accession Economic Programme (PEP) 
covering the period 2004 to 2007 to the European Commission on 1 December 2004. It is 
Bulgaria’s fourth PEP after the ECOFIN Council of 26/27 November 2000 had expressed its 
wish for a regular in-depth dialogue with accession countries. The programme largely complies 
with the requirements of the consolidated outline in terms of content, form and data. For the 
first time, data on output gap, cyclically adjusted budget balance and long-term sustainability of 
public finance have been included, however still lacking fully developed methodologies. The 
PEP is broadly consistent with other economic policy documents such as the Memorandum to 
the new 25-months precautionary stand-by arrangement with the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) of July 2004. The programme mostly follows the conclusions of the Joint Ministerial 
Meeting of 4 November 2003 on the Bulgarian 2003 PEP, but does less so with respect to 
measures aiming to increase the flexibility of labour markets.  
The programme is oriented towards providing the conditions for sustaining the process of 
catching-up with EU countries. It envisages a continuation of sound fiscal policies and the 
process of structural reforms in the pre-accession period. For the first time 2007 as the expected 
first year of EU membership is included in the programme, which gives rise to particular 
economic policy challenges regarding the absorption of the increasing inflow of EU funds and 
the declared objective of compliance with all convergence criteria to achieve an adoption of the 
euro by 2009/2010.  
2. JOINT OPINION 
“On 12 July 2005 the ECOFIN Ministers of the present Member States and the Acceding 
Countries examined the 2004 Pre-Accession Economic Programme of Bulgaria on the basis 
of an assessment prepared by the Commission Services with a contribution from the ECB 
and adopted this joint opinion. …. 
Ministers commend the Bulgarian authorities for sustaining the process of catching-up by 
maintaining the budget close to balance and continuing the process of structural reforms.  
They consider the Bulgarian Pre-accession Programme 2004 a useful medium-term 
framework for economic policy in Bulgaria on its way to EU accession.  They welcome that 
macroeconomic performance in 2004 turned out better than expected and consider the 
macroeconomic scenario plausible although further improvements in its methodological 
basis could be made. 
Ministers welcome the public finance scenario of a budget close to balance which is 
adequate in view of the possible risks for the external balance in a currency board 
arrangement and in view of potential inflationary pressures. Ministers consider that, while 
built-in buffers and conservative revenue forecasts increase fiscal flexibility and limit fiscal 
risks, they are also an impediment to the envisaged reduction of the tax burden and the 
expenditure-to-GDP ratio. They recommend to use future PEPs as a platform to commit the 
government to a more explicit strategy for the use of the Fiscal Reserve Account in order to 
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avoid its future depletion for an ad hoc-financing of additional public expenditure with 
potentially negative effects on macroeconomic stability. Ministers welcome the reforms in 
the social security system and in particular the pension system which have improved the 
long-term sustainability of public finances in Bulgaria. They note that reforms in public 
administration, also to prepare for EU accession, may require new staff, but should not go 
along with net increases in employment in public administration but rather be accompanied 
by reductions elsewhere.  Ministers consider that the programme’s description of the 
structural reform agenda is often more backward-looking than forward-looking and 
therefore not always providing a full picture of forthcoming reforms. They welcome the 
good progress in privatisation, the reduction of state aid and the restructuring and 
liberalisation of network industries, which should continue. Ministers emphasise the need to 
further strengthen the business environment in the economy, in particular by addressing 
remaining weaknesses in governance and administrative capacity. Ministers encourage the 
authorities to make further efforts for reforms in education and healthcare and for 
increasing the flexibility of the labour market. 
Finally, Ministers note Bulgaria’s progress in developing the institutional and analytical 
capacity required to participate in EMU.  However, they recommend Bulgaria to intensify 
its efforts to ensure that fully compatible ESA 95 data will progressively become a main 
reference for fiscal analysis before the time of Bulgaria’s accession to the EU.” 
3. MACROECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS 
3.1. Recent macroeconomic developments 
The programme starts with a clear and concise picture of economic developments in 2003 and - 
as far as data were available at the time of submission - in 2004. Following real GDP growth of 
4.3% in 2003, the Bulgarian economy continued its expansion at a rate of 5.6% in 2004. 
Growth is based on strong domestic demand fuelled by increases in net income, employment 
and bank credit. While this resulted in high import growth, exports were also growing stronger 
since the summer 2004, and the external balance of goods and services even had a positive 
contribution to growth in the third quarter. On the supply side, the good harvest, a strong 
increase in industrial production and a good tourism season were contributing to high output 
growth. Following a period of low inflation in the first months of 2003, rates accelerated from 
mid-2003 to mid-2004 due to higher food prices, as a consequence of a drought-related bad 
harvest in 2003, as well as increases in excise tax rates, administrative prices and import prices. 
These effects eased in the second half of 2004 so that consumer price inflation year-on-year 
was 6.1% on average and 4.0% at the end of the year. Unemployment decreased to 12.0% in 
2004 since jobs were created in the private sector and in government schemes for long-term 
unemployed. The current account deficit, which had deteriorated to 9.3% of GDP in 2003, 
turned out better at 7.4% of GDP in 2004 with improvements in all its balances except for the 
trade deficit which deteriorated further. Net inflows of foreign direct investment covered the 
current account deficit both in 2003 and 2004.2 
                                                   
2
 BNB balance of payments figures report a net FDI inflow of 7.6% of GDP in 2004. This figure takes into 
account a financial transaction of a value of 3.3% of GDP due to the change in foreign ownership of 
Mobiltel, the market leader in GSM mobile telephony in Bulgaria, through a Bulgarian intermediary which 
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3.2. Macroeconomic scenario 
As in previous programmes, the 2004 PEP reflects the economic policy priorities of the 
Bulgarian government of further reducing the gap of living standards to the EU Member States 
which is expected to be supported by EU membership in 2007 and the increase in EU funds. 
The required high growth rates are seen to be supported by continued economic stability as well 
as a sustainable development and the accumulation of high-quality human capital. 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
 Real GDP growth COM 4.3 5.7 6.0 4.5 n. a.
 (% change) PEP 4.3 5.0 5.3 5.3 5.5
 Consumer price COM 2.3 6.2 4.0 4.0 n. a.
 inflation (%) PEP 2.4 6.3 3.7 3.6 4.0
 General government COM 0.6 1.4 -0.5 0.0 n. a.
 balance (% of GDP) (*) PEP -0.1 0.1 -0.5 0.0 -1.3
 Primary balance COM 2.7 3.2 1.4 1.8 n. a.
 (% of GDP) (*) PEP 2.0 2.1 1.7 2.3 0.9
 Government gross COM 46.3 38.5 32.5 29.8 n. a.
 debt (% of GDP) (*) PEP 48.4 40.8 37.4 34.2 32.5
Note: PEP data in bold, COM in regular font
Table 1:  Comparison of key macroeconomic and budgetary projections
 
The macroeconomic framework appears overall consistent and sufficiently comprehensive. The 
underlying scenario of real GDP growth rates gradually increasing to 5½% in 2007 does not 
appear unrealistic and remains ¼ percentage point below the rates projected in the 2003 PEP. 
However, latest available data suggest that the situation in 2004 was better than expected in the 
2004 PEP. The demand-side contributions to growth in 2005 to 2007 show some unexplained 
volatility (cf. Appendix 1, Table 1). The objective of keeping the budget close to balance seems 
overall compatible with the macroeconomic scenario of a sustained and high growth path. 
Nevertheless, it is surprising that the increase in the minimum wage by 25% at the beginning of 
2005 and the fiscal expansion from a balanced budget in 2006 to a deficit of -1.3% of GDP in 
2007 do not seem to have more visible macroeconomic effects.  
The projections for the medium-term macroeconomic framework were made with the same 
model as used in previous PEPs and builds on the assumptions of the IMF and the European 
Commission on the development of the global and the European economy respectively. An 
alternative macroeconomic scenario is presented which assumes oil prices to be around USD 40 
in 2004 and 2005 and about USD 35 in 2006 and 2007 which is about 5 USD per barrel higher 
than assumed in the PEP’s main scenario and still about 5 USD below the price assumed by the 
Commission in the 2005 spring forecast for 2005 and 2006.3 The estimated negative effect is 
only marginal in 2004 and mostly absorbed in 2005, when real growth would be 0.55 
percentage points lower, while there would be no effects in 2006 and 2007. 
                                                                                                                                                           
was reported as a capital outflow in 2004 and will most likely be reported as a capital inflow in 2005 once 
the acquisition by the new foreign owner is accomplished.  
3
 Hence there is a difference in the oil prices assumptions of about 10 USD per barrel between the PEP’s main 
scenario and the Commission’s spring 2005 forecast. 
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Real sector 
The projected real GDP growth rates of the PEP’s macroeconomic scenario are lower than 
those of the Commission’s spring 2005 forecasts for Bulgaria in 2005 and higher in 2006. The 
Commission assumed that in 2005 consumption would be further stimulated by a slight 
loosening of fiscal and wage policies in view of national elections by mid-2005 and that in 
2006 some downward adjustment would be necessary to rebalance the economy and bring it 
closer to its medium-term potential growth rate. National accounts data show that real GDP 
growth in 2004 was 5.6% year-on-year. 
In the PEP projections, real GDP growth of 5% and higher is driven by high domestic demand 
resulting from increases in real wages, employment and bank credits. Gross fixed capital 
formation increases at double-digit rates which lifts its ratio to GDP from 21.7% in 2003 to 
22.8% in 2007. Negative contributions come from the external balance of goods and services as 
well as, from 2005 on, changes in inventories. On the supply side, all three broad sectors are 
growing. Employment growth between 1% and 2% brings the unemployment rate down to 10% 
in 2007. This results in labour productivity growth varying around 4% which is close to what is 
assumed as real wage growth and would keep real unit labour costs roughly stable. 
The PEP only briefly refers to the cyclical developments of the economy as presented in Table 
8 of Appendix 1. The output gap values are explained to be based on expert assessments made 
at the Agency for Economic Analysis and Forecasting (AEAF) with the fundamental 
assumption being that an unemployment rate of 10% corresponds to full employment. In line 
with the programme’s unemployment projection, the output gap diminishes gradually until 
potential output is reached in 2007. While the AEAF’s rather basic methodology may give rise 
to some caution as to the reliability of the estimates, it does not deviate much from the 
commonly estimated potential growth rate of about 5 % for Bulgaria. The PEP states that the 
work for model-based estimates of the output gap is ongoing in the AEAF.  
External sector 
In 2004, the current account deficit turned out at 7.4% of GDP. Assuming the continuation of 
strong imports, the trade deficit is projected to keep on deteriorating in absolute terms but to 
stabilise in relative terms at about 13½% of GDP in 2006/2007. Assuming the absence of major 
changes in other items, the current account deficit takes a similar development until 2006 
whereas in 2007 it is projected to drop to 7% of GDP (from 8% in 2006) because of the 
expected increase in EU transfers. Compared to the 2003 PEP, the projections for the current 
account deficit have more than doubled in nominal terms.  
External financing is expected to come to a large extent from net foreign direct investment 
(FDI) inflows peaking at 9.3% of GDP in 2004 and declining to 5.4% of GDP in 2007. Given 
that the privatisation process is likely to come to its end in 2005, it remains to be seen whether 
greenfield FDI of that order of magnitude is a realistic assumption. Positive net portfolio 
investment inflows are reflected in the projected increase in foreign debt in absolute terms. 
However, foreign debt decreases only slightly in relative terms to 66% to GDP in 2007, with 
public foreign debt accounting for less than half of it. The gap would be financed by falling 
foreign reserves in 2007. 
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3.3. Monetary and exchange rate policy 
Since 1997 Bulgaria is maintaining a currency board arrangement under which the Bulgarian 
currency (BGN, lev) is fixed at a rate of 1 EUR equals 1.95583 BGN by the Law of the 
Bulgarian National Bank (BNB). In September 2004 the BNB and in November 2004 the BNB 
jointly with the Government issued documents which outline the strategy towards the adoption 
of the euro. The declared objective is to apply for ERM II immediately after accession and to 
adopt the euro (including cash) in the second half of 2009 or on 1 January 2010, both at the 
present exchange rate of the currency board.  
In 2004, as in previous years, monetary aggregates have been growing at rates above 20% to 
remonetise the economy and are well covered by foreign exchange reserves. Bank credits to the 
non-financial sector kept on growing close to 50% year-on-year and achieved a ratio of 35% of 
GDP at the end of 2004. About 42% of all credits are in foreign currency, mostly euro, and 
33% are credits to households. This strong increase in financial intermediation became possible 
through the repatriation of domestic banks’ assets from abroad and foreign capital inflows 
induced by the positive interest rate differential. However, the PEP does not discuss the 
potential risks related to these developments with a view to banks’ capabilities of credit 
management and the resulting high imports. Precisely for these reasons, the BNB has 
introduced several measures throughout 2004 and again in early 2005 to reduce banks’ liquidity 
and to tighten supervision. 
COM PEP COM PEP COM PEP COM PEP COM PEP
 Real GDP (% change) 4.3 4.3 5.7 5.0 6.0 5.3 4.5 5.3 n. a. 5.5
 Contributions:
 - Final domestic demand 8.8 8.2 6.7 7.5 9.9 6.7 6.5 6.8 n. a. 7.1
 - Change in inventories 0.8 0.7 0.4 0.2 0.1 -0.6 0.0 -0.2 n. a. -0.2
- External balance of 
goods and services -7.1 -4.6 -1.4 -2.7 -4.0 -0.8 -2.0 -1.4 n. a. -1.4
 Employment (% change) 3.5 2.9 3.1 1.5 2.0 2.0 1.0 1.5 n. a. 1.5
 Unemployment rate (%) 13.6 13.7 12.0 12.4 10.8 11.6 10.0 10.7 n. a. 10.0
 GDP deflator (% change) 2.1 2.1 5.5 5.1 4.6 3.5 4.4 3.7 n. a. 4.0
 CPI inflation (%) 2.3 2.4 6.2 6.3 4.0 3.7 4.0 3.6 n. a. 4.0
 Current account balance 
(% of GDP) -9.3 -8.5 -7.4 -8.8 -8.5 -8.3 -7.0 -8.0 n. a. -7.0
Sources: Pre-Accession Economic Programme (PEP); Commission services Spring 2005 forecasts (COM)
Table 2: Comparison of macroeconomic developments and forecasts
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
 
Inflation is projected to remain below 4% in the years to come. If domestic demand continued 
to be strong in 2005 and growth to run above potential, this could be difficult to achieve, 
particularly under a fixed exchange rate peg regime, because of the induced pressure from 
prices of non-traded goods (Balassa-Samuelson effect). In 2006, even if growth were to 
moderate, this could still be challenging since contributions to consumer price inflation are 
calculated to be 2 percentage points from changes in administered prices and 1.1 percentage 
points from higher excise tax rates. 
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4. BUDGETARY TARGETS AND THE MEDIUM-TERM PATH OF THE PUBLIC FINANCES 
4.1. Programme overview 
The public finance framework is presented in a consistent way and is generally well explained. 
Explicit fiscal objectives are to keep the budget close to balance while gradually reducing the 
tax burden and streamlining expenditure on the basis of budgetary and structural reforms. 
However, this strategy is not maintained in 2007 when, due to EU accession, an increase in the 
deficit and the expenditure-to-GDP ratio is envisaged. Public debt is projected to decrease 
further, with an improved structure 
to reduce risks. Given that the 
macroeconomic scenario assumes 
actual growth to remain close to 
potential growth, the cyclically 
adjusted balance is mostly identical 
to the actual balance. Fiscal risks, 
which are mentioned to be related 
to reform progress in the social 
security system, health protection 
and fiscal decentralisation, are 
reduced by fiscal buffers and 
reserves in the order of 4% of GDP. 
Budget data are consolidated but 
not yet fully on an accrual basis as 
required by ESA 95 methodology. 
Budgetary targets for 2005 and 2006 are -0.5% and 0.0% of GDP and broadly following those 
of the 2003 PEP and the Commission’s spring 2005 forecast (see Chart 1). For 2007, a deficit 
of 1.3% of GDP and a nearly 3 percentage point increase in the expenditure-to-GDP ratio is 
deemed necessary because of EU accession. General government debt is targeted to decline to 
32.5% of GDP in 2007, more favourably than expected in the 2003 PEP. 
A recurrent pattern in 2003 and 2004 was the considerable revenue overrun. On the one hand, 
this conservative approach to revenue budgeting facilitates achieving the planned fiscal targets 
and supports credibility. On the other hand, it gives the government room for discretionary 
spending at the end of the year which impedes the objective of bringing down the tax burden 
and the expenditure-to-GDP ratio. As a result, the revenue-to-GDP ratio expected for 2004 in 
the 2004 PEP is 40.4% of GDP which compares to 37.5% foreseen in the 2003 PEP. 
The decrease by 2.2 percentage points of the revenue-to-GDP ratio between 2004 and 2005 is 
mostly brought about by a reduction of direct taxes and non-tax revenues while indirect taxes 
and external aid remain broadly stable relative to GDP (see Table 3). Thus, the implementation 
of the schedule for gradually bringing excise tax rates upwards to levels as required by the 
acquis is not expected to have a visible effect on revenues relative to GDP. In the context of the 
2005 budget, reductions in income tax rates were decided, but no further cuts in rates are 
foreseen until the end of the PEP period. In 2007, the increase in revenue of 1.8 percentage 
points of GDP is mostly related to external aid, i.e. EU funds. The foreseen reduction of 
expenditure relative to GDP by 2.1 percentage points between 2004 and 2006 is to a large 
extent resulting from decreases in wages and scholarships, maintenance and subsidies. The 
subsequent increase in 2007 by 3.1 percentage points arises from increases in expenditure on 
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
PEP 2002
PEP 2004
PEP 2003
Notification 2005
Chart 1:  Budgetary developments 
(general government balance, % of GDP)
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defence, subsidies, investment and others. For the period 2005 to 2007, expenditure is expected 
to correspond to ceilings set in last year’s medium-term framework for 2004 to 2006. The PEP 
mentions defence, education and healthcare as spending priorities where reforms are 
unfinished. Interest payments remain broadly stable relative to GDP since the reduction in debt 
is assumed to be compensated by an increase in interest rates. 
Change:
2004-07
Revenues 40.9 40.4 38.2 38.2 40.0 -0.4
of which:
- Taxes and social 
security contributions
32.3 32.3 30.8 31.1 31.2 -1.1
- Other (residual) 8.6 8.1 7.4 7.1 8.8 0.7
Expenditure 41.0 40.3 38.6 38.2 41.3 1.0
of which:
- Primary expenditure 38.9 38.1 36.5 35.9 39.1 1.0
of which:
Gross fixed capital 
formation
2.8 3.5 3.7 3.7 4.6 1.1
Consumption 10.3 9.9 9.6 9.4 9.5 -0.4
Transfers & subsidies 18.3 17.3 16.2 16.1 16.5 -0.8
Other (residual) 7.5 7.4 7.0 6.7 8.5 1.1
- Interest payments 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.3 2.3 0.2
Budget balance -0.1 0.1 -0.5 0.0 -1.3 -1.4
- Cyclically adjusted 0.7 0.2 -0.1 0.2 -1.3 -1.5
Primary balance 2.0 2.1 1.7 2.3 0.9 -1.2
Gross debt level 48.4 40.8 37.4 34.2 32.5 -8.3
Sources: Pre-Accession Economic Programme (PEP), ECFIN calculations
Table 3:  Composition of the budgetary adjustment  (% of GDP)
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
 
The PEP considers fiscal risks to be manageable. First, arrears accumulated by local 
governments and the health system amounted to 0.3% of GDP at the end of the first half of 
2004. Second, deficits in the social security system are covered by the central budget and 
should not have an immediate effect on the consolidated budget. Third, sensitivity to variations 
in the assumed inflation, interest and exchange rates is regarded as fairly small. These risks are 
reduced by on-going structural reforms and by the envisaged buffers in the central budget 
execution in the order of 4% of GDP. One of these buffers is the rule to spend only about 90% 
of the operational expenditure in the first three quarters of the year and to release the remaining 
part only if fiscal and economic performance developed as expected. Furthermore, there is a 
contingency and structural expenditures reserve of 0.6 to 0.8% of GDP which increases to 1.4% 
of GDP in 2007. 
In view of the considerable built-in flexibility of the budget, a significant deterioration of the 
deficit is unlikely to happen as long as the underlying macroeconomic framework materialises. 
Keeping the budget close to balance is adequate in order to avoid a further deterioration of the 
high current account deficit. However, the higher expenditure and deficit in 2007 involves the 
risk of being rather expansionary. 
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4.2. Targets and adjustment 
The budget year 2004 was characterised by higher revenues than projected, mostly because of 
strong economic activity and buoyant imports. At the middle of the year, the government 
agreed with the IMF to revise the initial target of a deficit of 0.7% of GDP to a balanced budget 
and, in case revenue overruns were even higher, not to spend more than 1% of GDP in addition 
to what was foreseen in the budget. In November 2004, the accumulated budget surplus (in 
cash terms) peaked at about 3.9% of GDP. The government decided some additional spending 
on pensions, health system, municipalities and a newly created public infrastructure projects 
company so that the cash surplus at the end of the year was 1.7% of GDP. Based on ESA 95 
methodology the consolidated surplus was slightly lower at 1.3% of GDP. 
The final decision for the adoption of the 2005 budget was taken by the Parliament on 17 
December 2004 and confirmed the PEP’s deficit target of 0.5% of GDP. Following negotiations 
in the Parliament to ensure a majority vote, modifications were made to the government’s draft 
budget, among others to foresee more expenditure on education and research, which increased 
revenue and expenditure by about 0.3% of GDP. The highest growth rates for expenditure are 
on social policy, healthcare and education. Along with the budget a number of changes in 
taxation were decided including a reduction of the corporate tax rate from 19.5% to 15% and of 
the personal income tax rates from a corridor of 12%-29% to 10%-24%, shorter depreciation 
periods as well as a shortening of the delay for VAT reimbursements for exporters from 45 to 
30 days. The expected impact of these measures on revenues is already taken into account and 
quantified in the PEP. Public sector wages are envisaged to increase by 5% on average at mid-
2005. Political risks to the 2005 budget arise from the national elections in June 2005 which 
will not only make it difficult for the current government to reject demands for further 
expenditure but could also make the budget subject to revisions by a new government. 
Following and agreement with the IMF, the Bulgarian government has in May 2005 revised its 
fiscal target for 2005 to a surplus of 1% of GDP, which will be financed through higher than 
originally expected revenues and cuts expenditures including on the public infrastructure 
projects company. Compared to 2004 this still implies a slight fiscal easing, albeit to a much 
lower extent than originally foreseen. 
The balanced budget in 2006 is similar in structure to the 2005 budget whereas the deficit of 
1.3% of GDP in 2007, if it were to result from EU accession, goes along with a substantial 
increase in the expenditure-to-GDP ratio. Avoiding the possibly adverse effects on inflation and 
current account deficit should be possible if more efforts were made to restructure the budget in 
2007 to adapt it to the budgetary effects of accession (see Box). 
4.3. Debt developments 
The debt-to-GDP ratio of general government is projected to decline from 48.4% in 2003 to 
32.5% in 2007. For the years 2004 to 2006 this is between 5 and 6 percentage points lower than 
the levels expected in the 2003 PEP. Following a buy-back of foreign debt in January 2005 (see 
below), general government debt has already dropped to about 36% of GDP. According to the 
2005 Fiscal Notification, general government debt is expected to decline to 33.4% by the end of 
2005. The main contributions to the change in debt ratio come from the primary balance and 
nominal GDP growth as well as, in 2004, exchange rate changes and privatisation receipts.  
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Budgetary effects of Bulgaria’s EU accession in 2007 
The PEP’s budget framework for 2007 is 
characterised by EU accession with assumed 
negative net budgetary effects of 2% of GDP 
and a deficit of 1.3% of GDP in 2007, following 
a balanced budget in 2006. Comparing the years 
2006 and 2007, the ratio of total expenditure to 
GDP increases from 38.2% to 41.3% of GDP, 
capital expenditure from 3.7% to 4.6%, 
subsidies from 1.2% to 1.9%, and “other” 
expenditure from 6.7% to 8.5%, whereas other 
items remain broadly constant. 
At first sight, this is difficult to reconcile with 
DG ECFIN’s estimates, presented in the table 
below, on the budgetary effects of Bulgaria’s 
accession in 2007.4 Starting point are the 
commitment appropriations and payment 
appropriations in current prices from 2007 to 
2009 as agreed in the accession negotiations. 
Payments are much lower than commitments to 
take account of possible absorption problems. 
However, payments from pre-accession 
assistance will continue and have been added 
here.5  
Bulgaria:  Budgetary effects of EU accession 
in 2007
  (in % of PEP-projected GDP)
Commit- 
ments Payments
Ccontribution to EU budget 1.1 1.1
EU transfers 4.7 4.3
of which:
- pre-accession aid 0.0 2.0
- Structural Funds 1.5 0.7
Net transfers 3.7 3.3
National co-financing 0.9 1.0
Source: DG ECFIN 
 
 
A main conclusion from these calculations is 
that net transfers from the EU budget to 
Bulgaria in 2007 will be sizeable and positive. 
Even if all potential “fiscal burdens” from 
accession (such as co-financing needs and 
Structural Funds additionality requirements) are 
taken into account, the net budgetary effect 
should still be positive in 2007.  
Arguing in the PEP for the need of a higher 
deficit in 2007 due to accession can therefore 
only hold in a static accounting approach in two 
ways. First, when the final beneficiary is non-
government, transfers from the EU budget are 
accounted outside the general government sector 
while they might sometimes require co-
financing from the government. Second, when 
the general government sector is the final 
beneficiary, they are accounted as fully 
additional expenditure, i.e. appearing on both 
the revenue and the expenditure side of the 
budget without substituting previously existing 
national programmes. In that way, the EU 
transfers have almost no effect on the balance, 
while the contribution to the EU budget and 
national co-financing of EU programmes have a 
negative effect.  
Notwithstanding this reasoning, which is 
broadly in line with Eurostat rules, the budget 
could be adequately restructured so that 
previously existing national expenditure is 
substituted by EU funds or used to co-finance 
EU programmes which are not subject to a strict 
“additionality” requirement. Then a positive 
budgetary effect in net terms should prevail and 
the expenditure-to-GDP ratio would not 
necessarily increase. 
 
                                                   
4
 A similar methodology was used for the ten new Member States by Hallet, M. (2004), ‘Fiscal effects of 
accession in the new Member States’, Economic Papers, No 203 (European Commission, Directorate-
General for Economic and Financial Affairs), Brussels, and by Hallet, M./ F. Keereman (2005): Budgetary 
transfers between the EU and the new Member States: manna from Brussels or a fiscal drag? ECFIN 
Country Focus Vol. 2, Issue 2 of 03.02.2005. 
5
 Pre-accession payments were assumed to amount to a quarter of the commitments foreseen in the roadmap 
for 2006 plus the payment appropriations included in the 2005 draft EU budget. 
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The government pursues an active debt management strategy to reduce the related risks. The 
share of domestic debt in total government debt increased by 1.9 percentage points to 13.6% 
and the external financing is envisaged to be negative until 2007 in order to further increase the 
domestic share also with a view to developing the non-banking capital market in Bulgaria. New 
foreign debt is only envisaged to refinance existing debt. An equal balance in currency structure 
USD/EUR and in floating/fixed interest rates has almost been achieved. The government 
guaranteed debt amounts to 6% of total government debt. The average maturity has been 
prolonged with the issuance of several 5 to 15 years government bonds over the last years.  
A specific feature of Bulgarian public finance is the fiscal reserve account (FRA) which is 
mostly held at the Central Bank and implies that government debt is much lower in net terms. 
Historically, it has been created in 1997 to function as a safety net for the currency board 
arrangement by which, in case of emergency, foreign debt obligations could be serviced for 
about one year. However, due to privatisation proceeds and the budget surpluses in the last 
years, it has reached 12.5% of projected GDP at the end of 2004. There are no clear legal 
guidelines for the use of the FRA except for a floor of BGN 2.5 million (about 6% of GDP) 
stipulated in the 2005 budget law. The 2004 PEP only mentions that the FRA “allows for the 
future financing to contribute to the attainment of the strategic objective of the debt 
management process rather than to provide resources for debt servicing” (p.64). This strategy 
was applied in July 2004 when the government used the FRA to finance a buy-back of all 
Brady discount (“DISC”) bonds of a nominal value of USD 680 million. In January 2005, the 
government bought back all interest arrears Brady bonds (“IAB”) of a nominal value of USD 
937.5 million financed by the FRA.6 This operation reduces gross public debt (and the FRA) by 
more than 3 percentage points compared to what is indicated in the PEP. This has improved the 
long-term sustainability of public finance without further stimulating domestic demand. 
However, the PEP could be a good platform to commit the government to a more explicit 
strategy for the use of the FRA in order to avoid its future depletion for an ad hoc-financing of 
additional public expenditure with potentially negative effects on macroeconomic stability. 
5. STRUCTURAL REFORMS 
5.1. Programme overview 
The PEP gives a good overview of reform progress in the past, but is incomplete on the planned 
reform agenda until 2007. The government considers structural reforms as an essential 
complement to its fiscal policy for achieving the objectives of sustained growth and stability 
while reducing the degree of intervention in the economy. In line with the previous PEP and to 
a large extent the conclusions on the economic criteria of the Commission’s 2004 Regular 
Report on Bulgaria, the finalisation of privatisation, reforms in the health and education 
systems as well as further liberalisation and restructuring of the network industries are 
considered to be the most important items on the reform agenda. 
Privatisation made significant progress in 2004 with the sale of the telecommunication 
company and the electricity distribution companies to foreign investors. Many minority state-
owned shares and smaller companies were privatised through the stock exchange. The largest 
                                                   
6
 The only Bulgarian Brady bonds remaining are the Front Loaded Interest Reduction Bonds (FLIRBs) of a 
nominal value of USD 648 million with a due date of 2012. 
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enterprises left for privatisation are in the energy and transport sectors as well as the tobacco 
company. Several measures were introduced to restructure the railway company which tends to 
make losses and to require subsidies. Liberalisation in the electricity sector made progress by 
implementing third party access for some large enterprises. Some reform measures were 
introduced in the health and education sectors but are still insufficient to substantially improve 
their efficiency. 
Table 4: Net direct budgetary impact of key reform commitments (in EUR million)
Description of the Policy 2004 2005 2006 2007
Changes in the corporate income tax -97
Changes in the personal income tax -60
Introduction of elements of family income taxation -63
Increase of excise tax rates 26
Introduction of the vignette system for the use of the road 
infrastructure
50
Completion of the privatisation process (reduction of 
dividends)
-43 -5
Reduction of active measures on the labour market 7 5
EU pre-accession funds (including national co-financing) -4 9 1
Increased social pension and minimum pension -87
Total impact on the budget (in EUR million) -172 -90 1
Total impact on the budget (in % of GDP)
-0.9 -0.4 0.0
Source: 2004 Pre-accession Economic Programme (PEP)
 
Although the matrix of political commitments on the budgetary effects of key reforms in each 
year is duly completed in the PEP, the main text refers only rarely to these estimates. From 
Table 4 the reform agenda might appear very front-loaded, but one has to take into account that 
measures will always be better known for year n+1 than for subsequent years. To some degree 
this might also reflect the fact that the heaviest reforms, many of them related to economic 
transition, are approaching their end. The reduction of income tax rates and the introduction of 
family income taxation will bring some losses in revenues. The completion of restructuring and 
privatisation of state-owned enterprises is expected to continue triggering important FDI 
inflows and to allow a further reduction of the already low level of state aid, but will also imply 
a phasing out of privatisation receipts and dividend payments. A general system of road 
charging on motorways is being introduced in 2005 after its introduction for trucks in 2004. In 
telecommunication, following the privatisation of the ex-monopoly in 2004, the liberalisation 
of the fixed-line sector continues as well as the award of a third GSM license and of 3 UMTS 
licenses in 2005 will bring more competition. In the energy sector the main measures are the 
further liberalisation in line with the acquis communautaire and the closing down of units 3 and 
4 of the Kozlodui nuclear power plant at the end of 2006. On the labour market the main focus 
is on active policies for long-term unemployed. An increase in pensions is expected to imply 
additional expenditure in 2005.  
The reform strategy is broadly in line with key objectives of the Lisbon agenda by improving 
the efficiency of product and capital markets. The progress in structural reforms has been 
important in bringing state aid relative to GDP down closer to the EU average (see table in the 
annex of this assessment). Of particular importance is the achieved and envisaged progress on 
the liberalisation of the network industries. Further reforms in the health and education systems 
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will be important not only to make public spending more efficient but also to enhance social 
cohesion and the transition to the knowledge-based society. The sound macroeconomic 
environment continues to improve the situation on the labour market. However, counter to the 
conclusions of the Ministerial Meeting on the 2003 PEP and those of the 2004 Regular Report, 
the 2004 PEP almost completely lacks measures aiming to increase the flexibility of the labour 
market. 
5.2. Product and capital markets 
The process of privatisation, which was the most important contribution to enterprise 
restructuring and the reduction of government intervention in the economy, is approaching its 
end. At the end of November 2004 there were 95 majority state-owned enterprises left for sale, 
after 2.878 had been sold. Privatised assets amounted to 86.95 % of the state owned assets 
estimated in 1993 and due to privatization in the medium term. Following the renewed failure 
to privatise the main part of the tobacco monopoly Bulgartabac, about 20 companies from the 
tobacco, energy and transport sectors are the largest ones remaining for privatisation. Among 
the smaller ones still to be privatised are companies offering specific services or products such 
as road maintenance and repair, defence industry enterprises, special commercial and service 
enterprises. In the first nine months of 2004, the private sector accounted for 77% of gross 
value added. 
Competition policy, which is mostly under the responsibility of the Commission for the 
Protection of Competition, was further strengthened by a number of measures. New 
implementing rules on state aid were adopted in May 2004. A national plan for the restructuring 
of the steel industry was decided which limits permitted state aid to the steel sector until 2007. 
A new law on public procurement and implementing rules were adopted in October 2004 
which, among others, foresee the creation of a public register and an agency to enhance 
transparency. 
The main objectives of the energy strategy are security, competitiveness and environment 
protection. A full participation in the regional energy market of South-Eastern Europe and in 
the common energy market of the EU after accession is envisaged. Measures for increasing 
energy efficiency and saving will be implemented. The restructuring of the energy sector has 
progressed further and the regulatory framework is mostly in place. Laws on energy, energy 
efficiency and secondary legislation were adopted in 2004. The last step of energy price 
increases in order to achieve cost recovery was made in summer 2004. The unbundling of gas 
and electricity transmission will be implemented according to the acquis calendar. Public and 
private investment in energy projects amounts to € 2.3 billion until 2007. However, no mention 
is made in the PEP of the expected effects of the foreseen closure of units 3 and 4 of the 
Kozlodui nuclear power plant before the end of 2006 and of the financing of a new nuclear 
power plant in Belene. 
In the transport sector, preparations are being made for granting concessions for the airports in 
Burgas and Varna as well as for sea and river ports. The restructuring of the railway company 
progressed by institutionally separating track, passenger and freight services and by reducing 
staff and railroads. Subsidies to the railway company are granted in the framework of an 
agreement for the provision of public services. A first license to a private freight railway 
operator was attributed in 2004. A road vignette system was introduced for trucks in 2004 and 
for light automobiles in 2005. 
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In the telecommunication sector, the privatisation of the ex-monopoly Bulgarian 
Telecommunication Company (BTC) triggered its restructuring. There is increasing 
competition in fixed-phone services through interconnection agreements with BTC and other 
cable investors. A third provider of GSM mobile phone services, for which BTC received a 
license in 2004, will enter the market in 2005. A change in ownership of the currently leading 
mobile phone provider is expected in 2005. The procedure for granting three UMTS licenses 
started at the end of 2004 and should be completed in early 2005 so that services are expected 
to start in 2007. The information society is promoted by a national research network, training 
measures, e-government measures and ICT centres across the country. 
The banking sector shows a very dynamic development on the basis of its small size and 
fragmented structure. Total assets were 55.7% of GDP by mid-2004 and increased by 16% 
year-on-year while the stock of credits to non-financial corporations and households keeps on 
growing by a rate of close to 50% year-on-year. The Central Bank (BNB) prepares the 
payments system for its nearing integration into euro area system. It introduced banking 
supervision measures to restrain the high credit growth and to align with EU banking 
legislation. 
The non-banking financial sector is a much less important for financial intermediation than the 
banking sector. The stock exchange index SOFIX reached new record highs in 2004 and 
increased by 40% between the beginning and the end of the year. Stock exchange turnover was 
dominated by trade in compensatory notes and privatisation-related shares. At the beginning of 
2005, the government brought its nearly 35% share of BTC to the stock exchange against 
compensatory notes. The PEP forecasts market capitalisation and turnover of the stock 
exchange to develop in line with GDP and to remain at about 9% and 2% of GDP respectively. 
Insurance premiums have increased to 2.2% of GDP and pension funds to 1.7% of GDP. The 
transposition of EU insurance directives into national legislation will be completed by the end 
of 2005. 
5.3. Labour market 
The medium-term objectives of the employment strategy 2004-2010 are to increase 
employment and to reduce unemployment, and the longer-term objective is to enhance 
economic activity and human resource development. An active labour market policy is being 
implemented to prevent long-term unemployment for disadvantaged groups and social 
exclusion. The National Action Plan focussed on vocational training and life-long learning. 
Contrary to recommendations, recent changes in the Labour Code regulating for example the 
stability of employment contracts in the case of a change in enterprise ownership and equalising 
the rights and obligations of part-time/temporary employees to those of full-time/permanent 
employees failed to increase labour market flexibility. The authorities intend to conduct a study 
on labour market flexibility whose results will be reflected in the 2005 Action Plan on 
Employment. The impact of the increase of the minimum wage by 25% from BGN 120 to BGN 
150 at the beginning of 2005 is not analysed in the PEP, for example with a view to direct 
employment effects or indirect effects through a spillover into excessive wage demands in other 
sectors beyond productivity growth. 
In education, the need for a more substantial reform is only partly met by some measures. A 
new mandatory pre-school year and a 13th grade in vocational secondary schools were 
introduced in 2003/2004. Educational requirements and national examinations in vocational 
training have to comply with newly defined curricula. Delegated budgets will be introduced in 
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all schools until 2009. A strategy for the development of higher education until 2010 has been 
adopted to improve financing and accounting in higher education in 2006 and 2007. Quota of 
students according to the needs of the labour market will be applied in 2007. A credit point 
system is effective in higher schools since 2004. 
5.4. Other reform areas 
The strategy for administrative reform 2003-2006 is focussed on preparations for EU accession. 
It includes an increase in public sector staff, recruitment based on competitions, merit-based 
career development and a wider use of one-stop-shops. Five out of 20 e-government services 
recommended by the EU have been implemented. Furthermore, it is foreseen to develop the 
administrative capacity of the six planning regions to manage Structural Funds. Efforts on 
judicial reform and the fight against corruption are continuing. In the context of fiscal 
decentralisation, transfers from central to local government will be made for responsibilities in 
education, healthcare, culture, social welfare, defence and security, and administration. At the 
same time, the enhanced local autonomy on services will go along with the obligation to 
finance them by own revenues. 
In order to facilitate transactions on the land market, a consolidated cadastre database started to 
operate at regional level. A more pro-active government intervention for land consolidation is 
planned. A main element of the 2005-2014 environmental strategy is the integration of 
environmental concerns into other sector policies. 
Further clarification on the part of the proposal that concentrated on agricultural land reform 
with a view to addressing the issue of land fragmentation would have been useful. The report 
focused on preparations for SAPARD but it lacked information on problem areas in agriculture 
and rural areas which needed to be addressed in the measures proposed. Furthermore, 
quantitative information on the overall spending for agriculture and rural development could 
have been provided. 
Since the submission of the PEP, the Commission and Bulgaria have signed a 'Joint Inclusion 
Memorandum' which sets out the main challenges and policy priorities in the fields of social 
protection and social inclusion including the commitment to concrete follow-up actions as 
regards for example labour market policy, education, or measures for vulnerable and 
disadvantaged groups. 
6. THE QUALITY AND SUSTAINABILITY OF PUBLIC FINANCES 
6.1. The quality of public finances 
On the revenue side, the recent overruns indicate that reforms in the customs service and the tax 
administration are effective. In 2006, the National Revenue Agency (NRA), which has so far 
only two regional pilot offices, should become fully operational and will be authorised to 
collect all revenues of central government, local governments, social security institute and 
health insurance fund. This is expected to enhance the efficiency of revenue collection.  
On the expenditure side, the programming budgeting methodology, which is currently applied 
only in some Ministries, will be introduced in all primary-level budget spending units in 2007 
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and the budget execution will then be fully on an accrual basis. Capital expenditure is estimated 
to have increased from 2.8% of GDP in 2003 to 3.5% of GDP in 2004 and projected to remain 
around that level until in 2006.  In 2007, also due to the inflow of EU funds, a share of 4.6% of 
GDP is targeted. In the area of human capital, rather high growth rates are expected for 
expenditure on education and research, although from a low base, so that its share relative to 
GDP remains low by international comparison (see table in the annex of this assessment). 
The reduction in public sector employment, largely due to the process of privatisation, tends to 
go along with substantial increases in employment in public administration. While reforms in 
the public administration, also to prepare for EU accession, may require new staff, they should 
not necessarily go along with net increases in employment in public administration but rather 
be accompanied by reductions elsewhere. According to Table 2 on labour market developments 
in Appendix 1 (p.118), public sector employment has decreased by 3.5% in 2003 and 2004 
respectively and will continue decreasing by 3% each year from 2005 to 2007. In line with this 
projection, Table 8 on expenditure of the consolidated state budget (p.59) shows a gradual 
decline of wages and scholarships from 5.2% in 2003 to 3.9% in 2007. However, Appendix 9 
on administrative reform (p.156) mentions that “in 2003, statistics showed an increase of the 
scope of the civil service by 10.3% on a year-to-year basis” and that on “1 April 2004, 8353 
new positions at the central and regional administration were designated for civil servants”. 
Data from the Bulgarian National Statistical Institute indicate that in December 2003 there were 
2.8% more employees in the public sector and 13.4% more employees in public administration 
than one year earlier; the corresponding figures for December 2004 are -5.4% and 7.4%.  
6.2. The sustainability of public finances 
Bulgaria has already implemented and plans further measures to improve the long-term 
sustainability of public finances. Provided their full implementation and given the achievement 
of the programme’s reform agenda and fiscal consolidation, Bulgaria is relatively well placed to 
meet the costs of a rapidly ageing population. Nevertheless, developments in relation to the 
reform of the pension and health-care systems need to be monitored carefully.  
Table 9 of Appendix 1 (p.126) gives a projection of the long-term sustainability of public 
finances, however without giving further methodological explanations in the main text. Total 
general government expenditure and revenues are projected to decline to 36% of GDP in 2020 
and to remain at this value until 2050. This is achieved by bringing pension payments down 
from 7.7% of GDP in 2005 to below 5% of GDP and stabilising healthcare and interest 
payments at 5% and 2% of GDP respectively. Pension contributions would be stabilised at 
about 4½% of GDP. Main assumptions are a gradual decrease of growth rates of real GDP and 
labour productivity and an increase in participation rates of those 15 and older from 51.5% in 
2005 to 57.2% in 2050 going along with a stabilisation of the unemployment rate at 5% from 
2030 onwards. 
A main objective of social security reform is an improvement in the financial stability of the 
system. Efforts for higher collection rates with a view to the sizeable shadow economy have 
been made through a reinforcement of the obligation to register employment contracts and 
through assumed minimum incomes by sector to calculate social security contributions. A 
gradual shift of the employer/employee shares is made from 70%/30% in 2005, to 65%/35% in 
2006 and 60%/40% in 2007. 
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For the three-pillar pension system the aim is to stabilise the first (compulsory) pillar and to 
further develop the second (supplementary) and third (voluntary) pillars. The supplementary 
pension funds (universal, occupational, voluntary) are forecast to double their assets between 
2004 and 2007 from € 376 million to € 746 million which is, relative to the PEP-projected 
GDP, from 1.9% to 3.0%. The successive increase of eligibility requirements on age and length 
of service to become eligible for pensions is continuing. 
Contributions to the National Health Insurance Fund (NHIF) will increase from 6% in 2005 to 
8% in 2006 to make a gradual shift of healthcare financing from central government to the 
contribution-financed health insurance fund between 2004 and 2007 while keeping health 
expenditure stable at 4.3% of GDP. Table 8 on expenditures of the consolidated state budget 
(p. 59) indicates NIHF expenditure of 2.2% of GDP in 2003 and 2004, of 2.0% of GDP in 2005 
and of 2.8% of GDP in 2006 and 2007. The new law on healthcare became effective at the 
beginning of 2005 which aims to reduce abuses of the system. A core part of healthcare reform 
is a more standardised cost calculation for medical services in a move towards activity-based 
payments and improved transparency and accounting. Hospitals are still a main problem of 
financing since most of them are not yet privatised and accumulating debt.  
 
* * * 
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Annex table 1: Structural indicators
BULGARIA EU 25
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
General economic background
Real GDP 1 5.4 4.1 4.9 4.5 5.6 3.7 1.8 1.1 1.0 2.3
Labour productivity 2 9.2 7.8 3.3 1.0 2.4 2.1 0.8 0.8 0.8 1.8
Real unit labour cost 3 -5.4 0.8 -0.8 5.5 -0.7 0.4 0.4 -0.4 -0.5 -0.9
Real effective exchange rate 4 96.5 103.7 105.8 109.0 113.3 98.7 100.5 103.0 106.1 108.8
Inflation rate 5 10.3 7.4 5.8 2.3 6.1 2.4 2.5 2.1 1.9 2.1
Unemployment rate 6 16.9 19.8 17.8 13.7 12.0 8.6 8.4 8.7 8.9 9.0
Employment
Employment rate 7 50.4 49.7 50.6 52.5 54.2 62.5 62.9 62.9 63.0 63.3
Employment rate - females 8 46.3 46.8 47.5 49.0 50.6 53.7 54.3 54.7 55.1 55.8
Employment rate of older workers 9 20.8 24.0 27.0 30.0 32.5 36.6 37.4 38.8 40.2 40.5
Long-term unemployment 10 9.4 11.9 11.7 8.9 7.1 3.9 3.8 3.9 4.0 4.1
Product market reforms 
Relative price levels 11 37.9 39.6 41.6 42.1 : 100 100 100 100 100
Total trade-to-GDP ratio 12 42.9 43.5 41.8 43.9 48.1 : 9.7 9.2 9.0 9.4
Total FDI inflows 13 8.0 5.9 5.8 10.3 8.4 16.0 7.6 8.3 6.1 3.9
Market share electricity 14 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Sectoral and ad-hoc state aids 15 0.7 0.5 0.2 0.5 : 0.3 0.3 0.3 : :
Business investment 16 12.1 14.7 15.3 16.5 17.8 18.4 17.9 17.2 16.8 17.0
Knowledge-based economy
Tertiary graduates 17 38.1 41.4 44.1 n.a. n.a. 43.2 47.0 49.0 52.2 n.a.
Spending on human resources 18 4.41 3.53 3.57 n.a. n.a. 4.9 5.1 5.2 n.a. n.a.
Educational attainment 19 74.9 78.2 77.5 75.6 76.0 76.4 76.2 76.5 76.6 76.7
R&D expenditure 20 0.52 0.47 0.49 0.50 n.a. 1.88 1.92 1.93 1.95 n.a.
Internet access 21 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 10.0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 42.0
Source:  Commission services.
1. Growth rate of real GDP in %.  2. Growth rate of real GDP per person employed in %.  3. Ratio of compensation per employee to 
nominal GDP per person employed, total economy, annual percentage change.  4. Vs IC36 (1999 = 100), current year's values are based on 
Commission's forecast deflator figures, nominal unit labour cost deflator.  5. Annual average rate of change in Interim Harmonized Indices 
of Consumer Prices (HICPs).  6. Unemployed persons as a share of the total active population.  7. Employed persons aged 15-64 in % of 
total population of the same age group. 8. Employed women aged 15-64 in % of total female population of the same age group. 9. Employed 
persons aged 55-64 in % of total population of the same age group.  10. Long-term unemployed (over 12 months) in % of total active 
population aged 15-64.   
f: forecast, e: estimated value, p: provisional value, b: break in series, s: Eurostat estimate, r: revised value, q: estimated from quarterly 
values.
11. Of private final consumption (EU25=100). 12. average value of imports and exports of goods and services in % o GDP; the value for 
EU 15 is the total for the Small Member States. 13. In % of GDP. 14. Market share of the largest generator (% of total net generation). 15. 
In % of GDP. 16. Gross fixed capital formation by the private sector in % of GDP.  17.Total tertiary graduates (ISCED 5-6) per 1000 of 
population aged 20-29. 18. Public expenditure on education in % of GDP. 19. Percentage of the population aged 20 to 24 having completed 
at least upper secondary education. 20. GERD (Gross domestic expenditure on R&D) - in % of GDP. 21. Percentage of households who 
have Internet access at home.
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PRE-ACCESSION ECONOMIC PROGRAMME OF ROMANIA 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Romania submitted its 2004 Pre-Accession Economic (PEP) on 30 November 2004, covering 
the period 2004-07. A new Government took office in December 2004 and against the 
background of its adoption of a major tax reform, Romania submitted a new 2004 PEP on 18 
February 2005. The programme was elaborated by the National Commission for Economic 
Forecasting in view of key policy documents in relation to Romania’s EU accession and in co-
operation with ministries and other public institutions. Social partners and NGO’s were 
consulted, and the programme was approved by the Government, who considers it a forerunner 
of Romania’s future convergence programme.   
The programme broadly complies with the requirements of the consolidated outline for the 
2004 PEP in terms of content, form and data. The PEP provides evidence of progress in the 
analytic capacity of the authorities, albeit the lack of cyclically adjusted budget balances, the 
scarce analysis of the long-term sustainability of public finances and limited quantified 
estimates of the impact of key fiscal and structural measures point to room for further 
improvement. The programme provides a factually correct summary of recent macroeconomic 
performance with due emphasis on unexpected developments and sets out a sufficiently 
comprehensive and broadly consistent macroeconomic framework. The programme presents its 
medium-term fiscal and other policy objectives and provides a detailed account of ongoing 
structural reforms in product, capital and labour markets in the light of EU-integration. The 
PEP is, however, yet to give a fully adequate and lucid illustration of the interplay between 
structural reform and fiscal and wage policies, in particular as the actual instruments are not 
concisely described and no clear timetable set. The programme follows the requested format 
and provides largely complete tables, which are in all but a few cases correctly compiled. The 
increased use of ESA 95 data compared to last year’s submission is evidence to the gradual 
alignment to the requirements of EU accession, although further efforts are warranted to ensure 
that fully compatible ESA 95 data become a main reference for fiscal analysis before the time 
of Romania’s accession.  
The programme’s strategy is centred on continued macroeconomic stabilisation and further 
structural reforms. The main fiscal policy instruments would consist in a significant relaxation 
of income, profit and social security taxation combined with strengthened tax collection, 
broader tax base and an efficiency enhancing expenditure policy. The general government 
budget deficit would stay under control and quasi-fiscal subsidies further reduced. Monetary 
policy would aim at sustainable disinflation via the implementation of an inflation targeting 
regime, progressive reduction of the interest rate level and increased flexibility of the exchange 
rate, while wage policy would support disinflation and competitiveness. The structural reform 
agenda consists of the continuation of a broad array of initiatives in order to enable Romania to 
cope with the competitive pressure and market forces within the EU. 
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2. JOINT OPINION 
On 12 July 2005 the ECOFIN Ministers of the present Member States and the Acceding 
Countries examined the 2004 Pre-Accession Economic Programme of Romania on the 
basis of an assessment prepared by the Commission Services with a contribution from the 
ECB and adopted this joint opinion. 
Ministers commend Romania for progress made in reforming its economy and in reducing 
macroeconomic imbalances.  They highlight the rapid fall in inflation, which is supported 
by an appropriate monetary policy, and the positive role that fiscal policy has played in 
achieving lasting economic stability.  They emphasise that the current strong recovery 
creates favourable conditions for accelerating structural reforms and addressing 
Romania's fiscal challenges.  They call for caution in the policy mix in order to ensure that 
high domestic demand and strong real appreciation will not jeopardise the sustainability of 
the external balance. Maintaining a focus on enhanced price stability and further 
disinflation is of the utmost importance in the coming years. 
Ministers note that Romania’s fiscal policy strategy, as outlined in the PEP, is pro-cyclical 
and surrounded by a series of important downside risks. They note that the considerable 
cuts in income and corporate profit tax are only partly financed. They welcome that 
revenue raising measures were adopted in April 2005 and that the revised 2005 budget 
brings important changes to the fiscal policy framework presented in the PEP, which would 
limit the pro-cyclical impact of initial reforms and support the continued embedding of 
Romania’s economic policy in an IMF programme framework, which however also requires 
further revenue increasing measures and a prudent public sector wage policy for the 2006 
budget.  In view of Romania’s experience, they acknowledge the merits of strengthening the 
supply side conditions of the economy in the medium term, notably by reducing non-wage 
labour costs.  At the same time, they express concern about the risk of a larger than 
projected adverse impact of the fiscal reform on revenues and encourage the Romanian 
authorities to implement additional measures to permanently strengthen the revenue base. 
They advise a cautious approach to estimating the positive effects from rate cuts on the tax 
base and a further use of quantified estimates for fiscal policy analysis.  They also 
underline the scope for further improvements in revenue collection.  Given the needs for 
public investment aimed at strengthening the economy’s growth potential and preparing for 
EU accession, they support the envisaged restraint of current expenditures and subsidies 
and consider that a clear medium-term expenditure framework could contribute to 
redirecting public expenditure towards human capital, infrastructure and administrative 
capacity, and they note that absorption capacity of EU transfers should be strengthened.  
In light of the ageing of the population, the structural imbalance of the public pension 
system and the expected increase in health expenditure, Ministers urge Romania to 
increasingly focus on the long-term sustainability of its public finances and develop a 
comprehensive strategy for reforming the pension system with the twofold purpose of 
improving its financial sustainability and providing an adequate pension level. Ministers 
note that the Romanian authorities have accelerated the reform preparation process and 
moved forward the initial date for the implementation of the second pension pillar. 
Ministers call for strong efforts to further reduce quasi-fiscal subsidies stemming from the 
financing requirement of state-owned enterprises, implicit subsidies provided via the energy 
sector and the accumulation of tax arrears.  Ministers note the additional measures taken 
by the Government, as envisaged in the PEP, to reduce the tax arrears. A vigorous 
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implementation of sector reforms, in particular for energy, mining, transport and 
agriculture, remains crucial for strengthening Romania’s competitiveness and preparing 
Romania’s accession to the EU. They also urge Romania to vigorously pursue reforms in 
the labour and product markets, which are crucial for enhancing the growth potential.  
They welcome the amendment of the Labour Code and emphasise the need to constantly 
increase the employment and participation rate, among other by improving flexibility in the 
labour market and limit entry into disability and early retirement schemes.  Ministers 
welcome the measures in favour of the development of the private sector but stress the need 
for additional action to improve the investment climate, in particular by addressing 
remaining weaknesses in governance and administrative capacity. 
Finally, Ministers note Romania’s progress since last year in developing the institutional 
and analytical capacity required to participate in EMU. However, they recommend 
Romania to intensify its efforts to ensure that fully compatible ESA 95 data will 
progressively become a main reference for fiscal analysis before the time of Romania’s 
accession to the EU. 
3. MACROECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS 
3.1. Recent macroeconomic developments 
The programme presents a factually correct overview of economic developments in 2003 and 
the first three quarters of 2004, albeit both years’ higher than expected public expenditure 
growth appears to be only partially explained. Concerning 2004, the document makes use of all 
relevant national account, external trade and current account data available at the time of 
revising the 2004, but could have benefited from a full update with regard to the budget 
execution. Compared to last year, the presented data gives more emphasis to monetary 
variables, current and capital account developments, which is welcomed. 
In 2003, Romania’s four-year economic recovery continued, as real GDP grew by 5.2%. 
However, growth was increasingly unbalanced and mainly driven by domestic demand. 
Household consumption rose strongly by 7.2% driven by surging consumer credit and high 
wage growth. With a real growth of 4.6%, government consumption also expanded 
considerably. Gross fixed capital formation increased rapidly at 9.1%, pointing to the ongoing 
replacement of Romania’s capital stock. The strong domestic demand led to a sustained import 
growth of 16.4%, while export growth decelerated, reaching 11.4% for the year. Consequently, 
net exports turned strongly negative, and the current account deficit widened to 6.0% of GDP. 
For 2004, preliminary figures show that GDP grew by 8.3%. Growth was driven by a further 
strengthening of household consumption, growing by 10.8%, and by strong gross fixed capital 
formation, growing by 10.1%. Public consumption recorded an annual growth rate of 4.6%. 
Although exports accelerated in 2004 to a growth rate of 14.1%, they continued to be outpaced 
by rapid import growth of 17.8% due to higher demand for both consumer and investment 
goods. As a result, net exports contributed negatively to real growth by 2.8% of GDP. The trade 
deficit widened further to 9.0% of GDP and the current account deficit increased to 7.5% of 
GDP.  
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2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Real GDP growth COM 5.2 8.3 5.5 5.1 n. a.
(% change) PEP 5.2 8.3 6.0 6.1 6.3
Consumer price COM 15.3 11.9 8.2 6.5 n. a.
inflation (%) PEP 15.3 11.9 8.1 6.0 4.4
General government COM -2.0 -1.4 -2.4 -2.6 n. a.
balance (% of GDP) PEP -2.0 -1.3 -0.7 -0.9 -1.9
Primary balance COM n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a.
(% of GDP) PEP -0.3 0.1 0.7 0.3 -0.8
Government gross COM 21.3 18.5 19.1 19.6 n. a.
debt (% of GDP) PEP 21.0 18.4 17.5 19.0 19.8
Table 1:  Comparison of key macroeconomic and budgetary projections
 
3.2. Macroeconomic scenario 
The programme’s strategic goal is restated as being the continued restructuring of the economy 
in order to enable Romania to cope with the competitive pressures and market forces within the 
European Union. A broad array of priority objectives related to both continued macroeconomic 
stabilisation and deepened structural reforms is listed. Among these, the improved functioning 
of markets, the transition towards a knowledge-based economy and the promotion of 
environmentally and socially sustainable economic growth are new priorities. Moreover, the 
2004 programme sets inflation reduction and an incomes policy sustaining disinflation as 
priority targets. This is an improvement compared to the 2003 PEP, where these objectives 
were treated as hypotheses underpinning the macroeconomic scenario. Due, probably, to the 
extended list of priorities, the programme is not succinct in presenting the key instruments 
envisaged, in particular in relation to the structural reform agenda. Concerning macroeconomic 
stabilisation, main fiscal policy instruments would be a significant relaxation of income, profit 
and social security taxation combined with strengthened tax collection, broader tax base and an 
efficiency enhancing expenditure policy. The general government budget deficit would stay 
under control and quasi-fiscal subsidies be further reduced. Monetary policy will aim at 
sustainable disinflation via the implementation of an inflation targeting regime, progressive 
reduction of the interest rate level and increased flexibility of the exchange rate. A restrictive 
wage policy remains the third stabilisation instrument emphasised, but although the programme 
stresses the need for a prudent wage policy to compensate for the pro-cyclical fiscal policy, 
some of the concrete steps foreseen seem to suggest a somewhat looser incomes policy than in 
last year’s submission. 
One macroeconomic framework is presented, which is sufficiently comprehensive and gives a 
useful and broadly consistent overview of demand and supply side developments over the 
programme period. Based on an improved production function methodology, the framework 
focuses more on the sources of potential GDP growth than in previous submissions. While 
clearly adding to the analytical dimension of the programme, the potential growth path seems at 
the same time to have determined the forecasted GDP growth, thereby implicitly assuming that 
domestic demand and inflation pressures will moderate over the period. Hence, the coherence 
between the macroeconomic scenario presented and the policy-mix outlined is only partial, in 
particular in relation to the effect of fiscal relaxation on domestic demand as well as the 
considerable real wage growth foreseen, which due to the positive effect of income tax cuts on 
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net wages and on the back of a rapid increase in the minimum wage would show an annual 
average growth of more than 8% during 2004-07. The programme to some extent recognises 
this by making clear that an accelerated implementation of the structural reform agenda is an 
essential prerequisite for the consistency of the framework. In the light of this, a more explicit 
and quantified analysis of structural measures to reduce the broad public sector deficit, 
including stricter enforcement of tax claims, reduction of losses in state-owned enterprises and 
energy price adjustments, would have added to the framework.  
Relative to last year’s PEP, three major revisions have occurred. First, growth is over the entire 
programme period more unbalanced as domestic demand is revised significantly upwards, in 
particular due to higher household consumption, while net exports display a stronger negative 
contribution to GDP. Secondly, the private sector savings-investment balance is expected to be 
significantly more negative while the public sector savings-investment balance is expected to 
be significantly less negative over the programme period. This revision is in line with 
developments over the last two years and seems indeed plausible, although the underlying 
factors for the downward revision of the private sector’s savings ratio, such as high credit 
growth and pent-up consumer demand in large segments of the population, are not well 
explained. Thirdly, both imports and exports are expected to grow at nearly twice the rate 
foreseen in the 2003 PEP. Stronger import growth is explained mainly by the upwards 
adjustment of domestic demand compared to last year’s submission, while stronger exports are 
explained by higher external demand, the positive effects on exports from increasing FDI, 
export promotion measures and the lower profit tax. While it is realistic that foreign trade will 
grow at double-digit rates, the programme correctly underscores that the projected real 
appreciation accentuates the need for continued productivity gains to maintain competitiveness.  
The external outlook underpinning the macroeconomic framework seems appropriate, albeit no 
table on the programme’s external assumptions is provided. Based on a stronger momentum of 
the EU economic recovery, accelerating world economic activity and rising commodity prices, 
it is in line with the Commission Autumn 2004 forecast. Although the decision of the central 
bank to pursue a more flexible exchange rate policy by abandoning the pre-announced target 
for the real exchange rate’s appreciation and limiting forex market interventions may make the 
nominal exchange rate largely unpredictable, some further mentioning of the expected nominal 
and/or real exchange rate path against the euro would have been appropriate. In spite of a 
significant nominal appreciation of the currency since Autumn 2004 and the expectation of 
continued strong capital inflows, the programme expects the average nominal exchange rate in 
2005 to remain at the end-2004 level 
Real sector 
For the period 2005-2007, the programme forecasts continued strong GDP growth of above 6% 
annually, which is driven both by domestic demand and by a considerable reduction in the 
negative contribution from net exports. Domestic demand is expected to gradually moderate 
over the programme period, but remains strong on the back of a solid 6.3% average real growth 
of household consumption and buoyant investment growth, which is expected to expand by 
close to 13% annually. Real government expenditure is seen to grow by an average 2.3% 
annually, which is half the rate recorded in 2003 and 2004. In line with the PEP’s overall 
objective of ensuring a positive contribution of the external sector to economic growth, the 
substantial negative contribution to GDP growth from the external balance observed in 2003-04 
declines gradually over the programme period against the background of sustained export 
growth and more tempered import growth. 
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On the supply side, the macroeconomic outlook foresees particularly high growth in the 
construction sector, averaging 11% over the programme period, which, in view of expected 
gains in households’ disposable income and enterprises’ net profits, improved access to 
mortgage credits and growing consumer and business confidence, is plausible. High activity is 
also expected in the services sector, which is forecasted to grow by 6.5% on average, while real 
agricultural production growth will hover below 3% annually. Overall, industrial production 
will continue to underpin economic growth, although the programme plausibly predicts that the 
structural adjustment process in certain sectors, such as mining and energy production, may 
take a short-term toll on industrial production, which would therefore be marginally below 
GDP growth. 
The PEP foresees higher participation and employment rates and gradually falling 
unemployment. Working-age employment growth is positive and seen as determined by private 
sector employment growth, and by the effect from lay-offs caused by the restructuring of state-
owned enterprises and lower public employment. Mainly due to a higher employment rate, the 
ILO unemployment rate is expected to fall moderately. Labour productivity is seen to grow 
broadly in line with GDP. Although labour market trends should be interpreted with caution as 
data are affected by revisions, changing methodology and the existence of a large informal 
sector, the expected development in participation and employment rates seems out of line with 
past developments. The programme explains this discrepancy by the positive demand and 
supply effects from lower income and corporate taxation. 
The macroeconomic outlook is largely in line with the Commission Spring 2005 forecast, 
which seem, however, to take into account a stronger effect on the external balance of the 
expected real appreciation of the ‘leu’ following the change in exchange rate policy, while it 
does not incorporate a noticeable slow down of public consumption growth as in the case of the 
PEP. Bearing in mind the advantages of a cautious fiscal strategy in relation to the 
macroeconomic scenario, the discussion of an alternative scenario consisting of even stronger 
domestic demand and a larger negative contribution from external trade to GDP could have had 
its merits, not least in highlighting the role of a prudent fiscal policy in improving the domestic 
savings-investment balance. 
Compared to last year’s PEP, the programme’s projections of sources of growth are based on an 
improved production function methodology, which has been elaborated in line with the work of 
the Economic Policy Committee. This analytical approach yields optimistic projections of an 
average 7.4% potential GDP growth during 2004-07, explained by an increasing capital stock 
and higher total factor productivity. Contrary to what has been observed hitherto, labour will no 
longer subtract from potential growth. Given the steady decline in participation rate since the 
mid-1990’s, the programme’s assumption of an increasing participation rate and stable potential 
employment over the programme period appears, however, questionable. The labour force may 
well fall more rapidly than projected in the PEP, not least as the programme also stresses the 
need for further privatisation and restructuring in the enterprise sector, which has until now 
been associated with many people leaving the labour force when becoming redundant. 
Projecting potential employment on the basis of a declining participation rate in line with actual 
developments since 1995 would yield a negative contribution from labour to potential GDP 
growth in the order of ½-1% of GDP. Under this assumption, the absence in the PEP of a 
positive output gap over the programme period would no longer hold as actual GDP would 
exceed potential GDP from 2005.  
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External sector 
In line with the expectation of high private consumption and investment activity, the 
programme foresees a lasting trade deficit over the period, gradually declining however from 
9.2% of GDP in 2004 to 8.5% in 2007. Such narrowing of the trade deficit contrasts with the 
Commission Spring 2005 forecast, which expected a continued widening to above 10% of GDP 
until 2006. This discrepancy is only partly explained by the forecasts’ different exchange rate 
assumptions and trade volumes. Presumably, more positive terms-of-trade developments is 
therefore an important factor in explaining the PEP’s smaller trade deficit. 
Increasing current transfers, both in the form of remittances and EU pre-accession assistance, 
would alleviate the impact on the current account deficit, which is expected to gradually decline 
to 6.3% in 2007. The significant shortfall of more than 0.6% of GDP between projected and 
actual current transfers from the EU in 2004 underlines, however, that such transfers may 
fluctuate from year to year and to large degree depend on advancing the institutional and 
programmatic framework necessary to absorb the increase in available EU funding. For the 
year 2007, an unexplained jump in remittances of close to 0.4% of GDP seems to neutralise the 
negative effect on net EU transfers caused by Romania’s contribution to the EU budget. 
Overall, current account developments could well turn out less comforting than scheduled in 
the programme, not least given the risk of higher domestic demand pressure and slower export 
growth. From a savings-investment balances perspective, the PEP contains useful and 
consistent private and public sector balances. The private sector savings-investment balance is 
expected to be significantly more negative than in last year’s submission, albeit the deficit 
declines over the period. This revision is in line with developments over the last two years, but 
a more elaborated account of why the private sector savings ratio in 2004 turned out nearly 7% 
of GDP lower than expected in last year’s PEP would have been valuable, in particular since 
the ratio is still expected to improve considerably over the period, thereby helping to contain 
the current account deficit. To alleviate the concerns over a further decline in private sector 
savings, the programme argues that structural reforms will increase the propensity to save in the 
corporate sector and that the gains in households’ disposable income caused by lower income 
taxes will primarily be saved. While the planned improvement of the financial balance in the 
state-owned enterprise sector is commendable, the programme fails to provide a fully 
convincing argumentation for how this will occur, in particular towards the end of the 
programme period when also the general government deficit is set to increase. Moreover, the 
programme’s hypothesis that pent-up consumer demand has been largely met and that the 
increased indebtedness of some households may put a brake on consumption at the aggregate 
level seems relatively optimistic. 
Given the PEP’s current account projections, the assumption that FDI inflows will remain 
above 4% of GDP throughout the period, the expectation of a significant increase in EU capital 
transfers in 2007 and the exchange rate appreciation, the foreign-debt-to-GDP ratio is projected 
to fall by almost 10 percentage points of GDP and would reach 20.9% of GDP in 2007. 
Nevertheless, given the uncertainty surrounding the size of the current account deficit and the 
effective absorption capacity of EU funds, a larger resort to international financial markets 
seems plausible. In the light of Romania’s progress in macroeconomic stabilisation, improved 
credit ratings, EU accession perspective and the already distinctly lower risk premium on 
Romanian sovereign debt, this should cause no difficulty. Large international reserves could 
also, in case of needs, facilitate financing of the current account deficit. 
The programme re-iterates Romania’s commitments in the context of EU accession as regards 
the gradual liberalisation of the capital account. At the same time, the programme mentions the 
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potential impact on the conduct of monetary policy from possibly strong capital inflows caused 
by the still relatively high domestic interest rate level. These inflows are expected to necessitate 
continued sterilisation operations by the central bank in order to limit the effect on liquidity. 
Against the background of rapid credit growth, a widening current account deficit and the 
emergence of inflationary pressure, Romania decided in the beginning of 2004 to delay the 
liberalisation of non-residents' access to domestic deposit accounts denominated in ‘leu’ in 
order not to spur further credit growth and add to the potential volatility of the balance of 
payments. The programme explains this decision, and highlights that the postponement is a 
temporary measure applicable until April 2005. Indeed, Romania liberalised on 11 April 2005 
the access of non-residents to deposit accounts denominated in “leu”. The liberalisation is a 
welcome step, which has been carefully prepared by Romania and confirms the return to the 
agreed timetable for dismantling remaining capital movement restrictions. Although the 
opening of deposit accounts to foreigners did not in the first instance trigger an unmanageably 
large surge in inflows, partly due to the preceding lowering of the policy interest rate, the 
potential volatility of the balance of payments has increased. Against this background, the 
regulatory framework was amended in order to allow for the introduction of safeguard 
measures, which can be resorted to in case of excess short-term capital flows leading to balance 
of payments disequilibria or severe disturbances of monetary and exchange rate policies that 
might entail considerable swings in domestic liquidity. If activated, the safeguard measures 
would be limited in time and be applied in respect of the principles of non-discriminatory and 
proportionality. While safeguards may play a positive role in preventing certain short-term 
inflows, interest rate cuts are largely a function of further disinflation. Prudence in fiscal and 
wage policy is therefore warranted also to facilitate further capital account liberalisation. 
3.3. Monetary and exchange rate policy 
The PEP carefully describes the monetary policy regime, which will over the programme 
period undergo a gradual and carefully sequenced changeover from a managed float regime, in 
which the exchange rate is used as the main anti-inflationary instrument, to an inflation 
targeting regime, in which interest rate changes will ultimately become the predominant 
monetary policy tool. The central bank will continue to aim at sustainable disinflation, while 
progressively paying less attention to economic growth, exchange rate and external balance 
objectives. Inflation expectations will be anchored via the announcement of an inflation target, 
by a further real appreciation of the ‘leu’ and through the use of policy interest rate changes 
which should ensure that credit growth remains within non-inflationary boundaries. Going hand 
in hand with the switch to inflation targeting, the central bank has opted for a more flexible 
exchange rate policy by limiting forex market interventions and abandoning the pre-announced 
target for the annual real exchange rate appreciation. This policy change has since its official 
announcement on 2 November 2004 caused a nominal appreciation of around 12% against the 
euro. The programme anticipates a broadly unchanged nominal exchange rate vis-à-vis the euro 
over the programme period, which would translate into a significantly more pronounced real 
appreciation than foreseen in the 2003 PEP. The euro is from 2005 the only reference currency 
for exchange rate policy as the euro-dollar currency basket previously used for assessing the 
real appreciation of the ‘leu’ is abandoned. 
The monetary policy conducted until now has contributed to both gradual disinflation and a real 
exchange rate development compatible with a sustainable current account position. 
Notwithstanding this record, the envisaged implementation of an inflation targeting regime 
appears well-founded and appropriate. Inflation targeting offers in the Romanian context the 
advantages of a clear focus on further disinflation, increased accountability of the monetary 
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authorities and a high degree of flexibility in the choice of monetary policy tools, which take 
account of the determinants of inflation and the evolving monetary policy transmission 
mechanism. Provided that the technical and institutional framework is fully completed, the 
programme’s objective to switch to inflation targeting seems attainable, although the 
programme is scarce in presenting an exact timetable and does not specify how the inflation 
target will be defined. The more pronounced real appreciation associated with freeing the 
exchange rate also implies, that inflation targeting is an attractive option to permanently bring 
the inflation rate down towards EU-levels, thereby avoiding the risk of sticky inflation. The 
programme is, however, rather timid in discussing how a steeper real appreciation would 
impact on external trade and the process of real convergence, although the risk of insufficient 
productivity gains is highlighted as a danger to the macroeconomic scenario. In the same vein, 
the programme is not explicit in recognising, that the changeover to inflation targeting will 
imply that fiscal and wage policies must bear an increasing responsibility for domestic demand 
management and the external balance.  
The inflation path outlined in the programme is broadly similar to the 2003 PEP, implying that 
average annual inflation would be brought down to 4.4% in 2007 compared to 11.9% in 2004. 
The hypotheses underpinning the inflation forecast are made more explicit than in last year’s 
PEP, which is helpful for the identification of factors directly or indirectly determining 
inflation. Interestingly, a reduced budgetary deficit is mentioned among these, although the 
programme expects the general government deficit to increase by 1.2% of GDP in the period 
2005-07.  
Key determinants of inflation dynamics are well explained. Relative prices will continue to be 
affected by the upwards adjustment of administered prices, in particular for natural gas, 
electrical power, district heating and railway tariffs. The inflationary impact of these 
adjustments would be highest in the first part of the period 2005-07, and could contribute by 
more than half to the rise in CPI. As the adjustments fade out in the second half of the period 
and in tandem with an expected impact from increased competition and higher efficiency of 
utilities suppliers, the impact from administered prices will be substantially reduced. A 
significant disinflationary impact from real appreciation of the currency is expected to persist 
over the programme period, yet of diminishing importance. Further restructuring of loss-
making state-owned enterprises is expected to strengthen financial discipline and thereby limit 
the inflation stemming from the accumulation of arrears and from a wage policy out of line 
with productivity gains. This emphasis on structural policies as a main driver of disinflation is 
welcomed. Given this recognition, and in view of wage policy continuing to strongly stimulate 
price increases, a more exhaustive account of the future interplay between wage policy and 
inflation would, however, have been of interest. This is the case both in relation to the state-
owned sector, where the programme suggests some relaxation of the monitoring of wage 
developments, and in relation to the minimum wage and public sector remuneration, where a 
real wage growth equal to real GDP growth is envisaged. While the programme correctly 
stipulates, that a prudent policy-mix will play a key role in keeping aggregate demand in check, 
it falls short of convincing that wage slippage would not cause inflationary pressure over the 
programme period.  
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4. BUDGETARY TARGETS AND THE MEDIUM-TERM PATH OF THE PUBLIC FINANCES 
4.1. Programme overview 
The programme’s fiscal framework is centred on a significant relaxation of income, profit and 
social security taxation combined with strengthened tax collection, a broader tax base and an 
efficiency enhancing expenditure policy. Moreover, the improved capacity to absorb increasing 
EU transfers is central to fiscal developments. While this framework is consistent with the 
objective of sustaining the real convergence process and higher long-term potential output, it is 
not entirely convincing with respect to the projected effects on budgetary and external balances 
and with respect to the effectiveness of measures to curb quasi-fiscal subsidies. In the same 
vein, the coherence with the macro-economic framework is not fully ensured, in particular as 
regards the hypothesis that sizeable tax cuts will go hand in hand with markedly reduced 
domestic demand pressure and a strong improvement in the private sector savings-investment 
balance, thereby helping to contain the current account deficit. Hence, a certain dissonance is 
noted between the likely effects of the fiscal policy measures and the stated role of fiscal policy 
in a policy-mix challenged with dampening domestic demand, safeguarding the external 
balance and sustaining the reduction of inflation. Given the magnitude of the fiscal reform, a 
more extensive analysis of its short- and medium-term budgetary effects, including heavier 
reliance on quantified estimates, would have made the fiscal framework more trustworthy. The 
omission of estimates for the cyclically adjusted balance is a step back compared to last year’s 
submission and underpins the concern that the timing of the tax reform has not fully taken into 
account the cyclical position of the economy. At the same time, however, the programme is 
very frank in recognising that the fiscal strategy is risky, that fiscal policy is pro-cyclical and 
that the scenario presented is conditioned on the full accomplishment of the programme’s 
structural policies. Furthermore, the programme rightly identifies and openly deals with a range 
of important downside fiscal risks, some of which could have been taken into account in the 
main scenario. The description of the fiscal framework benefits from the increased use of data 
compiled according to ESA 95, in particular for the breakdown of revenue and expenditure. 
While this is a noteworthy step forward, various measures to broaden the tax base and the 
detailed account of expected EU 
transfers are still described on a 
cash basis. This illustrates that ESA 
95 is not yet the main reference for 
fiscal analysis. Moreover, 
budgetary accounting of EU 
transfers should be fully aligned 
with the recent Eurostat decision on 
the treatment of such transfers.  
At the aggregate level, the fiscal 
plans resemble last year’s PEP in 
the projection of an increasing 
general government deficit over the 
programme period and a moderate 
expansion of the still low debt-to-
GDP ratio. The general government 
deficit is projected to narrow to 0.7% of GDP in 2005 due to a restrictive expenditure policy, 
which more than compensates for the revenue shortfall caused by the tax reform, followed by a 
widening of the deficit to 1.9% in 2007. Due to lower interest rate payments, higher GDP 
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growth and improved revenue collection, the deficit would, however, be significantly smaller 
than projected in the 2003 PEP. Both revenue and expenditure ratios would decline slowly until 
2006, but then jump by respectively 2% and 3% of GDP in 2007 for which the programme 
holds increased EU transfers, Romania’s contribution to the EU budget and co-financing of EU 
funded projects responsible. Somewhat surprisingly, the large cuts in profit and income tax as 
well as the envisaged reduction in social security contribution rates are seen to yield a less steep 
decline in the revenue-to-GDP ratio than expected in the 2003 PEP, even though a more timid 
fiscal relaxation was envisaged at the time.  
Romania has over recent years adopted an increasingly responsible fiscal stance, characterised 
by lower general government deficits than budgeted, a slowly increasing revenue ratio and a 
declining expenditure ratio. A broader tax base and improved revenue collection have played a 
significant role in this good performance which is, however, also explained by stronger than 
expected growth and additional savings on interest payments. In previous PEP submissions, the 
achieved degree of fiscal consolidation was not projected, which pointed to the use of a 
relatively cautious macroeconomic scenario and a prudent approach to incorporating gains from 
improved tax compliance and collection. The programme’s projection of some further revenue 
gains from improved tax administration is therefore realistic, but given that last year’s 
submission excluded such gains in the main scenario, a quantification of the expected gains 
would have been useful.  
Likewise, a specific estimate for the envisaged reduction in the quasi-fiscal subsidies, like in 
the 2003 PEP, would have given a clear sign of the expected results from actions targeting the 
financing requirement of state-owned enterprises and the implicit subsidies provided via the 
energy sector. Over recent years, Romania’s expenditure policy has remained pro-cyclical and 
although the projection of an increasing primary deficit did not materialise, the substantial 
reduction in interest payments and unexpectedly high revenue growth was not fully used to 
consolidate public finances. Against this background, the programme’s projection of a major 
restraint of current expenditures and subsidies will be a litmus test for the ability to not letting 
non-programmed revenue gains translate into extra expenditure.  
With the exception of 2005, where the fiscal reform would cause a decline in profit and income 
taxes of 1.5% of GDP, direct taxes are projected to increase on the back of higher revenues 
from social security and income tax. Contrary to the 2003 PEP, where the envisaged 5%-point 
reduction in social security contribution rates was expected to cause a decline in social security 
contributions of 0.8% of GDP over the programme period, this year’s submission foresees 
social security contributions to increase by 0.9% of GDP in spite of gradually cutting 
contribution rates by up to 10%-point from 2006. Indirect taxes are projected to rise 
considerably on the back of higher excise collection caused by the progressive alignment with 
acquis. Non-fiscal revenues would decline, but this loss is more than outweighed by increasing 
EU transfers, which are expected to amount to 3.1% in 2007. Over the programme period, 
considerable reductions in current expenditures for personal and material, declining interest rate 
payments, reduced social transfers and a sizeable reduction in subsidies would yield savings of 
around 5% of GDP. This room is used for significantly higher public investment and for 
transfers to other sectors with the aim of co-financing EU funded projects, in particular in the 
year of accession. 
The fiscal framework identifies seven highly relevant risks, which are either rooted in the fiscal 
strategy or may impact on the fiscal outcome. Although the PEP commits to adjust fiscal policy 
if needed, the fiscal scenario could with some advantage have taken into account a number of 
the risks. The tax reform may spur consumption and investment at a time of buoyant domestic 
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demand, double-digit real wage growth, solid credit growth and strongly appreciating currency. 
Corrective fiscal measures could therefore be needed to avoid an unsustainable widening of the 
current account deficit. A more pronounced appreciation of the currency, which would have a 
negative net impact on the budget due to a decline in revenue from excise duties7, could add to 
the need for fiscal adjustment. Also, an immediate negative impact on the revenue-to-GDP ratio 
from a rapid reduction in social security contribution rates is indeed likely, and although further 
reduction of non-wage labour costs would strengthen the supply side conditions of the economy 
it is for this reason welcomed that the programme makes rate cuts contingent on a satisfactory 
revenue development. Furthermore, the risk of not being able to absorb available EU resources 
is pertinent. Finally, substantial quasi-fiscal subsidies have remained a serious impediment for a 
responsive and transparent fiscal policy, and the PEP rightly underscores that a lenient attitude 
to financial discipline in the enterprise sector would entail serious risks. In addition to the risks 
highlighted is the programme, the full amount to be paid from central government as financial 
compensations for the non-restitution of property under Law 10/2001 is uncertain. The 
government has not yet decided how to schedule the compensation, which could amount to 
more than 0.5% of GDP annually on average over the next decade. The current budget 
incorporates only cash compensations foreseen.  
COM PEP COM PEP COM PEP COM PEP COM PEP
 Real GDP (% change) 5.2 5.2 8.3 8.3 5.5 6.0 5.1 6.1 n. a. 6.3
 Contributions:
 - Final domestic demand 7.8 7.9 11.0 11.9 8.9 8.9 7.1 7.8 n. a. 7.6
 - Change in inventories 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.6 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 n. a. 0.0
- External balance of goods 
and services -2.7 -2.7 -2.8 -3.6 -3.3 -2.9 -1.9 -1.7 n. a. -1.3
 Employment (% change) -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.1 -0.1 0.3 -0.1 0.2 n. a. 0.1
 Unemployment rate (%) 6.8 7.0 7.1 7.5 7.0 7.3 7.1 7.2 n. a. 7.1
 GDP deflator (% change) 19.5 19.5 15.8 13.6 11.8 9.5 8.7 7.3 n. a. 5.7
 CPI inflation (%) 15.3 15.3 11.9 11.9 8.2 8.1 6.5 6.0 n. a. 4.4
 Current account balance 
(% of GDP) -6.0 -6.0 -7.5 -7.6 -8.3 -7.1 -8.7 -6.7 n. a. -6.3
PEP: ILO unemployment rate. COM: Eurostat, harmonised unemployment rate  
Sources: Pre-Accession Economic Programme (PEP); Commission services Spring 2005 forecasts (COM)
Table 2: Comparison of macroeconomic developments and forecasts
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
 
Against the background of the risks identified, in particular that the tax cuts may have a larger 
adverse impact on the revenue-to-GDP ratio than projected, the budgetary outcome could turn 
out less comforting than expected. As recent year’s markedly good revenue performance can be 
partly attributed to favourable cyclical conditions, slowing growth could imply a rapid 
deterioration in the general government balance and an insufficient margin to the 3% reference 
value. Care should therefore be taken to ensure that the pro-cyclical fiscal policy does not over 
a prolonged period engender a widening of the primary deficit, which could cause prejudice to 
the long-term sustainability of public finances. Given the many needs for public investment 
                                                   
7
 In Romania, the imposition of harmonised excise duties (such as alcohol, tobacco and energy products) is 
expressed in EUR. As a first round effect, appreciation of the currency therefore causes declining budget 
revenues in “lei” terms. The PEP includes a sensitivity analysis pointing to a 16% nominal appreciation of 
the currency during 2005-07 causing a decline in budget revenues equivalent to 0.3% of GDP.  
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aimed at strengthening the economy’s growth potential and prepare for EU accession and in 
view of the already considerable limitation of current expenditures foreseen in the programme, 
the room for any further strong fiscal adjustment on the expenditure side is limited. As the 
programme rightly points out, additional measures to increase direct and indirect taxes, 
including a further broadening of the tax base, could be envisaged to pre-empt the occurrence 
of an increasingly unbalanced budget. 
4.2. Targets and adjustment 
In 2004, the relatively prudent fiscal stance both contributed to and benefited from a favourable 
macroeconomic environment, which in pair with a further decline in interest payments and 
progress in tax compliance and collection implied a better than expected revenue performance. 
Mainly for this reason, the planned general government deficit of 3.0% of GDP reported by 
Romania in March 2004 was significantly undershot and amounted instead, according to 
Romania’s latest fiscal notification, to 1.4% of GDP. The primary deficit, planned to be 1.4% 
of GDP, was contained to 0.2% of GDP. In cash terms (GFS methodology), tax revenues turned 
out 8.8% higher than originally budgeted and revenues from corporate profit tax, customs and 
excise duties fared particularly well. Legal and administrative improvements, such as the new 
Fiscal Code and the establishment of the National Agency for Fiscal Administration, paid off. 
Higher non-fiscal revenues also compensated for a considerable shortfall in EU transfers. In 
view of the need to dampen domestic demand and contain the current account deficit, two 
budgetary rectifications in July and August revised the 2004 general government deficit target 
(ESA 95) down to 2.2% and subsequently to 1.7% of GDP, while still allowing for some extra 
pre-election spending, notably generous increases of pension benefits and public sector wages. 
In cash terms (GFS methodology), total expenditures overran the original budget by 2.5%, with 
wage expenditures and material expenditures significantly higher than budgeted. Interest 
payments were 0.3% of GDP (ESA 95) lower than originally budgeted, while public sector 
gross fixed capital formation amounted to 3.4% of GDP (ESA 95), well above the 3.0% of 
GDP planned. Substantial quasi-fiscal subsidies continued to weigh on the broad public sector 
balance, but Romania intensified in 2004 its efforts to limit the accumulation of tax arrears, 
improve the weak financial performance of state-owned enterprises and gradually scale down 
the implicit subsidies to enterprises and households via the provision of energy below costs and 
non-collection of bills. These achievements were important for improving medium-term fiscal 
prospects, albeit further progress is warranted. 
For 2005, the programme’s budget deficit target of 0.7% of GDP is considerably lower than the 
2005 budget, which was approved before the adoption of the fiscal reform. It is therefore no 
good yardstick for this year’s likely budgetary outcome, although it is of interest that the 
original budget on the back of a much more timid relaxation of income and profit taxes 
projected a significantly larger general government deficit in 2005 than the programme. The 
PEP is not entirely lucid in explaining the differences to the approved budget and would have 
benefited from a more extensive analysis of the budgetary effect of various measures, including 
a heavier reliance on quantified estimates. For example, the programme restricts itself to 
mentioning that the cuts in income and profit tax will engender a revenue short-fall of 30.000 
billion 'lei’ (1.1% of projected 2005 GDP). No breakdown between income and profit tax 
reductions is provided, and it is not clear whether the estimate refers to the difference to the 
2004 budget outcome or to the approved 2005 budget. Presumably, the latter is the case since 
the estimate would then be in better correspondence with the projection of a reduction in 
revenue from profit and income taxes of 1.5% of GDP from 2004 to 2005. The programme 
specifies a number of measures on the revenue side, which in 2005 would yield compensatory 
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Budgetary effects of Romania’s EU accession in 2007 
The PEP’s fiscal framework is characterised by a 
significant jump in the general government deficit 
to 1.9% of GDP in 2007 following a deficit of 
0.9% of GDP in 2006. Comparing the years 2006 
and 2007, the ratio of total expenditure to GDP 
increases from 34.2% to 37.2% of GDP, of which 
capital expenditure grows from 4.2% to 5.3% of 
GDP and transfers from 13.2% to 15.3% of GDP. 
The PEP explains that this increase is caused by 
Romania’s contribution to the EU budget and the 
financing of projects receiving EU grants. EU 
grants are expected to increase from 1.2% of GDP 
in 2006 to 3.1% of GDP in 2007.  
The PEP also presents a cash-based view of 
budgetary flows, showing that EU grants are 
expected to increase from 1.4% of GDP in 2006 to 
2.2% of GDP in 2007, while Romania’s 
contribution to the EU budget is set to amount to 
0.9% of GDP in 2007. For this reason, net 
transfers remain broadly stable. Co-financing 
would grow from 0.4% GDP in 2006 to 0.9% of 
GDP in 2007.  
Most of the PEP’s estimates of transfers from pre- 
and post-accession instruments and the estimate of 
Romania’s contribution to the EU budget are in 
line with DG ECFIN’s estimates in the table 
below. The starting point is the commitment and 
payment appropriations in current prices agreed in 
the accession negotiations.8 Payments are much 
lower than commitments to take account of 
possible absorption problems. However, payments 
from pre-accession assistance will continue9 and 
the PEP projects lower payments from pre-
accession instruments in 2007 than DG ECFIN, 
which partly explains the difference in the estimate 
of total transfers. Moreover, the PEP seems to 
have disregarded transfers associated with internal 
policies and temporary budgetary compensations, 
which in 2007 would amount to nearly 0.5% of 
GDP. 
A main conclusion from these calculations is that 
net transfers from the EU budget to Romania in 
2007 will be sizeable and positive. 
Romania: Budgetary effects of EU accession
in 2007 
 (in % of PEP-projected GDP)
Commit- 
ments Payments
Ccontribution to EU budget 0.9 0.9
EU transfers 3.3 3.0
of which:
- pre-accession aid 0.0 1.3
- Structural Funds 1.1 0.5
Net transfers 2.4 2.1
National co-financing 0.7 0.7
Source: DG ECFIN 
 
Even if all potential “fiscal burdens” from 
accession (such as co-financing needs and 
Structural Funds “additionality” requirements) are 
taken into account, the net budgetary effect should 
still be positive in 2007.  
Arguing in the PEP that accession causes a higher 
deficit in 2007 therefore only holds in a static 
accounting approach in two ways:  1.)  when the 
final beneficiary is non-government, transfers from 
the EU budget are accounted outside the general 
government sector while they might sometimes 
require co-financing from the government. 
2.) when the general government sector is the final 
beneficiary, they are accounted as fully additional 
expenditure, i.e. appearing on both the revenue and 
the expenditure side of the budget without substi-
tuting previously existing national programmes.  In 
that way, EU transfers have almost no effect on the 
balance, while the contribution to the EU budget 
and national co-financing of EU programmes have 
a negative effect.  
Notwithstanding this reasoning, which is broadly 
in line with Eurostat rules, the budget could be 
adequately restructured so that previously existing 
national expenditure is substituted by EU funds or 
used to co-finance EU programmes which are not 
subject to a strict “additionality” requirement. 
Then a positive budgetary effect in net terms 
should prevail and the expenditure-to-GDP ratio 
would not necessarily increase. 
                                                   
8
 A similar methodology was used for the ten new Member States by Hallet, M. (2004), ‘Fiscal effects of 
accession in the new Member States’, Economic Papers, No 203 (European Commission, Directorate-
General for Economic and Financial Affairs), Brussels, and by Hallet, M./ F. Keereman (2005): Budgetary 
transfers between the EU and the new Member States: manna from Brussels or a fiscal drag? ECFIN 
Country Focus Vol. 2, Issue 2 of 03.02.2005 
9
 Pre-accession payments were assumed to amount to a quarter of the commitments foreseen in the roadmap 
for 2006 plus the payment appropriations included in the 2005 draft EU budget. 
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revenue of 0.8% of GDP. These are notably postponing planned cuts in social security 
contributions, moving forward the rise in excise duties and increasing a number of tax rates. 
Some of the measures were not yet adopted at the time of submitting the PEP. Also, the 
programme highlights that the tax base will be broadened by eliminating certain exceptions and 
deductions allowed for profit and incomes tax, but the measures are not specified. Likewise, 
there is no quantification of the expected gains from improving tax administration and curbing 
tax arrears.  
Notwithstanding these efforts, the revenue-to-GDP ratio, excluding EU grants, is seen to 
decline by 1.6% of GDP from 2004 to 2005. The main reason for the projected fall in the 
general government deficit is therefore to be found in the envisaged restraint of the expenditure 
side and an improved capacity to absorb EU transfers. Considerable reductions in current 
expenditures for material and personal, reduced social transfers and some reduction in subsidies 
would cause a fall of 1.4% of GDP in the expenditure-to-GDP ratio. The majority of these 
measures are not specified and were only approved in a budgetary rectification in June. For this 
reason, the programme’s fiscal projection for 2005 is different from the Commission services’ 
Spring 2005 forecast. The programme expects the budget revenue from grants, in particular EU 
grants, to evolve very favourably, doubling to 1.6% of GDP in 2005. In view of the significant 
pick-up in EU capital transfers to Romania in 2004, this estimate may hold. However, given 
that disbursements related to technical assistance (current transfers) in 2003 amounted to less 
than half the amount projected in last year’s PEP and in 2004 dropped to one fourth of the 
amount expected, some further reasoning for this sudden improvement in absorption would 
have been welcomed.  
For the years 2006-07, the programme envisages a continued restraint of non-EU related 
spending, while direct taxes are projected to increase by 1.2% of GDP on the back of higher 
revenues from social security contributions and from income tax; the latter apparently due to 
increased official employment and taxation of incomes from capital gains and interests. 
According to the programme, the gradual cut by up to 10% in the social security contribution 
rate, of which 8% reduction for employers and 2% reduction for employees, will stimulate 
companies’ voluntary compliance and lead to an immediate positive effect of 0.8% of GDP on 
collection. The programme also highlights that stricter enforcement will diminish evasion of 
social security taxes and contribute to the positive Laffer curve effect projected. The good 
experience with measures taken to strengthen tax collection shows that improved 
administration would indeed increase revenues, but the programme is not convincing in arguing 
that these gains would be immediately able to more than compensate for the considerable 
reduction in the contribution rate, not least since no forceful steps to improve enforcement are 
emphasised. In the 2003 PEP, the envisaged 5%-point reduction in contribution rates was 
expected to cause a decline in social security contributions of 0.8% of GDP over the 
programme period, while this year’s submission foresees social security contributions to 
increase by 0.9% of GDP until 2007 in spite of gradually cutting contribution rates by up to 
10%-point. The programme deals in some detail with expected payments vis-à-vis the EU 
budget. Receipts from the EU are expected to increase to 3.1% of GDP in 2007, while co-
financing and the contribution to the EU budget would both amount to 0.9% of GDP in 2007. 
Intriguingly, the programme holds costs related to EU accession responsible for the widening 
of the general government deficit to 1.9% of GDP in 2007 (see also box). In the programme, all 
EU transfers seem to be fully included on both the revenue and expenditure side of central 
government. According to a recent Eurostat decision, in cases where the government advances 
payments to the final beneficiary, the government must be considered as acting “on behalf” of 
the EU, and neither the transfer from government to the beneficiary, nor the transfer from the 
EU to government has to be recorded in the government accounts. 
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4.3. Debt developments 
The programme points to a relatively favourable evolution of general government debt over the 
programme period as the debt-to-GDP ratio is expected to remain broadly stable below 20%. 
Strong nominal GDP growth and falling interest payments will continue to support a further 
decline of the debt-to-GDP ratio, which is however limited by the debt-increasing effect of the 
envisaged deterioration in the primary balance. With the primary deficit gradually widening by 
1.5% of GDP from 2005 to 2007, the declining trend in Romania’s still moderate general 
government debt-to-GDP ratio is projected to come to an end in 2005.  
The programme does not expect any positive impact from privatisation receipts on debt 
developments, and the significant privatisations concluded in 2004 have not had any impact on 
reducing public debt, although privatisation receipts of around 1.5% of GDP have been placed 
in deposits and currency holdings. In the light of the still unfinished privatisation agenda, 
further scope therefore exists for using privatisation receipts to bring down public debt. The 
programme refrains from estimating the effect of currency movements on the debt ratio. Given 
that more than two thirds of total public debt is contracted in foreign currencies, the 
programme’s expectation of an average nominal appreciation of 5% (respectively 14% in the 
alternative scenario) over the programme period would help to reduce the debt ratio below the 
programme’s projection. Moreover, as the useful sensitivity analysis of the programme shows, 
a stronger than expected appreciation would cause a minor positive impact by reducing interest 
payments. Against this background, the programme’s projection of other factors increasing the 
debt-to-GDP ratio by around 4%-points in both 2006 and 2007 is difficult to validate and may 
be due to a wrong compilation of annex table 5. 
A new Law on Public Debt was adopted in June 2004, which resulted in a significant alignment 
with acquis. The law came into force on 1 January 2005 and within this framework, the 
Ministry of Public Finance will seek to continue an active debt management strategy with the 
objective of consolidating the use of debt instruments with maturities longer than 3 years, 
diversifying the debt portfolio by issuing state securities in foreign currencies and with variable 
interest, and increasingly develop the financing capacity of domestic markets. These objectives 
are welcomed and their attainment would together with a restricted issuance of state guarantees 
for the contracting of foreign loans by public institutions’ help improve the risk management of 
public debt. Significantly limiting the use of off-budget guarantees, such as the guarantees 
issued under the Risk Fund for External Loan Guarantees, is equally important. The gradual 
extension of the average maturity of debt, notably by establishing pricing benchmarks over a 
three-year maturity horizon for domestic paper, would also assist in the deepening of secondary 
markets and the conduct of monetary policy.  
5. STRUCTURAL REFORMS 
5.1. Programme overview 
The structural reform framework provided in the programme is very comprehensive, although 
the emphasis on continuing already initiated reforms does not facilitate the distinction between 
new and existing measures. Given the exhaustiveness of the annex table on reform measures 
undertaken, the main text would not have suffered from a more succinct presentation of past 
achievements. This would also have allowed the various arrays of the reform programme to 
stand out as a coherent entirety. The programme contains a clear commitment to continue the 
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structural reform programme in order to enable Romania to cope with the competitive pressure 
and market forces within the EU. Notwithstanding this strength, the presentation of factors 
underpinning the choice of concrete reforms and the related instruments could in some cases 
have been clearer. Also, a clearer timetable with more tangible targets to be met would have 
improved the PEP as a benchmark for tracking whether progress is sufficient to fully prepare 
the economy for accession. The policy matrix presented is largely complete and provides 
quantitative estimates of the impact of most of the important measures, although the description 
of measures does not in all cases associate well with the main text and the content of the 
budgetary cost estimates are therefore at times cloudy.  
The programme’s reform agenda consists of the continuation of a broad array of initiatives 
taken to improve the functioning of the market economy and strengthen the competitiveness of 
the economy by market opening, allowing fiercer competition and higher productivity. In the 
enterprise sector, the main measures would be continued privatisation and restructuring of 
state-owned enterprises, opening of regulated network industries, stricter enforcement of 
competition and state aid policy, improvement of the administrative and legal environment and 
promotion of SME’s. In the financial sector, further alignment of the legislative and regulatory 
environment in combination with the completion of bank privatisation would sustain recent 
years’ significant reform progress. For the labour market, the programme’s fiscal policy is 
intended to help overcoming a declining employment rate, a shrinking labour force and a large 
informal economy, but no other major reform measure is clearly set out which could 
significantly alter developments or promote a more flexible labour market. Additional reform 
areas include, inter alia, the agricultural sector, improved infrastructure, increased resources for 
education and some initial steps to reform the pension system. The overall reform strategy is 
largely unchanged from last year’s submission, albeit putting more emphasis on the promotion 
of a knowledge-based society. 
The many reform initiatives follow the strategy embedded in the National Development Plan of 
Romania, which sets EU accession as a fundamental aim. In many respects, the reforms 
therefore stem from Romania’s overall commitment to align its legal framework with the 
acquis and the endeavour to fully meet the Copenhagen economic criteria. Notwithstanding the 
objective of EU accession, which has helped to progressively broaden the consensus about 
economic reform and ensured increased consistency of reform efforts, the broader objective of 
the programme is to pursue an economic reform path, which has succeeded in gradually 
modernising Romania’s economic structure, increasing real incomes and improving living 
standards.  
The programme bears witness to the considerable budgetary financing needed to support the re-
allocation of economic resources and mitigate the social impact of rapid economic change. 
Most key reforms are costly and will have a sizeable negative net budgetary effect over the 
programme period (see table 5). There is a tangible risk that implementation delays could imply 
a back-loading of key reforms, which could eventually entail a gap between policy goals and 
results. That may impact negatively on Romania’s economic preparedness for EU membership. 
Economic transition also demands an enduring commitment from the authorities to 
continuously bring forward structural reforms, even under the fear of political and social costs. 
For some sensitive sectors where reform has traditionally been slow, such as energy, mining, 
transport and agriculture, the programme does not stand out as being more ambitious than in 
the past and the envisaged measures are at times vague. Moreover, like in previous years, there 
is no quantified discussion of the impact of key measures to limit quasi-fiscal subsidies in spite 
of the recognition that the programme’s success hinges on results in this field. 
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The reform objectives set out in the PEP do converge in the direction of key objectives of the 
Lisbon agenda, but further efforts in reforming the functioning of product and labour markets 
would be needed to progressively close the gap to the average position of current Member 
States. Moreover, Romania is making progress towards the knowledge-based economy from a 
very low level. Adapting the education system to the needs of the labour market constitutes a 
major challenge and much remains to be done to strengthen R&D and innovation. While the 
reform strategy laid out is in general supportive for Romania’s fulfilment of the second 
Copenhagen economic criteria by the time of accession, relatively few new measures or policy 
shifts are envisaged. A vigorous implementation remains crucial in order to be prepared for 
membership by 2007. In terms of supporting the macroeconomic policy-mix, the PEP aims at 
reducing quasi-fiscal subsidies, but the measures intended to reduce losses in state-owned 
enterprises, raise energy prices and curb non-payment are generally not new and have in the 
past been applied with only some success. 
Table 3: Net budgetary impact of key reforms 
Description of policy 2004 2005 2006 2007 
1.  Privatisation of state-owned 
     companies 
+ 891.7 + 326.8 + 9.1 + 6.0 
2.  Mining sector reform - 40.2 - 49.4 - 48.1 - 39.7 
3.  Pension system reform n. a. - 524.9 - 1048.4 - 339.5 
4.  Road infrastructure n. a. - 752.4 - 1000.9 - 1176.7 
5.  School rehabilitation programme - 14.5 - 76.9 - 68.1 -35.2 
Total budgetary impact (mill. EUR) n. a.  - 1076.8 - 2156.4 - 1585.1 
Total budgetary impact (% of GDP) n. a.  1.5 2.7 1.8 
Sources: Pre-Accession Economic Programme (PEP), ECFIN calculations 
5.2. Product and capital markets 
The programme contains four strategic objectives directly related to sustaining the reform 
process in product and capital markets. First, the process of privatisation and restructuring in 
the enterprise sector would be completed. Relatively clear intermediate targets are set for the 
privatisation or liquidation of remaining majority state-owned companies from the portfolio of 
the authority for the recovery of state assets (AVAS). The PEP is also more precise than in past 
years with regard to privatising companies owned by various ministries, and although no 
precise timetable is presented, the budgetary estimate reveals the intention to finalise 
important further privatisations in the energy sector in 2005, some of which were not 
concluded as planned in 2004. Also in other network industries, such as telecom and 
postal services, the programme envisages to follow-up on the achieved opening of national 
markets by gradually privatising major operators. On the contrary, no concrete 
commitments are set for the defence and tourism sectors other than the general intention 
to continue the privatisation process. In the transport sector, the programme foresees a 
further privatisation of some subsidiaries of state-owned companies in the field of road, 
rail and maritime transport as well as the sale of a share in Bucharest International 
Airport. The programme does in no way deal with the use of public-private partnerships 
in facilitating the upgrading and expansion of the road network, although Romania 
consider such partnerships important for a cost-efficient implementation of its ambitious 
motorway programme, which Romania previously envisaged to implement over the period 
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2004-12 and which would amount to close to 10% of 2004 GDP. Nor is it discussed to what 
extent PPP schemes are expected to qualify for being treated outside general government. 
Second, an improved functioning of markets is envisaged by means of an active competition 
policy, tight state aid policy, transparent rules for public procurement and minimising 
administrative barriers for businesses. This renewed commitment is commendable and 
welcome, notably in view of the previous weak enforcement record.. The programme 
recognises the existence of moral hazard among both state-owned and private enterprises 
caused by the lenient attitude to tax arrears and the widespread use of debt-rescheduling 
schemes at often generous and unclear terms. This has led to mounting tax arrears, and the 
programme gives a noteworthy political commitment to stop the granting of exemptions and 
increase the penalty interest rate to a level comparable to bank financing. The PEP does not 
explain how the rules for public procurement will become more transparent, and in the light of 
previous ad hoc government decisions a strong commitment to rule out any future derogation 
from existing legislation would have been appropriate. The list of actions aimed at improving 
the business environment addresses most deficiencies earlier pointed to, such as the need to 
further cut red tape, make tax administration more transparent, reform the functioning of the 
judiciary, improve bankruptcy legislation as well as its application and fight corruption, but the 
lack of any clear timetable or intermediate targets will make it difficult to use the PEP to track 
whether progress is sufficient to fully prepare the economy for accession.  
Third, a more modern structure of the economy would be pursued by the restructuring of ailing 
heavy industries and support to the development of the services sector and SME’s. 
Implementing the mining restructuring plan appears central in this respect with the aim to strike 
a balance between, on the one hand, downsizing and gradual elimination of subsidies and, on 
the other hand, socio-economic and environmental rehabilitation. Given the considerable 
direct subsidies to certain companies, which have nonetheless continued to accumulate 
arrears, a clearer commitment to reducing subsidies would have been welcomed. 
Continued reorganisation of the railway sector is also envisaged, but contrary to the mining 
sector no comprehensive strategy is yet in place, and the restructuring measures envisaged in 
the PEP fall short of convincing that companies will not continue to make losses and 
accumulate tax arrears in spite of sizeable direct subsidies. As part of the strategy for reforming 
public utilities in the energy sector, a reform of the district heating sector has been formulated. 
Its successful implementation will be a major challenge, not least since the plan requires 
substantial investments in metering and networks and since the envisaged abolition of producer 
subsidies from 2007 would imply considerable price increases for households. As the PEP does 
not mention previously announced estimates for metering investment costs (reaching from 360 
million to 1.1 billion euro) and does not deal with the removal of producer subsidies, some 
doubt is cast over whether the district heating strategy is still valid. It should be noted, that the 
programme expects the budgetary cost of granting heating aid to double over the programme 
period.  
In comparison, the SME strategy is comprehensive, setting out an array of more than 30 policy 
initiatives, among which improved access to finance, promotion of credit guarantee schemes 
and export development activities are most prominent in terms of public financing. Some 
further discussion of the expected effects of these measures would have been valuable, not least 
since the lack of credible financial records of companies and deficiencies in the markets 
underpinning the value of loan collateral remain important obstacles not addressed in the 
programme. Also, the programme is mute on the reasoning for a scheme under which SME’s 
can have refunded as grants the corporate tax paid on re-invested profits. This measure, apart 
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from the distortions it may entail in favour of incumbent enterprises and against external 
financing, may be at odds with the maximum cap on state aid intensity. 
Fourth, regulatory and legislative reforms would facilitate the further development of the 
financial sector and enhance its stability. The programme sets out clear short- and medium-term 
priorities for regulation and supervision of banks, capital markets and insurance companies, 
most of which are related to the further alignment with acquis. A number of important steps 
foreseen for the banking sector, such as the gradual increase of the deposit guarantee, the 
supervision of banks on a consolidated basis and improved accounting standards, would cater 
for increased stability and confidence in the sector. The PEP also shortly mentions the intention 
to privatise the state-owned savings bank, CEC, in 2005-06 and to proceed with the sale of a 
majority stake in the biggest commercial bank, BCR, to a strategic investor. This would be 
welcomed, since the finalisation of these privatisations would sharpen the competitive edge on 
both credits, where BCR has a strong position, and on savings, where CEC still benefits from a 
blanket deposit guarantee. In the capital market, a further alignment to European standards and 
principles would contribute to deepen the markets and increasingly attract funds from both 
households and institutional investors. For the insurance sector, the PEP foresees a smooth 
growth pattern on the back of legal and institutional improvements, but no particular reform is 
foreseen and the text falls short of addressing the role the sector could play in deepening 
financial markets, inter alia by providing life insurance products to supplement public pensions 
or by establishing and managing private pension funds. 
5.3. Labour market 
The programme reiterates a number of new measures envisaged to be implemented over the 
coming years, but aims in general at pursuing the active labour market policies already 
launched. A broad array of these measures are described, including in particular public 
subsidies aimed at creating and preserving employment, increased education and vocational 
training aimed at preventing shortage of skilled labour and institutional improvements to the 
public employment service that could facilitate the matching of supply and demand in the 
labour market. Moreover, it is envisaged to continue from 2006 the reduction of the still high 
pay-roll taxes. These measures all seem relevant, and may have had over recent years some 
impact on reducing long-term and youth unemployment although these improvements may also 
be of a cyclical nature.  
Some of the measures envisaged, such as the modulation of the unemployment benefit 
according to contribution rate and period, are apparently not yet designed in the detail, and it is 
difficult to identify potent labour market measures in the programme, which would be able to 
reverse the steady drop since the mid-1990’s in both female and male employment rates. Tax 
measures, in particular the reduction in income and social security tax, is the main approach by 
which the programme hopes to bring back into (formal) activity the large share of the working 
age population that remains outside the labour market. The tax reform implies an important 
reduction from 40% to 16% in the highest marginal income tax rate. This step would in general 
strengthen supply side conditions in the labour market and may in particular give an incentive 
for bringing into the open unreported salaries, which would generate additional tax revenue 
over the medium-term. At the same time, the positive effect on labour supply and employment 
should not be overestimated since part of the observed effect could be mostly statistical due to 
the shift from informal to formal remuneration for people having a formal work contract. 
Moreover, a number of obstacles will continue to discourage people working fully in the 
informal sector from re-entering the formal labour market. High payroll taxes still discourage 
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employment and official reporting of salaries, and a stronger positive effect of the flat-rate 
income tax could therefore be expected to occur only when payroll-taxes are further reduced. In 
the same vein, further progress in placing the pension system on a sound footing could add to 
the effect of the flat-rate tax by making formal employment more attractive, in particular for the 
low income groups for which the marginal tax rate was not reduced by the reform. Finally, the 
significant cut in profit tax from 25% to 16% would be expected to have a positive effect on 
labour demand, but the programme does not contain any estimate in this respect, and it is 
debatable to what extent a lower profit tax could instead speed up the structural change towards 
less labour-intensive production. 
Deep-rooted structural problems associated with the transition process itself, such as the 
mismatch between the labour force’s skills endowment and the requirements of a market 
environment, seem to explain the continuous decline of the participation rate, which came 
down to 62.2% in 2003. Although the net replacement rate of various out-of-work allowances is 
generally low, and therefore the benefit system generally creates few disincentives to labour 
market participation, the extensive use of early retirement and disability schemes may have 
played an important role in lowering the participation rate. In particular, this is the case for the 
advantageous access to early retirement for some professions, the rapid increase in withdrawals 
from the labour market on disability schemes and the use of prolonged severance payments 
intended to cushion the effects of redundancies in the state-owned enterprises. In the light of a 
participation rate for the 55-64 year old that remain below 40%, the programme naturally 
adheres to the objective of preventing early exit from the labour market, but is particularly 
weak in addressing specific measures to limit entry into such schemes and falls short of 
considering stricter eligibility criteria.  
The programme sees improved labour market mechanisms and higher flexibility of the labour 
force as a strategic objective. Labour market flexibility is indeed instrumental to improve the 
reallocation of resources, strengthen the economy’s resilience to adverse shocks, maintain 
Romania’s comparative advantage in labour-intensive production and create new jobs. The 
programme, however, confines itself to shortly mentioning that the Labour Code will be 
amended in co-operation with the social partners in order to ensure the code’s uniform 
application. Although the programme does not explain what amendments the government 
considers inescapable, it states that the revision will address some restrictive provisions, which 
are considered major impediments to the investment climate, such as the conditions for fixed-
term contracts and the requirements for collective dismissals, which are more restrictive than 
EU obligations imply. It is unclear whether the revision will also deal with the procedures for 
individual dismissals that are cumbersome and allow for protracted judicial recourse, the 
difficulties for the employer to redistribute working hours and the limited ability to dismiss 
personnel, which may serve as a barrier to hiring new employees. The programme would also 
have gained from discussing the merits of the fairly centralised wage bargaining system and the 
benchmark role of the statutory minimum wage, which could prevent wages from reflecting 
productivity differences across regions and skill profiles. In spite of a restrictive wage policy in 
the state-owned and public sector, only a moderate change in the relative wage structure 
between sectors has occurred. Moreover, there is some indication of a relatively small 
responsiveness of wages to unemployment developments in local labour markets, implying that 
wages do not seem to fully play their role in mitigating regional disparities.  
 - 43 - 
5.4. Other reform areas 
The PEP emphasises that agricultural reform is a priority with the objective of increasing 
competitiveness, ensuring high-quality production, speeding up land reform and preparing for 
the Common Agricultural Policy. Apart from the issue of land reform, where the programme 
aims to complete the privatisation process and the restitution of land entitlements, the 
instruments envisaged seem to be mostly producer subsidies, market regulation and financial 
support for rural development. Until accession, the budgetary cost of agricultural subsidies 
amounts to close to 450 million euro annually (approximately 0.7% of GDP), which would 
decline to around 160 million euro as of 2007 when EU agricultural transfers take effect. While 
these instruments may well be successful over time in increasing productivity on some 
agricultural holdings, it is much less clear how the policies will deal with the problem of the 
agricultural sector being a retreat for many unemployed, elderly and poor people who 
supplement low incomes with subsistence agriculture. The PEP does not clearly distinguish 
between policies aimed at necessary economic restructuring of the sector and policies aimed at 
social and rural development objectives. That leaves some concern that a dual rural economy 
may arise over time, characterised by a competitive fringe of larger effective farms and 
numerous old-fashioned farms with low productivity, low earnings and an insufficient 
investment level. 
In the field of education, the PEP gives increased weight to reforming the education system by 
improved access to quality education in terms of education material, staff qualifications and 
adequate schooling premises. This is welcomed as public spending on education has been low, 
which has caused an increasing quality gap between rural and urban areas and led to a high rate 
of non-enrolment and drop outs in rural areas. In the field of social inclusion, the PEP sets out a 
number of important objectives centred on improved social protection of for families and 
elderly people as and improvement to the administrative and institutional framework for social 
assistance. Since the submission of the PEP, the Commission and Bulgaria have signed a Joint 
Inclusion Memorandum which in the detail sets out the main challenges and policy priorities in 
the fields of social protection and social inclusion including the commitment to concrete 
follow-up actions.  
6. THE QUALITY AND SUSTAINABILITY OF PUBLIC FINANCES 
6.1. The quality of public finances 
The programme aims to further build on a number of institutional and legal measures taken 
over recent years to strengthen the budgetary framework and tax administration. These include 
the new Fiscal Code and Fiscal Procedures Code, which ensure greater transparency and 
stability of tax legislation and administration, as well as the establishment of the National 
Agency for Fiscal Administration, which is responsible for the unified collection, audit and 
enforcement of social security contributions. Also, a new Public Finance Law was adopted, 
which modernises the budgetary framework for central government, inter alia by elaborating 
indicative multi-annual budgets, setting expenditure ceilings for all budgetary agents and 
making use of budgetary reserve funds. This was complemented by initiating a process of fiscal 
decentralisation, which increases the fiscal autonomy of local authorities in terms of raising 
revenues. While these measures are likely to continue to contribute to an improvement in 
revenue collection, the programme puts little emphasis on a clear medium-term expenditure 
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framework needed for redirecting public expenditure towards human capital, infrastructure and 
administrative capacity. Such a framework could link the budget execution more concretely to a 
comprehensive strategy of re-allocating public spending, inter alia by increasing the role of the 
multi-annual budgetary framework. This would facilitate the decision-making process, improve 
time consistency and contribute to sufficient flexibility on the expenditure side of the budget, 
thereby avoiding the pitfall of rapidly increasing primary deficits when the favourable cyclical 
conditions come to an end. The framework could also comprise strengthened mechanisms for 
effective control over line ministries’ budget execution during the budget year and the 
progressive use of performance based budgeting. In combination with stricter overall 
expenditure control, inter alia by resisting the temptation to use the frequent budgetary 
rectifications to increase expenditure in line with unexpectedly high revenues, this would 
facilitate a lasting budgetary consolidation and limit pro-cyclical budget interventions. Being an 
overarching policy document, the PEP itself could become an important element in the 
formulation of such an expenditure framework.  
The programme also envisages to make the allocation of public expenditure more conducive to 
the real convergence process and to improve the quality of physical infrastructure and 
institutions. Compared to last year’s submission, additional information in relation to the 
functional distribution of public spending is provided according to ESA 95 standards, but some 
estimate for the allocation of public expenditure on main sectors would have been useful. 
Although the information is not sufficiently detailed to fully assess the extent to which the 
composition of public expenditure and revenue supports the programme’s strategic priorities, 
the programme reflects an increasing awareness of the role that public finances can play in 
enhancing potential output. A substantial increase in public investment is the main factor 
explaining the increase of public expenditure over the programme period. According to the 
programme, investment will be driven by the financing of environment, rural development and 
infrastructure projects, part of which is the implementation of a very costly motorway 
programme.  
Subsidies, social transfers other than in kind and social benefits are expected to decline 
considerably as a share of GDP over the programme period, although adequate resources for 
social protection measures remain a priority. Given the many needs for social improvement and 
the observed difficulty in recent years to limit the growth of transfers and subsidies to the rate 
initially planned, a more precise description of measures planned would have been welcomed. 
Funding for education is set to increase, but the programme does not explain the extent to 
which this is due to the wage hikes agreed in 2004. The programme aims at increasing public 
R&D expenditure to 1% of GDP in 2007, which in the light of current R&D expenditure just 
above 0.4% of GDP in 2004, around half of which was financed by businesses or from abroad, 
would constitute a major effort to strengthen the knowledge base of the economy.   
The fiscal policy as set out in the programme aims at providing strong incentives to work and 
invest, but is rather vague in providing the private sector with incentives to save more. Lower 
corporate tax creates an additional incentive for investment, thereby increasing potential output, 
stimulating technology transfer and enhancing international competitiveness. Notwithstanding 
these merits, it is questionable that the tax cut should be fully self-financed and increase 
enterprises’ propensity to save. It is noteworthy, that the cut in profit tax was partly financed by 
postponing previously agreed reductions in the social security contribution rate, and the 
programme seems not to hold up the advantages of lower profit tax against the consequences of 
raising other revenues and cutting expenditure. Cutting expenditure aimed at preparing for EU 
accession could jeopardise Romania’s preparedness for membership and could eventually 
hamper the smooth integration into the internal market. Hence, a more gradual approach to 
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lowering the profit tax could have been envisaged, not least since the investment ratio has 
already grown rapidly over recent years, reaching 23.3% of GDP in 2004 according to the 
programme. Moreover, FDI has picked up considerably since 2003, and foreign investors seem 
not to be primarily concerned by the profit tax level, but rather by other shortcomings in the 
business environment, such as the functioning of the judiciary, regulatory stability, 
transparency and predictability of the tax administration, restrictive provisions in the Labour 
Code and some remaining discriminatory government interference.  
6.2. The sustainability of public finances 
The programme deals with the long-term sustainability of public finances mainly by discussing 
the risk of a financially unsustainable public pension system against the background of four 
main factors: contribution rate, collection rate, real GDP growth and demographic 
developments. Financing of the public pension system, which would amount to 7-8% of GDP 
in 2005, has increased gradually since the late 1990’s, and the public pension fund has 
consistently recorded a deficit of up to 1% of GDP. The programme explains that this 
development is caused by the number of beneficiaries growing from 3.4 million in 1990 to 6.1 
million in 2004, but does not give emphasis to the extensive use of early retirement and 
disability schemes throughout the 1990’s, which are important factors in explaining this 
development. Moreover, due to an increasing number of self-employed and people working in 
agriculture and in the informal economy, the number of contributors has nearly halved during 
the 1990’s and currently less than half of the active population contributes to the public pension 
system. Thus, with 0.7 employees per pensioner in 2002 compared to 3.4 employees per 
pensioner in 1990, Romania faces already today a very unfavourable economic dependency 
ratio. The programme contains no long-term estimate of pension expenditures as a share of 
GDP, but briefly discusses the underlying assumptions for the period 2000-50, which are based 
on the assumptions of GDP growth remaining above 5% until 2030, constantly low 
unemployment rates and a significant increase in both male and female participation rate until 
2030. Demographically, increased life expectancy is expected to be mitigated by a higher 
fertility rate, although the old-age dependency ratio is still expected to increase from around 
35% in 2000 to 51% by 2050.  
The programme underlines that reform steps were taken to improve the financial balance of the 
system. These steps include setting up third-pillar private pension funds, for which participation 
will be optional, and the introduction as from 2008 of a privately managed second pillar 
pension system based on compulsory participation for younger employees. Furthermore, the 
public pension fund will from 2005 be alleviated by moving the financing of farmers’ pensions 
and some shorter-term benefits to the state budget. Finally, the statutory retirement age is being 
gradually lifted for both men and women. Regrettably, the programme does not comprise any 
analysis of the financial state of the public pension fund. Previous estimates submitted showed 
that if aiming at a positive real growth in public pensions in order to gradually restore the 
replacement ratio at the level of 1990 and if continuing the so-called “re-correlation” of 
pensions, the deficit in the pension fund would reach 1.2% of GDP in 2007. Re-correlation 
consists in increasing benefits for many pensioners in order to even out disparities between 
various cohorts, caused by high inflation and different indexation, and incurred in 2002-04 
budgetary costs of around 1.3% of the average annual GDP. The intended intensification of the 
re-correlation, which alone in 2006 would amount to close to 0.7% of GDP, would tend to 
further increase the deficit in the pension fund over the coming years. Moreover, the envisaged 
cuts in social security contribution rates could have an immediate negative impact on the 
funding of the public pension fund. Also, it is not clear to which extent the diversion after 2006 
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of contributions from the first pillar system to the second pillar is taken into account in the 
programme. At the same time, however, the programme aims at preserving the real level of 
public pensions once the re-correlation is finalised. This is a more moderate approach to lifting 
public pensions than in the past, both in terms of replacement ratio and in terms of the real level 
of pensions, which grew by close to 11% in 2004.  
As regards the need for further reform, the programme states that supplementary measures may 
be taken in the light of demographic developments. In view of the ageing of the population and 
the structural imbalance of the public pension system, which already today requires significant 
transfers from the state budget to the social security budget to cover the shortfall of financing, 
this appears to be a modest ambition. Given the existent shortfall of contributors to the pension 
system and the relatively certain estimates of a sharp increase in the old-age dependency ratio, a 
more pro-active and comprehensive strategy would be required to prevent an increasingly 
underfinanced first pillar and a persistently low replacement rate, which would cause increasing 
disparity in living standard between the working and the retired population. Both financial and 
social reasons therefore accentuate the need to develop and implement a comprehensive 
strategy for reforming the pension system with the twofold purpose of improving its financial 
sustainability and providing an adequate pension level.   
While pension reform is indeed a central issue, challenges in the health system and measures 
envisaged to ensure its longer-term financial balance are barely considered. The current low 
standards and coverage of medical care in combination with the impact of ageing and growing 
real incomes make it likely that a significant expenditure pressure may occur in this field. In 
line with the sustainability projections carried out by the EPC, other age-related expenditure, in 
particular for education and unemployment benefits, would also have to be factored in. Other 
elements of the three-pronged strategy, in particular measures to raise the employment rate, are 
not well addressed. This casts some doubt over the real growth scenario, which hinges on 
attaining high employment rates. Also, given the considerable emigration of Romanians since 
the 1990’s, some discussion of how expected migration flows could impact on the size of the 
working age population would have been useful. As the projections are highly sensitive to 
demographic developments, the programme could have been clearer in presenting the 
demographic scenario, and in particular the means by which higher fertility rates and higher 
participation rates for women can be attained simultaneously. Altogether, the PEP does not 
provide sufficient information to comprehensively assess the long-term sustainability of public 
finances. A broader coverage of issues and the elaboration of projections based on a 
methodology and assumptions comparable to recent analyses of the EPC would be instrumental 
to better ascertain the impact of ageing on public finances and should be an important element 
in Romania’s preparation for the participation in the EU economic policy co-ordination.  
* * * 
 - 47 - 
Annex table 1: Structural indicators
ROMANIA EU 25
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
General economic background
Real GDP 1 2.1 5.7 5.0 4.9 8.3 3.7 1.8 1.1 1.0 2.3
Labour productivity 2 0.6 7.0 7.2 6.1 8.1 2.1 0.8 0.8 0.8 1.8
Real unit labour cost 3 21.7 -1.1 n.a. -0.8 -2.5 0.4 0.4 -0.4 -0.5 -0.9
Real effective exchange rate 4 137.5 140.5 132.2 131.7 137.8 98.7 100.5 103.0 106.1 108.8
Inflation rate 5 45.7 34.5 22.5 15.3 11.9 2.4 2.5 2.1 1.9 2.1
Unemployment rate 6 6.8 6.6 7.5 6.8 7.1 8.6 8.4 8.7 8.9 9.0
Employment
Employment rate 7 63.0 62.4 57.6 57.6 57.7 62.5 62.9 62.9 63.0 63.3
Employment rate - females 8 57.5 57.1 51.8 51.5 52.1 53.7 54.3 54.7 55.1 55.8
Employment rate of older workers 9 49.5 48.2 37.3 38.1 36.9 36.6 37.4 38.8 40.2 40.5
Long-term unemployment 10 3.5 3.2 4.0 4.2 4.2 3.9 3.8 3.9 4.0 4.1
Product market reforms 
Relative price levels 11 41.9 41.9 41.2 40.5p n.a. 100 100 100 100 100
Total trade-to-GDP ratio 12 42.9 43.5 41.8 43.9 48.1 : 9.7 9.2 9.0 9.4
Total FDI inflows 13 2.9 2.9 2.5 3.1 7.1 16.0 7.6 8.3 6.1 3.9
Market share electricity 14 100.0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Sectoral and ad-hoc state aids 15 1.7 3.9 1.0 n.a. n.a. 0.3 0.3 0.3 : :
Business investment 16 17.0 18.3 18.2 19.1 19.1f 18.4 17.9 17.2 16.8 17.0
Knowledge-based economy
Tertiary graduates 17 18.0 20.2 26.7 39.3 n.a. 43.2 47.0 49.0 52.2 n.a.
Spending on human resources 18 2.89 3.28 3.53 n.a. n.a. 4.9 5.1 5.2 n.a. n.a.
Educational attainment 19 75.8 77.3 75.3 73.8 74.8 76.4 76.2 76.5 76.6 76.7
R&D expenditure 20 0.37 0.39 0.38 0.40 n.a. 1.88 1.92 1.93 1.95 n.a.
Internet access 21 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 6.0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 42.0
Source:  Commission services.
1. Growth rate of real GDP in %.  2. Growth rate of real GDP per person employed in %.  3. Ratio of compensation per employee to 
nominal GDP per person employed, total economy, annual percentage change.  4. Vs IC36 (1999 = 100), current year's values are based on 
Commission's forecast deflator figures, nominal unit labour cost deflator.  5. Annual average rate of change in Interim Harmonized Indices 
of Consumer Prices (HICPs).  6. Unemployed persons as a share of the total active population.  7. Employed persons aged 15-64 in % of 
total population of the same age group. 8. Employed women aged 15-64 in % of total female population of the same age group. 9. 
Employed persons aged 55-64 in % of total population of the same age group.  10. Long-term unemployed (over 12 months) in % of total 
active population aged 15-64.   
11. Of private final consumption (EU25=100). 12. average value of imports and exports of goods and services in % o GDP; the value for 
EU 15 is the total for the Small Member States. 13. In % of GDP. 14. Market share of the largest generator (% of total net generation). 15. 
In % of GDP. 16. Gross fixed capital formation by the private sector in % of GDP.  17.Total tertiary graduates (ISCED 5-6) per 1000 of 
population aged 20-29. 18. Public expenditure on education in % of GDP. 19. Percentage of the population aged 20 to 24 having completed 
at least upper secondary education. 20. GERD (Gross domestic expenditure on R&D) - in % of GDP. 21. Percentage of households who 
have Internet access at home.
f: forecast, e: estimated value, p: provisional value, b: break in series, s: Eurostat estimate, r: revised value, q: estimated from quarterly 
values.
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PRE-ACCESSION ECONOMIC PROGRAMME OF CROATIA 
1. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The ECOFIN Council of 26/27 November 2004 considered: “...that a regular in-depth dialogue 
with accession countries on a large spectrum of macro-economic policy and financial stability 
issues will assist the accession process. It could be used both as a means to identify risks and 
vulnerabilities in these countries and as a way to help them define their strategy for economic 
integration into the EU. Such a dialogue would further enhance the cooperation and the 
exchange of information between existing and future Member States ahead of their accession.  
(...)  The Commission is invited to report each year to the Council (Ecofin) on its assessment of 
the fiscal notification and the Pre-accession Economic Programmes, which are to be presented 
by the accession countries from 2001 onwards, as well as on the conclusions of the high level 
meeting.” 
Following the recognition of Croatia as a candidate country by the Council on 18 June 2004, 
Commission services invited the Croatian authorities to present a first Pre-Accession Economic 
Programme (the “2004 PEP”). On 1st December 2004, the Croatian Minister of Finance, Mr 
Ivan Suker, submitted on behalf of the Croatian government the first PEP of Croatia to the 
Commission, following its adoption by the government on 30 November. The authorities have 
subsequently sent revised sets of tables as the previous version contained a number of obvious 
errors and inconsistencies. The programme, which covers the period 2005-2007, presents a 
rather coherent macroeconomic framework, including medium-term fiscal targets and 
projections for key macroeconomic variables. While data are presented according to the GFS 
methodology, the introduction of ESA 95 standards is envisaged, yet not precisely scheduled. A 
significant part of the programme reports on structural reform measures already undertaken, in 
particular highlighting changes of the legislative framework. The assessment of envisaged 
structural reform measures would have benefited from a clearer definition of policy objectives 
and more information on instruments and cost estimates. Given the pioneer character of the 
document, it only partly complies with the content, form and data requested in the consolidated 
outline. The document is consistent with the government’s “Fiscal Policy Guidelines” adopted 
in July 2004 and the draft budget for 2005 and its medium-term budgetary projections, adopted 
in November 2004.  
The main objective of the programme is to reduce macroeconomic risks stemming from 
external imbalances, i.e. a significant current account deficit and a high and rising external debt, 
through a policy of considerable fiscal adjustment over the programme period. Monetary policy 
will continue to be geared at preserving price and exchange rate stability. The programme 
envisages an acceleration of privatisation and restructuring, in particular in the agriculture, 
shipbuilding and tourism sector and the development of a vibrant SME sector. 
The 2004 PEP projects a robust and slightly accelerating real growth, averaging 4.5% over the 
programme period, based on continuously strong domestic demand. Such growth rates appear 
rather optimistic. Against the background of a projected significant slowdown of public 
investment, such a growth scenario would require a rapid and strong acceleration of private 
investment growth. The latter may however to some extent continue to be undermined by 
persisting structural weaknesses of the economy. Also, the projected acceleration of public 
consumption growth may contradict with the fiscal consolidation foreseen. The European 
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Commission’s recent spring 2005 forecast projects a somewhat slower growth acceleration in 
2005 and 2006, based on a more modest increase of domestic demand growth in the context of 
continued stabilisation policies. With respect to the sources of growth, the 2004 PEP assumes a 
rather static contribution of demand components over the programme period. The broadly 
neutral effect of net foreign demand appears to be in contradiction with the otherwise 
favourable external assumptions of the programme. The European Commission’s Spring 
forecast predicts the sources of Croatian GDP growth to gradually change over 2004 - 2006, 
reflecting a shift from domestic to net foreign demand, as a result of an improving performance 
of exports of goods and services.  
The 2004 PEP projects a gradual and significant narrowing of the current account deficit from 
7.2% of GDP in 2003 to 3.8% of GDP in 2007, mainly driven by a reduction of the public 
sector savings-investment gap. The projected deficit reduction is seen as result of continued 
fiscal adjustment and a favourable external environment. However, it should be noted that 
under a scenario of robust growth and accelerated enterprise restructuring, privatisation and 
investment, the private sector savings and investment gap could well increase, absorbing net 
foreign savings, which may suggest larger current account deficits than those projected. The 
document does not address these kind of considerations. Unfortunately, the 2004 PEP does not 
provide detailed information on the financial and capital accounts. It only states that a major 
share of current account deficits in 2005 and 2006 is projected to be financed by net FDI 
inflows. In 2007, the deficit would be fully financed by net FDI.  
The 2004 PEP foresees no major changes with respect to the monetary and exchange rate 
policy framework. Indeed, the high degree of currency substitution and the ensuing credit risks 
constrain exchange rate flexibility and the scope for an independent monetary policy. The PEP 
assumes a constant nominal exchange rate against the euro over the entire programme period. 
Annual average inflation is projected to increase to 2.6% in 2005, mainly as a result of a lagged 
effect of the oil price hike in 2004, and to decline to 2.3% and 2.2% in 2006 and 2007, 
respectively. The projected inflation trend seems somewhat optimistic, as a scenario of 
accelerating growth, productivity increases, and net capital inflows could lead to real 
appreciation pressures, implying higher inflation rates over the programme period, in particular 
under the assumption of a constant nominal exchange rate. Further administrative price 
adjustments may also continue to fuel inflation to some extent. The Commission’s recent 
forecast projected average CPI inflation in 2005 and 2006 to increase to 2.7 and 2.8%, 
respectively, somewhat above the projected rates in the 2004 PEP. The 2004 PEP would have 
benefited from a brief presentation of possible policy responses to real appreciation pressures 
that may occur over the medium term, also in view of the preparation for ERM II participation.  
The 2004 PEP projects a significant gradual reduction of the general government balance from 
an expected 4.5% of GDP in 2004 to below 3% in 2007. Croatia’s first fiscal notification 
submitted in March 2005 reports a higher deficit of 5.2% of GDP for 2004, though part of the 
deviation from the 2004 target is due to the use of GFS 2001 in the fiscal notification, while the 
PEP targets are defined on the basis of GFS 1986. The equivalent deficit for 2004 is 4.9% of 
GDP, significantly higher than planned, which implies the need for a stronger fiscal adjustment 
in 2005 and beyond if the PEP’s fiscal targets are to be met. Fiscal adjustment is projected to 
take place primarily through a reduction of the share of public spending from 52.1% of GDP in 
2004 to 49.7% of GDP in 2007, or by 2.4 percentage points, while total revenues will decline 
slightly from 47.6% to 46.8% of GDP during the same period. The fiscal strategy foresees a 
reduction of the share of spending on wages, pensions, and social security, as well as a 
significant reduction of subsidies to the non-agriculture enterprise sector. Gross public debt is 
projected to be reduced to 52% of GDP in 2007, or by 1.8 percentage points as compared to 
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2004. The marked and continuous reduction of primary balances and revenues from 
privatisation, that are expected to be particularly significant in 2005 appear to explain a major 
part of continuous debt adjustment over the PEP period. The impact of interest payments on 
debt growth is projected to increase over the programme period, also in line with the planned 
shift from external to domestic financing which may entail somewhat higher borrowing costs.. 
Debt figures in the 2004 PEP and those reported in the first fiscal notification are not 
comparable, as the latter do not include contingent liabilities of the general government.  
While the overall fiscal adjustment envisaged seems appropriate and encouraging, it is difficult 
to detect whether the programme is sufficiently backed by permanent structural policy 
measures on both the revenue and expenditure side. The document contains only little 
information on specific fiscal or other economic policy measures and quantitative assessments 
of budgetary effects are generally not provided. While acknowledging the pioneer character of 
the 2004 PEP, the document would have certainly benefited from a larger degree of precision in 
this respect. A number of potential fiscal risks are not elaborated in the programme, such as 
reliance on one-off revenues measures and potential over-spending of other levels of 
governments and government agencies which seem still difficult to control, e.g. the Health 
Fund and the Railway system.  
The 2004 PEP covers structural reforms related to the enterprise and financial sector, labour 
market, agricultural sector and public administration. Moreover, it reports on a broad range of 
other horizontal or sector reforms, including judicial reform, environmental protection, 
education, transport and public procurement. The main policy objectives are the swift 
completion of privatisation of socially-owned enterprises, the promotion of SME development, 
a continuation of pension and social security reforms and the reform of public administration. 
Key measures are legislative alignment with EU law, institutional strengthening, and state 
financial support, in particular financial aid schemes for SMEs and for the restructuring of loss 
making enterprises in agriculture, tourism and shipbuilding.  
The presentation of the future structural reform agenda sometimes lacks a precise description of 
policy priorities, objectives and key measures to be undertaken. Reforms are not always related 
to specific structural deficiencies and cost estimates are generally not provided. Future 
programmes would certainly benefit from more detailed information in this respect. 
Privatisation and restructuring plans seem very ambitious and certainly require a renewed and 
strong reform commitment from the Croatian authorities as well as a swift removal of those 
obstacles that have seriously delayed the privatisation process in the past. With respect to the 
financial sector, the 2004 PEP does not provide plans as to the privatisation of the largest 
insurance company that was repeatedly announced in the past but has not yet materialised. On 
social security reforms, the PEP outlines a number of policy objectives, such as enhancing the 
efficiency and transparency of the system, but remains rather vague on the nature of policy 
measures planned to be undertaken.  
The 2004 PEP reports on a number of measures that are principally appropriate to enhance the 
quality of public finance. A key objective of the programme is a more efficient public 
administration. Public finance reforms are targeted at enhancing fiscal transparency and 
spending control. A reorientation of public spending towards education, research and 
development is foreseen, but a quantitative budgetary assessment is not provided. A reform of 
public procurement is planned to be implemented in 2005. Continued investments in and 
maintenance of road infrastructure to improve inter-regional connections are also foreseen 
under the programme. The 2004 PEP does not explicitly deal with the sustainability of public 
finance; it however reports on parametric reforms to be undertaken during the programme 
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period with a view to financially strengthening the first pillar of the pension system, including 
the re-adjustment of the pension formula in 2005. It is also intended to promote the second and 
third pillar, which could favourably impact on domestic savings, investment and growth. 
Overall, pension reforms envisaged could help curtailing the budgetary implications of an 
ageing population.  
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Real GDP growth COM 4.3 3.7 4.0 4.3 n. a.
(% change) PEP 4.3 3.9 4.4 4.5 4.6
Consumer price COM 1.8 2.1 2.7 2.8 n. a.
inflation (%) PEP 1.8 2.2 2.5 2.3 2.2
General government COM -6.3 -5.0 -4.4 -3.9 n. a.
 balance (% of GDP) PEP -6.3 -4.5 -3.7 -3.2 -2.9
Primary balance (*) COM n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a.
(% of GDP) PEP -3.0 -1.9 -1.3 -0.7 -0.3
Government gross COM 51.6 53.8 53.2 52.5 n. a.
debt (% of GDP) PEP 51.6 53.8 52.5 52.5 52.0
 *) data are on cash basis
Table 1:  Comparison of key macroeconomic and budgetary projections
 
It can thus be concluded: 
• Croatia’s first Pre-Accession Economic Programme for 2005-2007 is a comprehensive 
economic policy document, outlining a fundamentally sound medium-term macroeconomic 
framework, appropriate to address the current external imbalances. Given its pioneer 
character, the document only partly complies with the content, form and data requested. It is 
consistent with other policy documents which it complements and it should help 
strengthening guidance for economic policy making.  
• Over the past two years, the Croatian economy has benefited from relatively strong, but 
decelerating growth with low inflation and exchange rate stability. Significant fiscal and 
current account deficits have contributed to a high and rising external debt and need to be 
urgently addressed. The programme’s medium-term macroeconomic projections for growth, 
inflation and fiscal balances seem partly optimistic. 
• The programme’s policy mix of continued fiscal adjustment and stability-oriented monetary 
policies addresses the current imbalances of the Croatian economy in an appropriate way. 
However, the programme would have benefited from more detailed information on specific 
fiscal policy measures, their expected budgetary effects as well as the potential fiscal risks 
involved to fully assess the quality and sustainability of fiscal adjustment.  
• The structural reform agenda seems generally ambitious and will certainly require a strong 
reform commitment from the Croatian authorities as well as a swift removal of those 
obstacles that have seriously delayed reforms in the past. The presentation of envisaged 
structural reforms would have benefited from a clearer definition of objectives and specific 
measures, including estimates on the respective budgetary effects involved.  
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2. JOINT MINISTERIAL CONCLUSIONS 
“On 12 July 2005, the Economic and Finance Ministers of the EU and the acceding and 
candidate countries, along with representatives of the Commission and the European 
Central Bank and representatives of the Central Banks of the acceding and candidate 
countries, met for their seventh economic policy dialogue meeting. 
... 
Ministers welcomed the 2004 Pre-accession Economic Programmes of the two candidate 
countries. Ministers endorsed the following conclusions as regards the assessment of these 
programmes:  
Croatia 
1. Given its pioneer character, Croatia’s first PEP only partly complies with the content, 
form and data requested, but it should help strengthening guidance for economic 
policy making.  
2. Over the past two years, the Croatian economy has benefited from relatively strong, 
but decelerating growth with low inflation and exchange rate stability. Significant 
fiscal and current account deficits have contributed to a high and rising external debt 
and need to continue to be urgently addressed. The programme’s medium-term 
projections 2004-2007 for growth, inflation and fiscal balances seem partly 
optimistic, although coherent.  
3. While the overall envisaged fiscal adjustment seems appropriate and encouraging, the 
programme would have benefited from more detailed information on specific fiscal 
policy measures, their expected budgetary effects as well as the potential fiscal risks 
involved to fully assess the quality and sustainability of fiscal adjustment. 
4. The structural reform agenda seems ambitious, with reforms planned in a broad 
range of areas. It will certainly require a strong commitment from the Croatian 
authorities as well as a swift removal of institutional weaknesses that have seriously 
delayed reforms in the past. The structural reform agenda sometimes lacked a precise 
description of policy priorities, objectives and key measures to be undertaken, without 
cost estimates being provided. Future programmes would benefit from more detailed 
information in this respect. 
In view of the above assessment, Ministers were of the opinion that Croatia needs to 
continue to address as appropriate the present macroeconomic imbalances – mainly 
government deficit, current account deficit and external debt. Croatia also needs to tackle 
the remaining deep-rooted structural problems that may impair its capacity to stay on a 
path of strong growth. In this respect, EPC is invited to complement its 2004 work on the 
structural challenges in the candidate countries by an analysis on Croatia. Croatia should 
especially continue to advance privatisation and enterprise restructuring.  
…” 
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3. INTRODUCTION 
On 1 December 2004, the Croatian Minister of Finance, Mr Ivan Suker, submitted on behalf of 
the Croatian government the first Pre-Accession Economic Programme (the “2004 PEP”) of 
Croatia to the Commission, following government adoption on 30 November. The programme, 
which covers the period 2005-2007, presents a rather coherent macroeconomic framework, 
including medium-term fiscal targets and projections for key macroeconomic variables.  
While data are presented according to GFS methodology, the introduction of ESA 95 standards 
is envisaged, yet not precisely scheduled. A significant part of the programme reports on 
structural reform measures already undertaken, in particular highlighting changes of the 
legislative framework. The section on structural reforms does not appear to be a self-contained 
analysis. It is generally difficult to read and sometimes lacks an analytical assessment of how 
these measures contribute to the reform of goods and capital markets in the light of EU-
integration. The programme would have also benefited from a clearer definition of policy 
objectives and more information on instruments and cost estimates. Given the pioneer character 
of the document, it only partly complies with the content, form and data requested in the 
consolidated outline. The document is consistent with the government’s “Fiscal Policy 
Guidelines” adopted in July 2004 and the draft budget for 2005 and its medium-term budgetary 
projections, adopted in November 2005. The section on structural reforms is broadly in line 
with the respective parts of the 2005 National Programme for the Integration of the Republic of 
Croatia into the European Union.  
The main objective of the programme is to reduce macroeconomic risks stemming from 
external imbalances, i.e. a high current account deficit and a rising external debt, through a 
policy of significant fiscal adjustment over the programme period. The general government 
deficit is programmed to be reduced to below 3% of GDP by 2007 and the public debt to be 
stabilised at around 52% of GDP. Inflation is projected to remain low, supported by exchange 
rate stability and moderate wage policies. A reduction of interest rates is expected to encourage 
private investment and consumption over the programme period. The external debt to GDP 
ratio is projected to remain stable at slightly above 80% in 2004-2006 (after 74.6% at end-
2003), before it would fall to 79% in 2007. The programme envisages an acceleration of 
privatisation and restructuring, including in the agriculture, shipbuilding and tourism sector.  
4. MACROECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS 
4.1. Recent macroeconomic developments 
The PEP presents a fairly comprehensive overview of recent economic developments in 2003 
and the first eight months of 2004 for most economic indicators. In some cases, it should have 
been possible to provide more recent data (e.g. on inflation) and more details (e.g. on 
merchandise trade developments). Some important data are not provided at all (e.g. on wage 
developments) and in some cases the factual description would have benefited from more 
accuracy. The descriptive part contains also projections for 2004 which are not always 
consistent with projections of the macroeconomic programme presented later (e.g. on the 
current account deficit). 
According to the PEP, real GDP growth declined from 5.2% in 2002 to 4.3% in 2003 and 4% in 
the first half of 2004, as a result of a deceleration of private consumption growth. This trend 
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continued through end-2004, resulting in a lower annual GDP growth of 3.8% for the year as a 
whole. Total employment grew by 2.6% in 2003 and unemployment rates based on labour force 
survey data continued to decline from 14.7% in 2003 to 13.8% in the first half of 2004. 
Inflation remained low at 2% year-on-year in August 2004, as a result of moderate wage 
growth and only modest adjustments of administered prices. In the second half of 2004, 
inflation accelerated to 2.7%, mainly as a result of higher energy prices. The Kuna exchange 
rate remained stable in nominal terms and continued to appreciate in real effective terms in 
2003 and in 2004 by 2.5% and 3.2%, respectively. Monetary policy continued to be rather tight, 
curbing domestic credit growth to the non-banking sector which slowed down from 30% in 
2002 to 14.6% in 2003 and 13% in 2004. The current account recorded a significant deficit of 
7.2% of GDP in 2003, reflecting a huge trade deficit and a negative income balance. A strong 
export performance in 2004 supported a significant reduction of the current account deficit to 
below 5% in 2004.  The PEP emphasises that the external debt continued to grow, reaching 
77.3% of GDP in July 2004, as compared to 74.6% at end-2003. The external debt-to-GDP 
ratio climbed further to 82% of GDP by end-2004. The general government deficit in 2003 
stood at 6.3% of GDP, breaching the initial target of 4.5%, due to higher-than-planned 
spending commitments. Based on first half year data, the PEP projects the 2004 deficit to be 
reduced to 4.5% as initially targeted, while it actually reached 4.9% of GDP. 
COM PEP COM PEP COM PEP COM PEP COM PEP
 Real GDP (% change) 4.3 4.3 3.7 3.9 4.0 4.4 4.3 4.5 n. a. 4.6
 Contributions:
 - Final domestic demand 6.5 6.5 3.9 3.9 3.8 4.4 3.9 4.6 n. a. 4.8
 - Change in inventories -0.7 -0.7 -0.2 0.0 -0.2 0.0 -0.1 0.0 n. a. 0.0
- External balance of goods 
and services -1.5 -1.5 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.5 -0.1 n. a. -0.2
 Employment (% change) 0.1 0.3 0.5 -0.7 1.0 1.6 1.2 1.5 n. a. 1.5
 Unemployment rate (%) 14.5 14.7 13.9 14.9 13.3 14.2 12.5 13.3 n. a. 12.1
 GDP deflator (% change) 3.2 3.3 2.9 2.2 3.4 2.6 3.4 2.3 n. a. 2.2
 CPI inflation (%) 1.8 1.8 2.1 2.2 2.7 2.5 2.8 2.3 n. a. 2.2
 Current account balance 
(% of GDP) -7.0 -7.2 -5.3 -5.6 -4.7 -5.1 -4.5 -4.4 n. a. -3.8
Sources: Pre-Accession Economic Programme (PEP); Commission services Autumn 2004 forecasts (COM)
Table 2: Comparison of macroeconomic developments and forecasts
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
 
4.2. Macroeconomic scenario 
The PEP outlines a medium-term macroeconomic scenario with projections for key variables, 
covering real sector, fiscal and external developments. Alternative scenarios are not presented. 
Projections are based on a financial programming and accounting methodology. The scenario is 
presented in an overall coherent and consistent way. The main objective is the reduction of 
macroeconomic risks stemming from current external imbalances in the form of significant 
current account deficits and a high and increasing external debt. The key policy instrument to 
achieve these objectives is fiscal consolidation, namely a reduction of the fiscal balance to 
below 3% of GDP by 2007, through a rationalisation of current spending and lower public 
investments. Monetary and exchange rate policies remain primarily geared at price stability and 
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the exchange rate is programmed to remain stable vis-à-vis the euro. The policy mix appears 
appropriate under the specific Croatian circumstances, i.e. a high level of currency substitution 
which limits the scope for a fully autonomous monetary and exchange rate policy. The 
macroeconomic scenario would have benefited from elaborating on possible strategies and 
policies to address the potential conflict between low inflation and a stable exchange rate in an 
open catching-up economy with liberalised capital markets and access to finance. The 
projections are based on the assumptions of an economic recovery in the EU/euro area, 
Croatia’s main trading partner, which is broadly in line with the Commission’s external 
assumptions in the spring economic forecast. Moreover, world trade in goods and services is 
assumed to grow.  
Real sector 
The PEP is based on a scenario of relatively robust real growth, averaging around 4.5% over 
the programme period, following a further decline of the growth rate in 2004 to 3.8%. Growth 
projections are somewhat more optimistic as compared to the recent Spring 2005 forecast 
presented by the European Commission, which projects real GDP to grow by 4.0% and 4.3% in 
2005 and 2006, respectively. The PEP assumes a significant acceleration of private 
consumption growth from 3.8% in 2004 to 4.6% in 2005, to be followed by a 4.3% increase in 
both 2006 and 2007. However, the assumption of continued fiscal consolidation, tight monetary 
policy, and moderate wage adjustments may suggest a more moderate growth profile. This led 
the Commission to forecast a 4.1% growth of private consumption in 2005 and 2006. The PEP 
contains contradictory information on the projected real growth of public consumption. While 
the text part on page 12 assumes an average annual real growth of 3.6%, table 1 in the ANNEX 
indicates a different growth profile of public consumption with lower, but still positive and 
accelerating growth rates in 2005-2007. However, both scenarios do not appear to be consistent 
with the projected strong fiscal adjustment, even under the assumption of a lower government 
consumption deflator. The projected growth profile of gross fixed capital formation with 
substantially lower growth rates during the PEP period as compared to 2003 appears plausible 
and reflects the gradual termination of public investment projects to be followed by a stronger 
private investment toward the latter part of the PEP period.  
In the 2004 PEP scenario, real growth over the period 2004 to 2007 remains to be exclusively 
driven by domestic demand. Private consumption and gross fixed capital formation are 
projected to contribute 2.6 and 1.5 percentage points, respectively, to real growth on an annual 
average. The effect on real growth of net foreign demand remains broadly neutral over the 
programme period, which is somewhat surprising against the background of overall favourable 
external assumptions of the programme, e.g. further trade integration and good export 
performance. Based on similar external assumptions, the recent Commission’s forecast projects 
a gradual change of the sources of Croatian GDP growth over the forecast period 2004 to 2006, 
reflecting a shift from domestic to net foreign demand. The contribution of domestic demand 
falls from 6.5% in 2003 to a still strong 3.9% in 2004 - and 2006. Net exports are projected by 
the Commission to contribute positively to growth in 2005 and 2006 with 0.3% and 0.5%, 
respectively. Such a scenario is also plausible under the policy mix and the external 
assumptions presented in the PEP. Actual developments in 2004 also point to a changing 
growth composition, as net external demand for the first time since 2000 posted a positive 
contribution to GDP growth. On the supply side, the document’s projections of a relatively 
strong growth of both industry and services over the PEP period appear plausible and in line 
with the underlying assumptions of the programme. The document does not provide 
information as to what extent the growth scenario is based on projections on Croatia’s potential 
 - 56 - 
growth. It neither elaborates on expected changes in factors of production (e.g. labour market 
developments) and productivity. Moreover, a more detailed assessment on which factors would 
lead to an “improved labour productivity” (pages 12, 18) would have added to the quality of the 
2004 PEP.  
External sector 
The PEP projects a gradual and significant narrowing of the current account deficit from 7.2% 
of GDP in 2003 to 3.8% of GDP in 2007. It outlines a scenario of strong and accelerating 
growth of merchandise exports while merchandise imports are projected to grow more slowly. 
Export recovery is seen as a result of further integration with the EU economy, together with 
stronger FDI, ongoing enterprise restructuring and improved labour productivity raising price 
competitiveness. As a result, the merchandise trade deficit is projected to be reduced from 
27.4% in 2003 to 23.2% in 2007, i.e. by 4.2% of GDP. The 2004 PEP does not contain a 
competitiveness assessment on the basis of projected real effective exchange rate trends. The 
programme assumes a continuously good performance of tourism and related air traffic 
services, but does not provide any quantification on the latter. As a result, a huge surplus of the 
services balance, although slightly declining as a % of GDP, continues to counterbalance a 
significant part of the merchandise trade deficit over the reference period. Information provided 
on the projected development of net factor income from abroad (incl. interest income) is rather 
cryptic. Table 3 suggests that net interest payments to the rest of the world will slightly increase 
in 2005, but markedly decline in 2006 and 2007 both in euro terms and as a percent of GDP. 
While the document does not explicitly provide an explanation for this trend, lower interest 
payments to non-residents may seem plausible against the planned shift from foreign to 
domestic borrowing. Other net factor income from abroad are projected to remain broadly 
constant as a share of GDP. The surplus in the balance of net current transfers is projected to 
slightly increase, on the back of an expected growth of workers’ remittances. As a percentage 
of GDP, the surplus in current transfers will decline from 4.4% in 2004 to 3.9% in 2007. The 
significant reduction of the current account deficit to below 5% that took place in 2004 is a 
welcome development and supportive of the strong current account adjustment in 2005-2007, 
as programmed in the PEP. However, it should be noted that the lower deficit in 2004 was 
partly a result of an improved export performance, but also due to some one-off transaction in 
the income balance, resulting from the transfer of patent rights of a Croatian company to an 
affiliate abroad. Overall, the projected reduction of the current account deficit in 2005 – 2007 
seems rather optimistic. From a savings-investment perspective, the deficit reduction may be 
interpreted as a reflection of gradually lowering fiscal imbalances, as envisaged in the 
programme. If fiscal policies turn out to be more expansionary than envisaged, current account 
deficits may actually be higher. Moreover, the underlying assumptions of the 2004 PEP of 
robust growth, as well as accelerated enterprise restructuring, privatisation and investment 
could well imply higher private sector savings and investment gaps than those indicated in table 
3, absorbing higher net foreign savings. The latter would also suggest higher current account 
deficits than those projected in the PEP.   
The PEP does not provide detailed quantitative information on developments of the financial 
and capital account. A significant share, i.e. above 90%, of the current account deficits in 2005 
and 2006 are projected to be financed by net FDI inflows. In 2007, the deficit is fully financed 
by net FDI. The PEP assumes that foreign investor’s confidence will be strengthened through 
the negotiations on EU membership, the implementation of the current IMF programme and 
continuous reform efforts in the country, notably in the area of privatisation and public 
administration reform. The projected net inflow of FDI accounts for 4.6% of GDP in 2005, 
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4.1% in 2006 and 3.9% in 2007. This profile does not seem overly optimistic in the context of 
envisaged macroeconomic and structural policies and the expected acceleration of privatisation 
and investment in the Croatian economy. The programme does not elaborate on the 
development of foreign currency reserves over the reference period; table 3 however suggests a 
steady annual increase in foreign reserves by around 6%. No information is provided on the 
state of play and future plan with respect to the liberalisation of capital movements as required 
under the EU acquis.  
4.3. Monetary and exchange rate policy 
The PEP contains a comprehensive description of the monetary and exchange rate policy 
framework that has practically been in place during the past ten years which is labelled as a 
“managed float”. The primary policy objective is price stability. The exchange rate has 
traditionally been used as a stabilisation anchor, following periods of high and hyperinflation in 
the early 1990ies. The scope for larger exchange rate flexibility is constrained against the 
background of a highly euro-ised financial system with a significant share of banking deposits 
denominated in foreign exchange. In order to lower exchange rate risks, commercial bank’s 
lending is either denominated in or indexed to the euro. However, as borrowers are usually not 
in a position to hedge foreign exchange liabilities, the Croatian financial sector is faced with 
significant credit risks. Against this background, exchange rate stability becomes an important 
intermediate policy objective in the context of monetary policy. De facto, the Croatian 
monetary and exchange rate regime is more similar to a fixed exchange rate system than to a 
floating. The scope for an independent monetary policy is rather constrained. The main 
instruments of monetary policy are interventions in the foreign exchange market to alleviate 
excessive fluctuations, changes in obligatory reserve requirements to steer banking liquidity 
and to sterilise liquidity effects of interventions, and the obligation for commercial banks to 
keep a minimum of foreign exchange liquid assets as a general safeguard against exchange rate 
and credit risks. 
The 2004 PEP briefly concludes that no major policy changes are planned as the current 
instruments of monetary policy have proven efficient in ensuring price stability in the specific 
Croatian context. Annual average inflation is projected to increase to 2.6% in 2005, mainly as a 
result of a lagged effect of the oil price hike in 2004, and to decline to 2.3% and 2.2% in 2006 
and 2007, respectively. The PEP assumes that the exchange rate of the Kuna vis-à-vis the euro 
will remain constant at around HRK 7.52 over the programme period.  
The programme emphasises that the current system is also compatible with the main elements 
of ERM II and that therefore no major adjustments would in due time be necessary to satisfy 
the conditions for ERM II entry. Moreover, the PEP claims that the eventual introduction of the 
euro would substantially reduce credit and exchange rate risks currently embedded in the 
Croatian financial system and therefore argues “in favour of a speedier EMU accession”. 
Croatia’s EMU accession strategy still needs to be prepared.  
The programme’s policy conclusions appear reasonable, as the scope for larger exchange rate 
flexibility and a fully autonomous monetary policy is indeed very constrained in a highly 
euroised financial system with a large share of open positions and limited hedging possibilities. 
However, the PEP would have benefited from a brief discussion of pros and cons of alternative 
policy options. Moreover, the PEP does not discuss potential policy conflicts that could arise 
under the current framework. More specifically, the Croatian economy, which is projected to 
grow stronger and to realise higher productivity gains as compared to the EU economy, may be 
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confronted with some real appreciation pressures, arising from Balassa -Samuelson effects and 
continuous capital inflows. These effects might be weaker than experienced in other transition 
countries at similar level of development, as prices of non-tradable goods seemed to have 
already converged to some extent to EU levels. Nevertheless, the authorities will be confronted 
with policy choices as the real appreciation could be brought about by either higher domestic 
inflation or an appreciation of the nominal exchange rate or a combination of both. As the 
programme assumes a constant nominal exchange rate vis-à-vis the euro over the programme 
period, real appreciation would be reflected in higher domestic inflation. Against this 
background, the projected inflation trend in the 2004 PEP may seem rather optimistic. A 
scenario of accelerating growth, productivity gains, continued net capital inflows etc could 
imply higher inflation rates in the years 2006 and 2007 than those projected in the programme. 
Moreover, administrative price adjustment may also continue to fuel inflation to some extent 
during the programme period. Also based upon these considerations, the Commission’s recent 
Spring forecast projects average CPI inflation in 2005 and 2006 to increase to 2.7 and 2.8%, 
respectively.  
5. BUDGETARY TARGETS AND THE MEDIUM-TERM PATH OF THE PUBLIC FINANCES 
5.1. Programme overview 
The 2004 PEP presents a medium-term fiscal framework in line with the “Fiscal Policy 
Guidelines”, a policy document adopted by the Croatian government in July 2004. The fiscal 
framework contains projections of broad fiscal aggregates for each level of government and 
outlines elements of the fiscal strategy over the programme period. The main policy objective is 
to reduce macroeconomic risks stemming from a high and increasing public and external debt 
through a significant reduction of the general government deficit. Fiscal adjustment is presented 
as part of an overall economic strategy aimed at improving the investment climate and reducing 
the role of the state in the economy. 
Ongoing public finance reforms are 
aimed at enhancing fiscal 
transparency and budget control, 
improving the efficiency of public 
administration, and fostering fiscal 
decentralisation. Policy measures 
include the reduction of subsidies 
to the enterprise sector and of 
enterprise arrears. The share of 
spending on wages, pensions and 
social security will be reduced 
while more public funds will be 
made available for education and 
science. The PEP also envisages a 
comprehensive tax reform to 
support investment and growth and 
to ensure a more equitable distribution of income. The 2004 PEP does not systematically 
describe all underlying tax reform and expenditure reduction measures that are planned to be 
undertaken during the programme period. It only provides limited quantitative information on 
the budgetary effects of some fiscal measures over the programme period. It is therefore 
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difficult to detect whether the programme is backed to a sufficient extent by policy measures to 
achieve the planned fiscal adjustment. While acknowledging the pioneer character of the 2004 
PEP, the document would have certainly benefited from more details and precisions in this 
respect. The programme does not elaborate on the cyclical position of the economy and the 
respective budgetary impact. The discussion of fiscal risks is useful, but does not specify 
possible quantitative effects and policy responses associated with these risks. No sensitivity 
analysis based on different assumptions for key macroeconomic variables is provided. Budget 
data are mostly presented on a GFS 1986. The introduction of ESA 95 methodology is 
explicitly mentioned as a policy objective, although the programme does not specify a 
timeframe for implementation. 
The PEP projects a significant gradual reduction of the general government balance from an 
expected 4.5% of GDP in 2004 to 2.9% of GDP in 2007, or by 1.6 percentage points. Gross 
public debt is projected to be stabilised at around 52% of GDP during the programme period, 
following an increase to 53.8% in 2004 compared to 51.6% in 2003.  
Change:
2004-07
Revenues 46.4 47.6 47.2 46.8 46.8 -0.8
of which:
- Taxes and social 
security contributions
42.1 42.5 42.8 42.9 42.9 0.3
- Other (residual) 4.2 5.1 4.4 4.0 4.0 -1.1
Expenditure 52.7 52.1 50.9 50.0 49.7 -2.4
of which:
- Primary expenditure 50.6 49.9 48.5 47.5 47.1 -2.8
of which:
Gross fixed capital 
formation
6.7 6.8 5.7 5.7 5.8 -1.0
Consumption 19.7 18.8 18.6 18.2 18.0 -0.8
Transfers & subsidies 22.3 23.2 23.0 22.6 22.4 -0.8
Other (residual) 1.9 1.2 1.2 1.1 0.9 -0.3
- Interest payments 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 0.0
Budget balance -6.3 -4.5 -3.7 -3.2 -2.9 1.6
- Cyclically adjusted -6.3 -4.4 -3.7 -3.4 -3.3 1.1
Primary balance -3.0 -1.9 -1.3 -0.7 -0.3 1.5
Gross debt level 51.6 53.8 52.5 52.5 52.0 -1.7
* data are provided on a cash basis
Sources: Pre-Accession Economic Programme (PEP), ECFIN calculations
Table 3:  Composition of the budgetary adjustment  (% of GDP)*
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
 
The projected fiscal adjustment in 2005 – 2007 is certainly ambitious, particularly against the 
background of the recent track record in 2003 and 2004. Major fiscal slippages occurred in 
2003, although under the responsibility of the previous government. The fiscal deficit reached 
6.3% instead of 4.5% of GDP as agreed under the IMF programme, mainly due to higher-than-
planned current spending, an accumulation of budgetary arrears and an expansion of quasi-
fiscal activities. In 2004, the new government aimed to reduce the deficit to 4.5%, however, 
officially released budget data for 2004 suggest that the fiscal target has not been met and point 
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to a consolidated general government deficit of around 4.9%, mainly as a result of lower-than-
expected revenues from VAT and excises. This implies that an even stronger fiscal adjustment 
in 2005 and beyond is needed if the PEP’s fiscal strategy is to be fully implemented. 
A key feature the PEP’s fiscal programme is a significant reduction of the expenditure-to-GDP 
ratio from 52.1% in 2004 to 49.7% in 2007, or by 2.4 percentage points. A major part of this 
reduction is programmed for 2005, when the share of spending will be reduced by 1.3 
percentage points, to be followed by a further decline of 0.8 and 0.3 percentage points in 2006 
and 2007, respectively. Total revenues are set to decline slightly from an expected 47.6% in 
2004 to 46.8% of GDP in 2007, or by 0.8 percentage points, a large part of which is front-
loaded in 2005. Such a fiscal scenario will certainly require a strong and sustained commitment 
to fiscal discipline, including difficult policy decisions on permanent structural measures to 
reduce the share of public spending. Moreover, following recent delays in implementing 
reforms, concrete fiscal measures need to be implemented rapidly. 
The PEP presents a number of potential fiscal risks, which may result from changes in the 
external environment. Lower growth in the EU than assumed under the programme is indeed 
very likely to impact on GDP performance in Croatia. Higher interest rates would increase the 
costs of debt service, impacting directly on the budget. The programme also mentions risks that 
could arise from to domestic policy decisions, i.e. fiscal risks stemming from higher pensions 
or state guarantees. Other risks, that seem also obvious in the present context, are not 
mentioned, such as a worse than expected revenue performance. The 2004 budget relied to 
some extent on revenues from one-off transactions that are by nature not sustainable. Moreover, 
shortfalls in current revenues from VAT and excise towards the end of 2004 point to potential 
risks, especially if measures to combat tax evasion do not lead to the desired effects. Also, there 
appears to be quite some potential for over-spending by government agencies that seem still 
difficult to control, e.g. the health and railway sectors. There is also a risk that the government 
might give in mounting pressures to increase public sector wages and subsidies.  
Against this background, the actual budget outcome over the PEP period may turn out to be less 
comforting that envisaged in the programme.  
5.2. Targets and adjustment 
In line with the adopted budget framework for 2004, the 2004 PEP assumes that a significant 
fiscal adjustment would already take place in 2004, leading to a reduction of the general 
government deficit to 4.5% from 6.3% a year before. This adjustment would take place largely 
on the revenue side. Consolidated general government revenues in 2004 are programmed to 
increase by 1.2 percentage points (from 46.4% to 47.6% of GDP). Although the PEP does not 
explicitly mention all the factors of revenue growth, part of the expected increase in the share 
of revenues to GDP may be due to one-off measures, including expected revenues from 
dividend payments and from the sale of a concession for a third GSM operator. Consolidated 
general government expenditures are set to decline by 0.6 percentage points (from 52.7 to 
52.1% of GDP). The PEP reports that the consolidated general government deficit reached 7.4 
billion HRK in the first semester of 2004, equivalent to 3.6% of projected full-year GDP. The 
programme claims that important adjustments in the second half of 2004 on both the revenue 
and expenditure side will help reducing the deficit to 4.5% of GDP. In that context, an 
addendum to the 2004 PEP reports on the adoption of a revised central government budget in 
mid-July, which was aimed at bringing on budget the transactions of the Croatian Railways. In 
order to compensate for this additional spending and to secure the deficit target of 4.5% of 
GDP, one-off measures (intended sale of government shares in Croatian telecommunication) 
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and larger revenues from VAT, social contributions and income taxes were foreseen in the 
revised central budget. As already pointed out, available budget data for 2004 show that the 
consolidated general government deficit reached 4.9%% instead of the targeted 4.5%. While it 
seems that current spending has been broadly contained as planned, it appears that both one-off 
revenues and revenues from indirect taxes have underperformed to a considerable extent.  
For the year 2005 and in line with the budget adopted in November 2004, the PEP foresees a 
further reduction of the general government deficit to 3.7% of GDP, equivalent to an 
adjustment of 0.8 percentage points compared to the planned 2004 deficit. However, the 
required adjustment in 2005 turns in fact out to be significantly higher, amounting to around 1.2 
percentage points on the basis of the actual budget outcome in 2004. The PEP projects 
consolidated general government spending to be reduced by 1.3 percentage points while 
consolidated revenues will decline by 0.5 percentage points. Data provided in table 4 of the 
ANNEX suggest that fiscal adjustment in 2005 differs from the one planned in 2004. It will be 
driven by a significant reduction in government spending, in particular by a decline in gross 
fixed capital formation as a share of GDP. Also, the share of public consumption and of 
spending on social transfers is projected to be slightly reduced, while the share of interest 
payments and subsidies will somewhat increase. The PEP does not report on specific fiscal 
measures on the revenue or spending side that are planned to be undertaken to implement the 
2005 budget, which makes it difficult to assess the quality of fiscal adjustment in 2005. Also, 
the underperformance of revenues in 2004 and recent delays in adopting already agreed 
measures to contain public spending in 2005 (e.g. in the pension and health care area) may put 
in question the achievement of the fiscal deficit target in 2005.  
In 2006 and 2007, the general government deficit is projected to be further reduced to 3.3% and 
2.9% of GDP, respectively. A major part of adjustment is planned to be realised through a 
reduction of primary expenditure, in particular of government consumption and spending on 
transfer and subsidies while public investment as a share of GDP is projected to stay at around 
the same level. The share of interest payments are projected to increase from 2.4% of GDP to 
2.6% in both years. Concrete fiscal measures that would support fiscal adjustment over the 
latter part of the PEP period are not reported.  
5.3. Debt developments 
The PEP contains a brief overview of recent debt developments. The public debt ratio has 
increased considerably over the last five years from 42.3% of GDP in 1999 to 51.6% of GDP in 
2003 and a substantial share of outstanding public debt is external (i.e. around 60% in 2003), 
i.e. either denominated in or indexed to foreign currencies. The descriptive part of the PEP 
would have benefited from a more precise definition of public debt (e.g. it is not clear whether 
it includes government arrears) and a short assessment of the main reasons for the relatively 
high public and external debt level. More specifically, the PEP could have briefly mentioned 
the issue of takeover of debt from former Yugoslavia and increasing external borrowing from 
international capital markets following the granting of an investment grade credit rating in 
1997. Moreover, the PEP lacks information on the average maturity and the amortisation 
schedule of the current stock of public debt and on the medium-term refinancing needs. 
The main medium-term objective is to reduce the share of external debt in public debt. Hence, 
official domestic borrowing is envisaged to gradually replace external borrowing, also with a 
view to stabilising and eventually reducing the overall stock of external debt in relation to GDP 
(to below 80% by 2007). This objective is planned to be achieved through a number of policy 
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measures, such as the reduction of general government deficit, the continuation of privatisation 
and strict limitation on the issuance of government guarantees. Following an expected increase 
of the public debt-to-GDP ratio to 53.8%, it is projected to be reduced to 52% in 2007. The 
2004 PEP does not contain a detailed assessment of factor contributing to the change in gross 
public debt. However, the annexed table 5 provides some indications, although it does not 
follow the usual sign convention and is not complete. From there, it seems that the marked 
reduction of primary balance deficits and revenues from privatisation, which are expected to be 
particularly significant in 2005 (i.e. 1.9% of GDP) explain a major part of continuous debt 
adjustment over the PEP period. The effect of interest payments on debt growth increases 
gradually, also in line with the planned shift from external to domestic financing which may 
entail somewhat higher borrowing costs. At the same time, the intended increase in the share of 
fixed interest debt to 70-75% - from 68% in 2003 - should partly compensate this effect. Nor 
the  PEP neither annexed table 5 provide information on exchange rate effects on the growth of 
public debt. The current currency composition of public debt suggests however that exchange 
rate changes e.g. between the euro and the USD/JPY could significantly impact on the growth 
of the debt stock in national currency terms. This holds true even under the assumption that the 
share of euro-denominated debt will be increased.  
As mentioned above, a greater reliance on domestic borrowing is projected to be part of the 
envisaged external debt reduction strategy. It is also seen as an important requirement to foster 
the development of domestic financial markets, which is claimed to be important to ensure 
additional financing options for the government (and the economy). However, the possible 
advantages of such a strategy would need to be compared with the potential drawbacks, which 
are not elaborated in the PEP. Although a shift to domestic financing might reduce exchange 
rate risks, it could under current circumstances increase rollover and refinancing risks due to 
the generally shorter maturities of domestic debt markets. Therefore, the scope for shifting debt 
to domestic markets might at this stage be constrained until the kuna yield curve will be 
extended over the medium term.  
The PEP gives a brief presentation of the legal and institutional arrangements for debt 
management, which apparently has considerably improved through the adoption of the Budget 
Act in 2003. The latter gave the key responsibility of debt management to the Ministry of 
Finance, introduced reporting obligations on debt and guarantees and clearly defined debt 
management activities. The PEP refers to a recent joint IMF/World Bank study which assesses 
shortcomings and risks with respect to public debt management and outlines recommendations 
for the reorganisation of debt management with a view to enhancing transparency, efficiency 
and risk assessment and control. The PEP mentions some activities planned for 2005 with a 
view to fully addressing the identified shortcomings. These measures however seem to fall 
short of the scope of reforms needed to improve debt management capacity. Notably, two of the 
three mentioned measures are explicitly related to ongoing external assistance, namely projects 
that are expected to be financed under the CARDS programme (i.e. purchase of a new debt 
management system, technical assistance). While CARDS assistance can certainly support 
some of the important reforms in this area, it can not replace the authorities’ commitment and 
action to implement the wide-ranging reforms urgently needed in this important policy area.  
 - 63 - 
6. STRUCTURAL REFORMS 
6.1. Programme overview 
In line with the consolidated outline, the 2004 PEP covers structural reforms related to the 
enterprise and financial sector, labour market, agricultural sector and public administration. 
Moreover, it reports on a broad range of other horizontal or sector reforms, including judicial 
reform, environmental protection, education, transport and public procurement. The 
presentation is for a great part descriptive and backward looking, providing information on past 
reforms with an emphasis on legislation. The main policy objectives are the swift completion of 
privatisation of socially-owned enterprises, the promotion of SME development, a continuation 
of pension and social security reforms and the reform of public administration. Key measures 
are legislative alignment with EU law, institutional strengthening, and state financial support. 
The latter contains financial aid schemes for SMEs and for the restructuring of loss making 
enterprises, in particular in agriculture, tourism and shipbuilding. The presentation sometimes 
lacks precise definitions of policy objectives and respective instruments. Not all of the 
measures listed in the structural reform matrix are described in the text. Key reforms are not 
always related to specific structural deficiencies and cost estimates are generally not provided. 
Most of the measures are expected to be implemented during the 2004 PEP period; some others 
are being extended beyond the current PEP time frame. 
In spite of progress with structural reforms that has been made over the past few years in some 
important policy areas, the Croatian economy is still suffering from significant inefficiencies 
and weaknesses that constrain productivity and growth. Also, some earlier announced reforms 
have been delayed during 2004, in particular in the field of privatisation and enterprise 
restructuring. Moreover, some policy changes seem to have at least partly reversed previous 
reforms, such as in the area of pensions. Public administration reform and the reform of the 
judiciary have progressed more slowly than previously expected. Against this background, the 
2004 PEP structural reform agenda looks ambitious and will require continued reform 
commitment and enhanced policy implementation over the programme period. 
Key policy measures in the area of privatisation and real sector restructuring are front-loaded in 
2005 and may appear very ambitious. Also, some specific measures e.g. in the area of state aid 
and pension adjustment are scheduled for 2005. Other policies, such as SME development, 
social security reforms and legislative alignment are planned to occur more gradually. Sector 
specific policies also tend to be of a continuous nature. As the programme does not provide any 
detailed information on the sequencing of specific reforms, it is difficult to assess 
implementation risks.  
6.2. Product and capital markets 
The PEP outlines the following main reform areas related to the functioning of product 
markets: the finalisation of privatisation of socially-owned enterprises, the strengthening of 
competition policy and state aid control, the restructuring of public utilities and SME 
development. Since the start of privatisation in the early 1990’s, some 2,000 companies have 
already been sold, mainly on the basis of stock exchange auctions or public tenders. As of 
September 2004, the Privatisation Fund still held minority or majority shares in 1,073 
companies. Enterprises in the tourism, agriculture and shipbuilding sector account for a 
significant share of the Fund’s assets in gross nominal value terms. Privatisation of state 
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ownership in these sectors has generally been delayed, as many companies are loss making and 
highly indebted (shipbuilding, agriculture) or suffer from a lack of maintenance and unresolved 
real estate issues (tourism). The cancellation of share sales and strong resistance from trade 
unions have also delayed privatisation. The declared policy objective is to accelerate 
privatisation and finalise it by end-2005 (for shipbuilding later). This is expected to be achieved 
through the re-organisation of the Privatisation Fund, a more effective communication policy, 
new privatisation methods (e.g. public private partnership), and financial restructuring of 
companies to make them more attractive for potential investors. The PEP remains quite vague 
on the precise policy measures. It does not quantify the potential budgetary costs of state 
financial support. Overall, given recent implementation delays, major financial problems of a 
large number of enterprises and fiscal constraints, the completion of privatisation by end-2005 
seems rather ambitious and would certainly require a stronger commitment on the part of the 
government, including the willingness to eventually liquidate enterprises. On competition 
policy, some progress has been made, namely with respect to the establishment of the legal 
framework for anti-trust and state aid policy, although it has not yet been sufficiently aligned 
with the EU acquis. Further legislative harmonisation is therefore a key priority. The problem 
of a still weak administrative capacity and enforcement record are planned to be addressed 
through an increase in staff and financial resources of the competition agency. The PEP rightly 
puts emphasis on strengthening state aid policy through the establishment of a fully-fledged 
state aid registry, enhanced cooperation with sector regulators and measures raising public 
awareness about state aid rules. With respect to reforms in the area of public utilities, the 2004 
PEP very much focuses on recent and outstanding legislation. In the energy sector, a number of 
new laws are in preparation aimed at bringing regulatory frameworks and policies gradually in 
line with the EU acquis. The schedule for next phases of the privatisation of the oil company 
INA remains open. In the transport sector, an important objective is the restructuring of 
Croatian railways and opening of railway services to competition. In the telecommunication 
area, the license for a third GSM operator has been awarded with a view to enhancing 
competition. Also the market entry of new operators on the fixed line market is being prepared. 
The PEP envisages liberalising the telecommunication market by 2007 through the adoption of 
EU compatible legislation. SME policies are guided by the “Programme of Incentives for 
SME’s (2004-2008)” which was adopted by the government in May 2004. The programme 
foresees a large number of support schemes, such as subsidies, state guarantees and co-
financing arrangements. The PEP does not provide estimates on their respective effects on 
growth or on budgetary costs.  
The Croatian financial sector is dominated by banks, accounting for 83% of assets. The 
privatisation of the Croatian banking sector was largely completed by end-2000, followed by 
further sector consolidation which reduced the number of banks from 53 at end-1999 to 40 in 
2004. Almost 97% of banking assets are privatised and 91% are foreign owned. Banks are 
generally very liquid, well capitalised, and highly profitable. Banking supervision lies within 
the responsibility of the Croatian National Bank and is in line with relevant EU legislation. The 
credit risk associated with the high level of euro-isation as well as a generally weak legal 
framework for the enforcement of creditor rights are potential vulnerabilities to the banking 
system. The PEP does not report on new reform measures related to the banking sector. With 
respect to the non-banking financial sector, major policy initiatives concern further alignment 
of legislation, the promotion of investment funds, and the introduction of an efficient and 
unified supervision. The 2004 PEP does not give any indication as to the privatisation of the 
largest insurance company that was repeatedly announced in the past but has not yet 
materialised.  
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6.3. Labour market 
The 2004 PEP gives a fairly comprehensive overview of the situation on the Croatian labour 
market. Participation rates are relatively low, unemployment of youth is particularly high, and 
long-term employment accounts for more than one half of total employment. Recent labour 
market reforms have introduced incentives for active job seeking and substantially reduced the 
level of employment protection that has been assessed as one of the most stringent in Europe. 
These measures are expected to continue to improve the functioning of labour markets, as 
evidenced by recent increases in employment despite a slight deceleration of growth. 
Employment subsidies are mentioned as the main financial instrument to enhance employment 
creation, but the document does not provide details, e.g. on the design and fiscal costs. 
Unfortunately, the programme lacks a precise description of future measures listed in the 
structural reform matrix which includes, among others, the setting up of redundancy 
programmes for companies under restructuring, the implementation of an active employment 
policy and the institutional strengthening of the Croatian Employment Bureau. During 2003 
and 2004, the Croatian authorities have prepared a National Action Plan for Employment, 
which has not yet been adopted. On social security reforms, the PEP outlines a number of 
policy objectives, such as enhancing the efficiency and transparency of the social system, but 
remains rather vague on the nature of policy measures planned to be undertaken. It also remains 
unclear what is precisely meant by the envisaged de-centralisation and partial privatisation of 
social welfare activities.  
6.4. Other reform areas 
Public administration reform is a key priority under the 2004 PEP. A comprehensive strategy of 
public administration reform has not yet been developed and adopted by the government. The 
2004 PEP contains an ambitious agenda of policy measures aimed at improving transparency 
and efficiency of state administration, including the implementation of a new Civil Service Act. 
The programme could have elaborated more on specific reform measures envisaged to 
strengthen institutional capacity relevant for the acquis in the economic and financial domain. 
In the area of agricultural reform, the 2004 PEP envisages the development of agricultural land 
markets, the improvement of the cadastre system, the privatisation of agricultural companies 
and the establishment of institutions required for future participation in the Common 
Agricultural Policy. Detailed information could have been provided on the development of state 
support for this sector over the programme period and on the proposed agricultural policy 
instruments. The programme also foresees continuing work on a Regional Development 
Strategy that does not yet exist in Croatia. Urgent judiciary reforms that have been delayed for 
long are another key priority and should help enforcing creditor’s rights and improving the 
overall business environment. The planned restructuring of the Croatian railways entails the 
opening of railway infrastructure to domestic and foreign providers of transport services, the 
division into core and non-core business and the privatisation of the latter. These measures 
should contribute to enhancing competition and improving the quality and efficiency of 
passenger and cargo transport services. The 2004 PEP also covers areas such as environmental 
protection, education and research, tourism, and public procurement.  
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7. THE QUALITY AND SUSTAINABILITY OF PUBLIC FINANCES 
7.1. The quality of public finances 
The 2004 PEP reports on a number of measures that are principally appropriate to improve the 
quality of public finance. Public finance reforms are aimed at enhancing fiscal transparency and 
budget management. This includes the “bringing on budget” of previously off-budgeted items 
as well as improved budget reporting according to international standards with a view to 
introducing ESA95 at a later stage. The scope of the Treasury system established in 2000 is 
planned to be broadened to cover all extra-budgetary funds’ and government’s agencies’ 
operations. This should result in a strengthening of expenditure control over the medium term. 
A more efficient public administration is an explicit policy goal of the programme, based on 
principles such as merit-oriented pay, increased staff competence and a politically impartial 
civil service. As already mentioned above, a reorientation of public expenditure from current 
spending on wages, transfers and subsidies towards spending on education, research and 
development is foreseen. The document does however not provide a quantitative assessment of 
this planned shift in government spending. The envisaged reform of public procurement is 
planned to be implemented in 2005 and should also contribute to improving the quality of 
public finance. The 2004 PEP also foresees continued investments in and maintenance of road 
infrastructure to improve inter-regional connections. The document leaves open if and to what 
extent investment costs are planned to be covered by private sources of finance. 
7.2. The sustainability of public finances 
Croatia has already embarked on pension reforms, which have complemented the pay-as-you-
go system through a funded system, consisting of a second (mandatory) and a third (voluntary) 
pillar. The 2004 PEP envisages parametric reforms with a view to financially strengthening the 
first pillar. The most important measures in that respect is the planned re-adjustment of the 
pension formula in 2005 (from wage indexation to a Swiss formula), an increase of the 
retirement age and the inclusion of previously non-insured groups of employees. Overall, past 
and planned pension reforms should help curtailing the budgetary implications of an ageing 
population and should favourably impact on domestic savings, investment and growth, 
provided that planned reforms are comprehensively and timely implemented.  
Table 9 of the Annex provides a projection of the long-term sustainability of public finances 
over the period 2005-2050; however the text does not explicitly deal with the sustainability of 
public finance and does not further comment on the table. Total general government 
expenditure and revenues are projected to gradually decline to around 37-38% of GDP by 2050. 
Old age pension payments in GDP are projected to increase from 10.8% in 2005 to 12.4% by 
2050, while interest and health care payments will slightly be reduced to 1.6% and 7.4% of 
GDP, respectively. Pension contributions would gradually increase from 7.4% to 8.5% of GDP 
during the respective period. The main assumptions are a constant long-term potential GDP 
growth of 4% and a constant growth of labour productivity of 5%. Projections for participation 
rates are not provided. The unemployment rate, according to the Labour Force Survey, is set to 
decline substantially from 13.8% in 2005 to 7.0% in 2050. 
An important objective under the 2004 PEP is the adoption of a Health Care Development 
strategy covering the period until 2015, which should guide the completion of privatisation of 
primary heath care and the rationalisation of secondary health care institutions. In order to 
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enhance the fiscal situation of the health fund, the 2004 PEP foresees a reduction of costs 
through co-payments for medicine and changes with respect to the fund’s coverage of medical 
treatments. However, quantitative estimates of potential cost savings are not provided.  
* * * 
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Annex table 1: Structural indicators
CROATIA EU 25
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
General economic background
Real GDP 1 2.9 4.4 5.2 4.3 3.8 3.7 1.8 1.1 1.0 2.3
Labour productivity 2 -1.9 10.4 0.7 4.2 2.2 2.1 0.8 0.8 0.8 1.8
Real unit labour cost 3 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.3 1.1 0.4 0.4 -0.4 -0.5 -0.9
Real effective exchange rate 4 103.7 100.0 98.2 95.7 92.6 99.4 101.4 103.5 106.4 108.6
Inflation rate 5 4.6 3.7 1.7 1.8 2.1 2.4 2.5 2.1 1.9 2.1
Unemployment rate 6 16.5 16.3 15.2 14.7 14.2 8.6 8.4 8.7 8.9 9.0
Employment
Employment rate 7 63.0 62.4 57.6 57.6 57.7 62.5 62.9 62.9 63.0 63.3
Employment rate - females 8 45.5 44.9 47.4 46.7 47.8 53.7 54.3 54.7 55.1 55.8
Employment rate of older workers 9 24.2 23.7 26.8 29.0 30.4 36.6 37.4 38.8 40.2 40.5
Long-term unemployment 10 n.a. n.a. n.a. 8.4 6.9 3.9 3.8 3.9 4.0 4.1
Product market reforms 
Relative price levels 11 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 100 100 100 100 100
Total trade-to-GDP ratio 12 49.6 51.4 49.8 51.7 51.4 : 9.7 9.2 9.0 9.4
Total FDI inflows 13 5.7 5.9 2.7 6.9 2.6 16.0 7.6 8.3 6.1 3.9
Market share electricity 14 n.a. n.a. n.a. 82.0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Sectoral and ad-hoc state aids 15 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.3 0.3 0.3 : :
Business investment 16 21.8 22.3 24.6 27.5 n.a. 18.4 17.9 17.2 16.8 17.0
Knowledge-based economy
Tertiary graduates 17 n.a. n.a. n.a. 13.1 n.a. 43.2 47.0 49.0 52.2 n.a.
Spending on human resources 18 4.50 4.20 4.32 4.20 n.a. 4.9 5.1 5.2 n.a. n.a.
Educational attainment 19 n.a. n.a. 90.3 90.7 92.5 76.4 76.2 76.5 76.6 76.7
R&D expenditure 20 1.23 1.07 1.12 1.14 n.a. 1.88 1.92 1.93 1.95 n.a.
Internet access 21 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 42.0
Source:  Commission services, Croatia's Central Bureau of Statistics.
1. Growth rate of real GDP in %.  2. Growth rate of real GDP per person employed in %.  3. Ratio of compensation per employee to 
nominal GDP per person employed, total economy, annual percentage change.  4. Vs IC36 (1999 = 100), current year's values are based on 
consumer's price index deflator.  5. Annual average rate of change in Interim Harmonized Indices of Consumer Prices (HICPs).                      
6. Unemployed persons as a share of the total active population.  7. Employed persons aged 15-64 in % of total population of the same age 
group. 8. Employed women aged 15-64 in % of total female population of the same age group. 9. Employed persons aged 55-64 (EU25) or 
50-64 (Croatia) in % of total population of the same age group.  10. Long-term unemployed (over 12 months) in % of total active population 
aged 15-64.   
f: forecast, e: estimated value, p: provisional value, b: break in series, s: Eurostat estimate, r: revised value, q: estimated from quarterly 
values.
11. Of private final consumption (EU25=100). 12. average value of imports and exports of goods and services in % of GDP; the value for 
EU 15 is the total for the Small Member States. 13. In % of GDP. 14. Market share of the largest generator (% of total net generation).      
15. In % of GDP. 16. Gross fixed capital formation by the private sector in % of GDP.  17.Total tertiary graduates (ISCED 5-6) per 1000 of 
population aged 20-29. 18. Public expenditure on education in % of GDP. 19. Percentage of the population aged 20 to 24 having completed 
at least upper secondary education. 20. GERD (Gross domestic expenditure on R&D) - in % of GDP. 21. Percentage of households who 
have Internet access at home.
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PRE-ACCESSION ECONOMIC PROGRAMME OF TURKEY 
1. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
On 1 December 2004, the Turkish authorities submitted the 2004 Pre-Accession Economic 
Programme (PEP) to the European Commission. It covers the 2004-2007 period, and it is 
Turkey’s fourth PEP after the ECOFIN Council of 26/27 November 2000 had expressed its 
wish for a regular in-depth dialogue with accession countries. The programme largely complies 
with the requirements of the consolidated outline in terms of content, form and data. However, 
the PEP does not provide a consistent time series of public finance indicators for the 2003-2007 
period, whereby ESA95 standards are used. In view of the objective of the programme, 
information in the tables should also be provided in EUR and not in only in USD-terms.  
The PEP is broadly consistent with other economic policy documents such as the Memorandum 
related to the new Stand-By Arrangement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) of May 
2005. The medium-term budget 2005-2007 is largely in line with what is indicated in the PEP. 
The PEP has been formally approved by the "High Planning Board", which consists of the 
Prime Minister and representatives of key ministries. The structure and content of the Pre-
Accession Economic Programme gives proof of a high degree of familiarity with the technical 
tools and analytical requirements of this exercise. 
The new programme takes into account many of the points raised in the assessment of the 2003 
PEP and illustrates improving technical and analytical capacities of the Turkish administration. 
The format and information provided in the programme are to a large extent in line with the 
requirements. Compared to last year, the current programme is more optimistic with respect to 
the economic framework and fiscal targets.  
As last year, the programme's key objectives during the period 2004-2007 are to strengthen 
macroeconomic stability and to increase the welfare of the society. Key priorities are to ensure 
a sustainable growth environment, to reduce inflation and to bring down government deficit and 
debt ratios to EU levels. Lowering regional differences is also considered to be important in the 
programme period. These measures are implemented with the perspective of fulfilling the 
Copenhagen criteria for EU membership. The macroeconomic framework appears both realistic 
and consistent. The policy mix strongly emphasises disinflation and fiscal sustainability. 
Monetary and income policies are supposed to support the disinflation process. The floating 
exchange rate regime will be maintained. The success of this economic scenario strongly 
depends on a significant improvement in the investment climate, declining real interest rates 
and continued market and consumer confidence. Access to external sources of finance appears 
to be of crucial importance for achieving the described growth pattern. The underlying growth 
scenario of 5% per annum is very similar to the Commission’s growth forecasts. The Turkish 
economy has been booming in 2004, driven mainly by private consumption and domestic 
investment. The country’s fiscal performance has been impressive, with the primary surplus 
overshooting its target by about 1 % of GDP. Since mid-2004 economic growth has slowed 
down to more sustainable levels, close to potential output. In particular domestic demand has 
been softening. Due to this, and in combination with the strong lira, inflationary pressures 
appear to have further eased. The PEP inflation forecast for 2005-2007 is more optimistic than 
the Commission forecast, albeit not unrealistic, and conditional upon further wage restraint in 
the private and public sector.   
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The widening of the trade deficit needs to be monitored closely. The Commission believes that 
the deterioration of the trade balance poses a potential challenge to stability in 2005-2007. In 
spite of the strong tourism revenues, the 2004 current account deficit amounted to USD 15.6 
billion (5.1% of GDP), and over one billion more than in the 2004 PEP. Over half of the deficit 
was financed by portfolio investment inflows. The same PEP 2004 foresees an increase of 
about 90% in FDI in 2005. Capital movements in Turkey have been fully liberalized. 
A strict monetary policy has been an important element in the disinflation process, using base 
money as a key monetary anchor. During 2002-2003, the Central Bank further improved its 
perception as an independent institution with the primary objective of achieving and 
maintaining price stability. The increased confidence of market participants supported the 
strengthening of the Turkish currency and allowed to gradually reduce benchmark interest 
rates.  
From January 2006 onwards, a formal inflation targeting will be introduced. In its initial stages, 
the existing framework of base money targets, accompanied by indicative targets on net 
domestic assets will be retained. These targets will remain under close review. In early 2006, an 
inflation consultation clause will be introduced. Consequently, the monetary policy committee 
will assume full responsibility for setting interest rates. Working within the free floating 
exchange rate regime, the central bank plans to strengthen its net international reserves, and to 
continue its daily foreign exchange purchase auctions. Furthermore, efforts have been 
undertaken to reduce the costs of banking intermediation and to diversify the financial 
instruments available.  
In the aftermath of the recovery following the 2001 financial crisis, public finances have 
improved mainly due to declining interest rates, while current non-interest expenditures 
remained broadly stable. The general government deficit decreased dramatically from 29.8% of 
GDP in 2001 to respectively 12.6% and 8.8% in 2002 and 2003 (in ESA 95 terms). The 
improvement reflects to a large extent a drop in interest rate payments from 18.7% of GDP in 
2001 to 14.3% in 2003. Non-interest expenditures remained stable at slightly above 22% of 
GDP, while tax revenues went up slightly from 21.5% of GDP in 2002 to 23.4% in 2003. The 
large improvements on the expenditure side combined with the small progress on the revenue 
side led to a significantly higher primary surplus of 5.1% of GDP (GFS method)10 in 2003, up 
from 3.7% in 2002.  
The programme presents the government’s structural reform agenda, which mainly focuses on 
the need to improve the functioning of product and capital markets in order to increase the 
efficiency and competitiveness of the Turkish economy. Important areas include reforms 
concerning the labour market, continued restructuring and strengthening of the financial sector, 
privatisation of state-owned enterprises and policies to improve the investment climate. The 
programme also outlines measures to increase efficiency and decentralisation of public 
administration through a broad reform agenda.  
The outlined rather ambitious reform agenda has a clear focus on alignment with EU 
regulations as well as on reforms to improve the functioning of the Turkish economy and seems 
well in line with goals under the Lisbon agenda. Initiated or near-term reform efforts are 
outlined in the programme while the degree of future policy commitment and in particular the 
                                                   
10
 The table on general government revenues and expenditures seems to be aggregated according to the GFS 
standard. A presentation in ESA 95 might have indicated much higher primary surpluses. 
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timing of envisaged reforms are rather vague, especially beyond 2005. The budgetary impacts 
of reforms are only presented for some areas and the numbers are not always presented in 
detail.  
The section on fiscal issues gives a good summary on how the Turkish authorities intend to 
rebalance public finances and to maintain fiscal sustainability. However, a more detailed 
presentation of expenditure and revenue categories, whereby they use the ESA95 definition, 
would have been helpful. The achievement of the fiscal objectives relies to a large extent on 
maintaining a significant primary surplus and on benefiting from declining interest rates.  
It can thus be concluded that: 
• The Pre-accession Programme 2004 covering the period 2004 to 2007 aims to sustain the 
process of catching-up by reducing budgetary deficits and general government debt and 
continuing the process of structural reforms. The programme largely complies with the 
requirements of the consolidated outline in terms of content, form and data. It is a useful 
medium-term framework for economic policy in Turkey on its way to EU accession and is 
broadly consistent with other strategic documents, such as the IMF programme. 
• Macroeconomic performance in 2004 turned out better than expected with buoyant growth, 
declining inflation and a lower than expected budget deficit. However, the current account 
deficit is substantially higher than in 2003. This trend of rising external imbalances needs to 
be closely monitored. The PEP 2004 forecasts a significant shift in the composition of the 
capital account, whereby FDI would start to replace portfolio investment as the main 
financing item as from 2005. The overall macroeconomic scenario until 2007 is plausible 
although further improvements in its methodological basis could be made. 
• The public finance scenario of a gradual reduction in the budget deficit is adequate in its 
target, albeit somewhat optimistic. However, a tighter fiscal stance would further alleviate 
the potential risks to the external balance. 
• The structural and institutional reform agenda presented in the programme is overall 
adequate. Implementation of the reform agenda has been proceeding in areas such as 
banking sector reform, public administration reform and improvements of the investment 
climate. However, the remaining reform agenda is vast, and several measures outlined in the 
2003 PEP have been delayed. The presented budgetary impact of reforms is not 
comprehensive in its scope. Further reform efforts are particularly important in the area of 
privatisation and in the area of the functioning of the labour market. 
2. JOINT MINISTERIAL CONCLUSIONS 
“On 12 July 2005, the Economic and Finance Ministers of the EU and the acceding and 
candidate countries, along with representatives of the Commission and the European 
Central Bank and representatives of the Central Banks of the acceding and candidate 
countries, met for their seventh economic policy dialogue meeting. 
... 
Ministers welcomed the 2004 Pre-accession Economic Programmes of the two candidate 
countries. Ministers endorsed the following conclusions as regards the assessment of these 
programmes:  
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... 
Turkey 
1. The improvement of this year’s programme was welcomed as it incorporates many of 
the suggestions made in the assessment of the 2003 PEP. It illustrates improving 
technical and analytical capacities of the Turkish administration. The format and 
information provided in the programme are to a large extent in line with the 
requirements.  
2. The macroeconomic performance in 2004, with buoyant growth, declining inflation 
and a lower than expected budget deficit, is welcome. However, the current account 
deficit was substantially higher than in 2003. The external imbalances need to be 
closely monitored. The overall macroeconomic scenario until 2007 is plausible 
although further improvements in its methodological basis could be made. 
3. The public finance scenario of a gradual reduction in the budget deficit is adequate in 
its target, even somewhat ambitious. However, a tighter fiscal stance would further 
alleviate the potential risks to the external balance. Moreover, the main fiscal risks, 
although reduced considerably compared to the last PEP, remain related to the 
relatively high level of debt and its sensitivity to interest rate and exchange rate 
fluctuations. 
4. Progress has been made on structural reforms, in areas such as banking sector 
reform, public administration reform and improvements of the investment climate. 
However, the remaining reform agenda is vast, and several measures outlined in the 
2003 PEP have been delayed. Further reform efforts are particularly important in the 
areas of fiscal sustainability (in particular the attainment of the primary surplus 
target agreed with the IMF is essential for underpinning macroeconomic 
stabilisation), privatisation, the business environment, and the functioning of the 
labour market. 
In view of the above assessment, Ministers were of the opinion that Turkey needs to 
continue improving its macroeconomic situation – mainly inflation, government deficit, debt 
level and current account deficits. Maintaining a focus on enhanced price stability and 
further disinflation is of the utmost importance in the coming years. Turkey also needs to 
focus on sustainability of public finances, advance privatisation and reform the labour 
market and the agricultural sector.  
3. INTRODUCTION 
The Turkish authorities submitted the 2004 Pre-Accession Economic Programme (PEP) 
covering the period 2004 to 2007 to the European Commission on 1 December 2004. It is 
Turkey’s fourth PEP since the ECOFIN Council of 26/27 November 2000 which expressed its 
wish for a regular in-depth dialogue with accession countries. The programme largely complies 
with the requirements of the consolidated outline in terms of content, form and data. The PEP is 
broadly consistent with other economic policy documents such as the Memorandum related to 
the new stand-by arrangement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) of May 2005. The 
budget 2005-2007 is largely in line with the PEP assumptions.  
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Like in previous years, the Pre-accession Economic Programme has been prepared under the 
leadership of the State Planning Organisation, including contributions from and consultations 
with all relevant institutions, in particular the Treasury, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of 
Agriculture, the Central Bank, the Privatisation Agency, the Banking Regulation and 
Supervision Agency, etc. The document has been formally approved by the "High Planning 
Board", which consists of the Prime Minister and representatives of key ministries.  
Increasing welfare of the society will continue to be the main objective of the economic policy 
during the period of 2004-2007. To this end, along with strengthening macroeconomic stability, 
further improvement of the current social policy implementations will be possible. 
The main perspective in determining economic policy in the process of EU accession, is the 
further improvement of the economic structure in the context of Copenhagen economic criteria, 
with an ultimate aim of achieving convergence towards the Maastricht criteria. The basic 
priorities of Turkey’s macroeconomic policies during PEP 2004 period, are to reduce inflation 
permanently, to bring the ratio of the public deficits and public debt stock to GDP closer to the 
EU averages and to establish a sustainable growth environment in the economy, as it was the 
case under the PEP 2003. 
4. MACROECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS 
4.1. Recent macroeconomic developments 
The report presents a clear and concise picture of economic developments in 2002 and 2003. 
With respect to 2004, the document covers all relevant data available by late November. 
Compared to last year, the presented data is slightly more detailed.  
The Turkish economy experienced a rapid recovery after the sharp recession of 2001. Real 
GDP grew by respectively 5.8% and 8.9% in 2003 and 2004. The recovery in 2002-2003 was 
mainly driven by exports and restocking, while domestic demand remained weak. In 2004, 
private consumption and private gross fixed capital investment growth accelerated 
dramatically. The broadening of the recovery was supported by production indicators, in 
particular industrial output and capacity utilisation. 
Inflationary pressures have declined gradually since 2002. Important factors for this 
development were increased confidence, in large part due to strict and consistent monetary and 
fiscal policies, and a strong exchange rate. Furthermore, moderate public sector wage 
agreements helped to strengthen credibility of the government’s disinflation programme. 
Observed high growth rates did not immediately lead to additional job creation. Unemployment 
even increased from 10.3% in 2002 to 10.5% in 2003, while employment declined by 1.0% in 
the year to 2003. Rural unemployment rates remained significantly lower than in urban areas, 
largely due to the widespread practise of unpaid family workers in agricultural areas. Since 
mid-2004, however, statistics started to suggest that the recovery in the real sector has begun to 
show its effects on employment. In the second quarter, jobless rates fell to 9.3% with 
participation rates steady –albeit very low compared to the incumbent EU-Member States- at 
49.2% 
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2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Real GDP growth COM 5.8 7.7 5.0 5.1 n. a.
(% change) PEP 5.8 9.6 4.8 5.1 5.1
Consumer price COM 25.3 10.6 8.7 6.4 n. a.
inflation (%) PEP 25.3 10.7 9.6 6.1 4.5
General government COM -9.7 -3.9 -3.9 -3.0 n. a.
balance (% of GDP) (*) PEP -10.1 -6.3 -4.4 -2.1 -0.5
Primary balance COM n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a.
(% of GDP) (*) PEP -6.7 -7.8 -7.5 -7.2 -7.0
Government gross COM 87.2 80.8 75.9 71.9 n. a.
debt (% of GDP) (*) PEP 80.2 78.4 75.3 72.2 68.3
(*) PEP data for public finances use GFS definition; COM forecast is done in ESA 95.
Table 1:  Comparison of key macroeconomic and budgetary projections
 
The current account deficit widened significantly from 0.8% of GDP in 2002 to 3.3% of GDP 
in 2003 and 5.1% of GDP in 2004, reflecting very strong imports due to the acceleration of 
economic activity – in part due to pent-up demand- and the high import content of exports and 
restocking. In 2004, the external balance continued to deteriorate. Despite a strengthening of 
the exchange rate, Turkish exports managed to increase their share in global markets and to 
raise their share of higher value added commodities in total exports. Tourism revenues reached 
a record high in 2004.  
A strict monetary policy has been an important element in the disinflation process, using base 
money as a key monetary anchor. During 2002-2003, the Central Bank could further improve 
its reputation as an independent institution with the primary objective of achieving and 
maintaining price stability. The increased confidence of market participants supported the 
strengthening of the Turkish currency and allowed to gradually reduce benchmark interest 
rates. Furthermore, efforts have been undertaken to reduce the costs of banking intermediation 
and to diversify the financial instruments available. The Central Bank maintained the free 
floating exchange rate regime and limited its interventions to the smoothening of sharp 
fluctuations. In addition, it used the strength of the Turkish currency to increase its foreign 
exchange reserves. 
Public finances improved mainly due to declining interest rates, while current non-interest 
expenditures remained broadly stable. The ESA 95 general government deficit decreased 
dramatically from 29.8% of GDP in 2001 to respectively 12.6% and 8.8% in 2002 and 2003. 
The improvement reflects to a large extent a drop in interest rate payments from 18.7% of GDP 
in 2001 to 14.3% in 2003. Non-interest expenditures remained stable at slightly above 22% of 
GDP, while tax revenues went up significantly from 21.5% of GDP in 2002 to 23.4% in 2003. 
The large improvements on the expenditure side combined with progress –even though less 
spectacular-on the revenue side led to a significantly higher primary surplus of 5.1% of GDP 
(GFS method)11 in 2003, up from 3.7% in 2002. 
                                                   
11
 The table on general government revenues and expenditures seems to be aggregated according to the GFS 
standard. A presentation in ESA 95 might have indicated much higher primary surpluses. 
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4.2. Macroeconomic scenario 
Like in previous years, the Turkish authorities have presented a comprehensive economic 
framework for the period 2004-2007. The main policy priorities are to ensure a sustainable 
growth environment, reducing inflationary pressures and bringing public sector deficit and debt 
ratios to EU averages. Key instruments in this respect are the strengthening of the market 
economy and the improvement of competitiveness by reducing state influence and the 
establishment of independent regulatory agencies. The key objective of monetary policy is to 
support price stability. Base money is the central aggregate to influence monetary 
developments in the economy. The PEP 2004 explains in quite detail how implicit inflation 
targeting will be, in the near future, replaced by explicit inflation targeting for achieving and 
maintaining price stability. In contrast with last year in the PEP 2003, an in-depth presentation 
on the implementation strategy has been included without, however, any precision on the date 
of introduction.  With respect to exchange rate policy, the programme envisages the 
continuation of the current free floating exchange rate regime. Income policy will use inflation 
targets as guideline for public sector wage settlements. In an attempt to improve the personal 
income distribution, pensions of low-income groups have been raised. In order to strengthen the 
private sector wage bargaining process, the current social dialogue in the framework of the 
Economic and Social Council will continue.  
As in previous years, the quantitative framework for the period 2004-2007 is well presented 
and contains detailed information on key variables. The link between the macroeconomic 
framework and the impact of structural reforms described in sections 3 and 4 has been 
elaborated on, but still deserves more attention. The programme's external assumptions are in 
line with international forecasts, including the EU Commission's Spring 2004 forecast. 
Compared to these forecasts, the Turkish programme is somewhat more optimistic with respect 
to world import prices. The assumption on the EUR/USD exchange rate is based on the one in 
the Commission's Autumn 2004 forecast. 
COM PEP COM PEP COM PEP COM PEP COM PEP
Real GDP (% change) 5.8 5.8 7.7 9.6 5.0 4.8 5.1 5.1 n. a. 5.1
Contributions:
- Final domestic demand 5.9 5.9 13.6 9.7 7.7 3.9 7.0 4.5 n. a. 4.4
- Change in inventories 3.0 3.0 0.0 1.3 -1.0 -2.4 -1.0 -0.9 n. a. -0.2
- External balance of goods 
and services -3.1 -3.1 -6.0 -1.4 -1.7 3.3 -0.9 1.5 n. a. 0.9
Employment (% change) -1.0 -1.0 2.0 2.4 2.0 2.5 2.0 2.5 n. a. 2.5
Unemployment rate (%) 10.5 10.5 10.3 10.0 10.0 9.8 9.6 9.6 n. a. 9.3
GDP deflator (% change) 26.8 22.5 10.0 8.2 8.9 7.9 6.0 6.4 n. a. 4.5
CPI inflation (%) 25.3 25.3 10.6 10.7 8.7 9.6 6.4 6.1 n. a. 4.5
Current account balance 
(% of GDP) -2.9 -2.2 -5.3 -3.4 -4.0 -2.3 -4.0 -2.0 n. a. -1.8
Sources: Pre-Accession Economic Programme (PEP); Commission services Autumn 2004 forecasts (COM)
Table 2: Comparison of macroeconomic developments and forecasts
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
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Real sector 
The real sector scenario used in the programme is broadly in line with the Commission Spring 
2005 forecast. Both sources assume that the Turkish economy will grow at rates - close to 
potential -of around 5% per annum through the programme period, mainly driven by private 
consumption and domestic investment, and with a negative contribution from the external 
balance. Job creation is expected to be modest. The disinflation process is set to continue. The 
current account deficit falls from a peak in 2004, mainly due to strengthening exports of goods 
and services.  
The economic background of the 2004 PEP is characterised by slightly stronger output growth , 
and a more dramatic slowdown –which has already started in the third quarter of 2004 to 4.8% 
in 2005 and 5.1% during the remaining programme period.  
Based on 2 of the 3 different methods used to calculate potential output, the programme expects 
that the economy will has reached potential output in 2004 and will remain close to potential in 
2005-2007. Interestingly enough, no rising inflationary pressures are expected from this growth 
pattern. The main reasons for the favourable growth performance are the effects of structural 
reforms. Compared to the 2003 PEP, the current programme has largely maintained the GDP 
growth profile for 2004-2007. For 2004, it is more optimistic, based on a better then expected 
output performance realised. Concerning the sources of growth, the 2004 programme shows a 
stronger reliance on investment and private consumption, while the expectations concerning 
private and public consumption and imports are more cautious. This growth pattern is largely 
plausible, given the negative impact of the strict fiscal policy on public consumption and 
disposable income. Furthermore, the programme appears to be reasonable in assuming a 
positive effect of decreasing interest rates, declining economic volatility and the diminishing 
crowding out of private investment through public sector borrowing on private investment. 
However, the high growth rates of imports observed in 2004 would have deserved a more 
detailed explanation. Although pent-up demand was certainly an important factor behind the 
sudden increase in imports of durable goods, the high import content of investment and exports 
could be elaborated upon. Furthermore, a reference to the likely implications of this growth 
profile on government revenues would have been appreciated.  
Regarding the contribution of the various production factors to economic growth, Turkey’s 
output appears to have been mainly driven by capital, contributing 73% to total growth during 
1990 – 2000 and even by 87.3% in 2001-2003. The share of labour has been 23.5% in 1990-
2000, and swapped to a negative contribution of 23% in 2001-2003 following the 2001 
financial crisis.  The increase in total factor productivity has been respectively 3.3% and 35.6% 
in 1990-2000 and 2001-2003. During the remaining programme period, this distribution is 
expected to become more even, with the share of capital accumulation in growth generation 
reaching a share of 31.1% on average during 2004-2007, the share of employment 25.2% on 
average and that of total factor productivity 43.7%. The increase in the investment ratio from 
21.3% of GDP in 2002 to 25% in 2007 will be increasingly financed by domestic savings, 
reflecting increased confidence in economic stability.  
As a result of strong capacity increasing investment, the programme is rather optimistic 
concerning employment generation, expecting an average employment increase of about 2½% 
each year. However, an increase in the labour force will limit the decline in unemployment.  
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External sector 
Turkey's current account balance has significantly deteriorated in the aftermath of the 2001 
financial crisis. For the programme period, a decrease in the current account deficit is expected. 
The main reasons for this scenario are optimistic assumptions on the growth of merchandise 
exports and tourism revenues. The expected volume of workers remittances is forecasted to 
stabilize around USD 1 billion. As a result, the current account deficit is expected to decline 
from around 5% of GDP in 2004 to 3% in 2007. The programme is not very clear about the 
expected structure of the financing of the current account gap. However, the programme 
expects no difficulties in financing the current account deficit, despite considerable repayment 
obligations towards the IMF, amounting to about EUR 8 billion during 2005-2007.  
In addition to the baseline scenario, the programme presents two alternative scenarios, 
analysing the effect of lower than expected external demand and of missing the inflation 
targets. In the trade shock scenario, exports in 2005 are expected to be 1% of GDP (about EUR 
2.5 billion or less than 5% of total export values) below the base line scenario. As a result of the 
high import content of exports, the impact on GDP growth and the current account is 
significant in the first year (GDP growth would fall by just under 2%), but very limited in the 
remainder of the programme period. As last year, the programme also contains a brief 
discussion of possible factors negatively affecting the disinflation path, such as the deviation 
from fiscal discipline, unexpected developments in the exchange rate and oil prices etc. 
However, no further quantification has been included in the PEP 2004.  
4.3. Monetary and exchange rate policy 
The key objective of monetary policy is to ensure price stability, or –in other words- to support 
the disinflation process. At present, the central bank is using base money and short-term interest 
rates as main policy tools. Clearly specified floors and ceilings for monetary aggregates, such 
as net domestic assets and net international reserves, are key orientation marks in this respect. 
The central bank is ready, both technically and institutionally, to switch to an explicit inflation 
targeting and will do so as soon as an agreement is reached with all parties involved on the 
process of monetary policy decisions, more specifically on sharing information with the public. 
As requested in last year’s PEP assessment, a more detailed roadmap on this shift was included 
this year.  
The exchange rate policy is characterised by a free float. The only interventions made aim at 
smoothening excessive exchange rate volatility. Based on reversed currency substitution and a 
strong balance-of-payments situation, the programme implies a real appreciation of the 
exchange rate during 2004-2006. This should support the disinflation process. Turkey has 
successfully introduced its new currency, the new Turkish Lira, on 1 January 2005 (see Box 1). 
In tandem, they have aligned their CPI with actual consumer spending, thereby using 2003 as a 
base year. First indicators point at no –or very little- additional pressures stemming from the 
latter operations.  
Inflation came down substantially from around 30% in 2002, to 18.4% at the end of 2003 and 
single digits from September 2004 onwards. The most important factors that contributed to this 
fall achieved in inflation are the increased confidence in the economy as a result of the strict 
monetary and fiscal policies that were implemented and therefore the steady decline in 
inflationary expectations. The incomes policy implemented under the programme was another 
important factor which contributed to the decline in inflation. 
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The envisaged permanent reduction in chronic inflation aims at converging towards EU 
averages by the time of accession. The Central Bank has been implementing an implicit 
inflation targeting regime, in order to achieve its targets. It intends to shift to formal (explicit) 
inflation targeting policy in January 2006. 
5. BUDGETARY TARGETS AND THE MEDIUM-TERM PATH OF THE PUBLIC FINANCES 
5.1. Programme overview 
The overall objective of Turkey’s fiscal policy is to contribute to the establishment of a 
sustainable growth environment and at the same time to support the disinflation process. 
Achieving substantial primary 
surpluses appears to be the main 
fiscal tool in this respect, 
contributing to disinflation and debt 
sustainability. As last year, the 
document does not describe in great 
detail how to achieve those targets. 
The presentation of the public 
finances would have gained 
significantly by discussing the 
various measures and their impact 
on the presented objectives. Main 
revenue-related measures are an 
improving of efficiencies in tax 
collection and a broadening of the 
tax base. On the expenditure side, 
the emphasis is on reducing public 
sector employment and to raise the 
efficiency of the current expenditure system. Unfortunately, like last year, no quantitative 
estimates of the budgetary effects of the described measures are given.  
The programme foresees an increase in the general government fixed capital formation, from 
3.4% of GDP in 2004 to 3.9% in 2005-2007. No further information is given on how those 
additional expenditures are supposed to be used. Furthermore, more details on plans to improve 
the quality of public investment would have been useful.  
Compared to the 2003 PEP, the 2004 document expects a higher primary surplus and a faster 
decline of general government net borrowing. The main reason is a more optimistic assumption 
on the decline in interest payments and the expectation of a declining share of revenues. As a 
result of a lower government lending and higher growth recorded in 2004, the debt ratio 
declines faster than in the 2003 programme. Like last year, the detailed tables on public sector 
finances are not in line with ESA 95 standards.  
The programme appears realistic, in particular since real interest rates are falling faster than 
anticipated in a context of high growth.  
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Chart 1:  Budgetary developments  
(general government balance, % of GDP)
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Change:
2004-07
Revenues 42.7 43.4 44.5 44.1 43.7 0.3
of which:
- Taxes and social 
security contributions
33.0 33.8 35.1 35.1 35.2 1.4
- Other (residual) 9.7 9.6 9.4 9.0 8.5 -1.1
Expenditure 52.8 49.7 48.9 46.2 44.2 -5.5
of which:
- Primary expenditure 36.0 35.6 37.0 36.9 36.7 1.1
of which:
Gross fixed capital 
formation
3.7 3.4 3.9 3.9 3.9 0.5
Consumption 17.9 17.7 17.5 17.4 17.3 -0.4
Transfers & subsidies 12.5 12.6 12.8 12.7 12.5 -0.1
Other (residual) 1.9 1.9 2.8 2.9 3.0 1.1
- Interest payments 16.8 14.1 11.9 9.3 7.5 -6.6
Budget balance -10.1 -6.3 -4.4 -2.1 -0.5 5.8
- Cyclically adjusted -10.6 -8.9 -6.3 -3.9 -2.1 6.8
Primary balance 6.7 7.8 7.5 7.2 7.0 -0.8
Gross debt level 80.2 78.4 75.3 72.2 68.3 -10.1
Sources: Pre-Accession Economic Programme (PEP), ECFIN calculations
Table 3:  Composition of the budgetary adjustment  (% of GDP)
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
 
The 2004 programme comprises for the second time cyclically adjusted budgetary balances. 
The results point at a relatively high share of the structural component in the Turkish fiscal 
performance, which, however, has started coming down after 2002 due lower interest rates in 
combination with high primary budget surpluses. The calculations also indicate that the growth 
of the Turkish economy during most of the programme period is very close to potential. 
However, given the strong volatility in the last decade, it is very difficult to assess the present 
cyclical position of the Turkish economy. 
5.2. Targets and adjustment 
According to the PEP 2004, the general government deficit amounted to 6.3% of GDP in 2004, 
which compared very favourably with the 2004 projection of 9.5% of GDP (in the 2003 PEP). 
Stronger than anticipated economic growth –which also led to more receipts- and a faster fall in 
real interest rates largely explain the difference.  
In 2005, a general government budget deficit of 4.4% of GDP is targeted. This is broadly in 
line with the 2005-2007 medium term fiscal framework, which underpins the new IMF-Stand 
By Agreement.  
The key objective of the medium-term fiscal framework is achieving substantial primary 
surpluses during the whole programme period of 7.8% in 2004 and decreasing gradually to 7% 
of GDP in 2007.  
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The share of general government revenues in GDP is expected to decline during the programme 
period, reflecting the phasing out of a number of temporary revenue measures and the effect of 
additional fiscal measures promoting investment. To some extent, these revenue-reducing 
measures will be compensated by the intended widening of the tax base and the improved 
efficiency of tax collection. Overall, general government receipts are expected to range between 
43.5 and 44.5 percentage points of GDP during 2004-2007. In contrast with previous years, no 
straightforward reduction in the tax burden is foreseen. 
A significant fall in general government expenditure is programmed in relative terms, from just 
under 50% of GDP in 2004 to 44% in 2007. The main driving forces for this foreseen decline 
are reductions in public sector employment and the effects of efficiency increasing measures. 
The largest contribution to the decline in total general government expenditures, however, is 
stemming from a decline in interest payments, decreasing by nearly 7 percentage points of 
GDP, from 14.1% of GDP in 2004 to 7.5% in 2007.  
5.3. Debt developments 
The programme sets out the institutional arrangements for the management of public debt and 
describes the Law on Public Finance and Debt Management from April 2002, which regulates 
debt management and introduces borrowing limits. The debt ratio is expected to fall due to 
declining interest rates and primary surpluses of over 7% of GDP throughout the 2004-2007 
period. Consequently, interest payments are programmed to fall gradually from 16.8% in 2003 
to 7.5% in 2007.  Furthermore, the sustainability of the public debt will be improved by 
measures to lengthen the debt maturities, to diversify financial market instruments and to 
provide for liquidity reserves. For improving the management of contingent liabilities, the 
treasury will apply an active risk management strategy. In order to strengthen the transparency 
of debt management, a single borrowing authority has been determined and stricter rules of 
debt management have been introduced. Risk accounting has been established. In view of 
improving transparency, public debt management reports are now published on a quarterly 
basis and the responsible minister presents an annual special report to parliament and to the 
budget commission. In line with the programme, the gross debt level is expected to fall 
continuously and rapidly, from 80.2% of GDP in 2003 to 68.3% in 2007.  
Various sensitivity analyses were presented. One examined the sensitivity of public finances 
with respect to growth and higher interest rates. The growth shock scenario itself is split into 
two sub-scenarios, one assuming a reduction in public expenditures, while the other assumes 
public expenditures to remain constant in nominal terms. A separate sensitivity analysis focuses 
on the debt stock dynamics. According to the PEP 2004 calculations, the debt situation appears 
to be sustainable. The most critical scenario is the one assuming growth to be one percentage 
point lower and real interest rates to be 5 percentage points above the baseline scenario, 
whereby the gross debt level would remain broadly constant at just under 80% throughout the 
programme period.  
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6. STRUCTURAL REFORMS 
6.1. Programme overview 
The 2004 programme presents a rather ambitious structural reform agenda outlining present and 
planned policy measures in a wide range of areas. The areas covered are similar to the 2003 
PEP and the programme gives a fairly good overview of implemented measures and activities 
under progress. However, in many cases the programme provides limited information on clear 
strategies and actions beyond 2005 as well as limited information about envisaged time frames 
for reforms. The programme mainly focuses on reforms aiming at improving the functioning of 
markets, in particular reforms in the areas of labour markets, product and capital markets, 
privatisations and improvements in the investment climate. This is in line with the conclusions 
in the Commission’s 2004 Regular Report on Turkey where deficiencies were noted in the 
functioning of the Turkish market economy. Some areas of reforms are also linked to the issue 
of fiscal sustainability (such as reforms of the health care and social security systems) and the 
harmonisation with EU regulations and practices.  
The financial link and budgetary impact of the presented measures are in most areas vague, 
which can partly be explained by the fact that future strategies and time schedules are vague as 
well. In some cases, such as for labour markets, agricultural policies and social security, 
attempts are made to estimate budgetary effects of policies over the programming period (see 
table 4). Apart from agricultural support (where direct support to farmers is included and which 
equals about 0.65% of GDP for 2004) the presented budgetary impacts are very small. It is 
however unclear if this reflects the true fiscal impact of reforms since many areas have been left 
out or may not be fully accounted for. The policy matrix presented in the programme gives a 
fairly good overview of what has been achieved in terms of structural reforms and which 
measures have been initiated, but gives less guidance on planned measures.  
Table 4: Net budgetary impact of key reforms (EUR million if not other stated) 
Description of policy 2004 2005 2006 2007 
1.  Labour market  -553.4 -663.5 -703.2 -650.0 
2.  Agriculture12 -1590.5 -1517.5 -227.1 -263.3 
3.  Regional development -1.4 -13.5 -123.8 -137.6 
4.  Health care and social security -6.0 -74.0 -223.7 -260.8 
Total budgetary impact) -2146 -2268 -1054 -1312 
Total budgetary impact (% of GDP) 0.87 0.83 0.3 - 
Sources: Pre-Accession Economic Programme (PEP), ECFIN calculations 
The fulfilment of the agenda outlined in the 2003 PEP has for most areas been fairly good but 
delays or changed plans have been recorded in others. Privatisation is one key area where 
targets outlined in the 2003 PEP were not met, although some progress was noted in the course 
of 2004. In the areas of competition policies and improvements of the investment climate, the 
                                                   
12
 For 2004 and 2005 all investments and direct transfers to be made under the Agricultural Reform 
implementation Project is included.  
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creation of some envisaged institutions were cancelled or delayed. However, in these fields 
progress was noted on a number of other issues such as attempts to reduce bureaucracy and 
increase the protection of property rights. Reforms and restructuring of the banking sector 
proceeded although state owned banks continue to be a source of distortions in the sector. The 
large reform agenda linked to public administration also moved forward although 
implementation has so far in most areas been limited.   
Improving market conditions and the preparatory work already achieved has improved 
prospects for successful implementation of some previously difficult reforms such as 
privatisation. However, the programme is vague on expectations in terms of time frames. 
Strong political support (and in some cases strong market confidence) will be crucial for 
successful implementation. The large scope of the reform agenda may also put a strain on 
public administration and delay the process. In some areas a clearer prioritising of reform 
efforts could be beneficial.   
6.2. Product and capital markets 
The aim of reforms concerning product and capital markets is to strengthen the market 
economy and entrepreneurship, and the economy’s overall efficiency and competitiveness. 
Improving the functioning of product markets is mainly addressed through privatisations, 
competition policy and improvements of the investment climate. Privatisation has been on the 
Turkish reform agenda for the last two decades but progress has overall been rather limited. 
Efforts have increased over the last years, but negative market conditions and the at times 
insufficient political determination have hampered the process. Privatisation receipts were far 
below projections in 2002 as well as in 2003 although privatisation did pick up during 2004. 
The framework for privatisations outlined in the 2004 PEP is similar to the presentation in the 
previous programme, with the same sectors targeted for privatisation. However, the programme 
does not clearly show what has been achieved during the year in terms of privatisations, while 
one can note that several planned privatisations failed or were cancelled during 2004. The 2004 
PEP outlines relaunches of the privatisation processes for a number of high profile companies 
such as Turk Telekom, Turkish Airlines and PETKIM (Petrochemical Corporation). The initial 
steps towards the privatisation of the Turkish Electricity Distribution Company (TEDAS) have 
also been taken with the tender planned to be launched in 2005 and the privatisation completed 
by 2006. The programme gives a historic overview of privatisation receipts and revenues, 
which shows that the net positive inflow from privatisations has been very limited. No attempts 
are made to estimate future privatisation receipts. The scope of the privatisation scheme seems 
appropriate, however in the light of previous delays the question which remains is the speed of 
the process. Improving market conditions and lessons learned from previous failed tenders 
should facilitate sales in the envisaged areas. However, success also requires strong political 
will and continued improved investor confidence.  
In the area of competition law and policy, the programme describes important improvements to 
the legal framework but gives very limited insight into future planned measures. The 
establishment of a body coordinating and controlling state aid practices, which was envisaged 
in the 2003 PEP to be in place already at the end of 2003, has been delayed and no time table 
for its creation is presented in the 2004 programme. 
The programme also emphasises reforms aiming at improving the overall investment climate, 
in particular in the light of the traditionally low inflows of FDI. Despite a now liberal 
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legislative framework, businesses are hampered by, for example, complex bureaucracy and an 
inadequate protection of property rights. The PEP describes the main framework for reforms 
(accepted in December 2001) under which technical committees in a large number of fields 
have been set up and it outlines several measures which have been initiated or implemented to 
address relevant shortcomings. These include improvements in the capacity of the Turkish 
Patent Institute, the approval of an SME strategy and attempts to simplify the bureaucratic 
procedures concerning sectoral licencing. These measures seem to focus on some of the most 
urgent areas of reform although the details of implemented measures are difficult to assess. 
However, reforms are needed in a wide range of areas and a description of future strategy and 
plans is not provided. The Investment Advisory Council, which has recently been established to 
advise Turkey on necessary reform measures and which consists of high level executives from 
different countries, should be an important additional instrument to help Turkey adopt the right 
priorities concerning future reform efforts in this field. In the 2003 programme, an Investment 
Promotion Agency was envisaged to be soon established, but plans have changed and such an 
institution is not included in the 2004 PEP.   
As regards the financial markets and in particular the banking sector, substantial restructuring 
has taken place and reform efforts continued in 2004, largely in line with the measures outlined 
in the 2003 PEP. A limit in the deposit guarantee system was introduced, the Savings Deposit 
Insurance Fund (SDIF) and the Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (BRSA) were 
separated and some measures to reduce banking intermediation costs were implemented, 
although further cost reducing measures are envisaged in the 2004 programme. Banks balance 
sheets have continued to strengthen, although this is also a consequence of improved market 
conditions. However, progress on the privatisation of state-owned banks has been very limited 
and privatisations foreseen in the 2003 PEP failed to materialise. The state-owned banks are a 
source of distortion in the banking sector and a change of ownership structure is important for 
the future growth and development of banking activities. The 2004 programme does not outline 
any timetable for the privatisation agenda. Given previous delays and the problems attached to 
privatising the state-owned banks, it is likely to remain a difficult area for reforms. To further 
strengthen the regulatory framework, the 2004 programme foresees the adoption of a number of 
legal measures which should help bringing banking legislation closer to international standards. 
However, the programme focuses on measures during 2005 and does not provide a more 
medium-term agenda for banking sector reforms. Concerning the area of capital markets, 
planned measures until 2007 are more clearly outlined and a strong focus on compliance with 
EU regulations can be noted. Also for the insurance market the programme aims for alignment 
with EU regulations.  
6.3. Labour market 
The programme identifies certain weaknesses of the Turkish labour market, such as a low 
participation and employment rate (particularly among women), a high level of informal 
employment and low labour productivity. In addition, increasing competition in the agricultural 
sector is creating an outflow of workforce from rural to urban areas, potentially increasing 
overall unemployment. These weaknesses have been accentuated over the last years and labour 
market imbalances have increased. The measures proposed to address these issues are mainly in 
the areas of education, active employment policies and support for rural development and 
SMEs. Although these areas are highly relevant, measures targeting directly the problems of the 
high level of informal employment and the relatively inflexible labour market are not explicitly 
mentioned and could have been appropriately included in the programme.  
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In the field of education, the programme foresees budgetary expenditure on basic education 
rising by 30% between 2004 and 2006. Since educational levels are still comparatively low, 
this seems well motivated. However, an outline of measures and planned budgetary impacts, if 
any, for other levels of education, such as secondary and higher education (as was done in the 
2003 PEP) would have been useful as these should also be areas of priority for improvements. 
In terms of active employment policies, only a few measures are outlined in the programme, 
such as social support projects to dampen the effects of privatisations and an active labour 
programme which is partly EU funded. Anticipated spending on these types of projects only 
constitutes 1% of total commitments in the area of labour market (including education). 
However, the programme also foresees continued preparation of a National Employment 
Strategy, which for example will include strategies on how to enhance employability and how 
to facilitate access to the labour market for disadvantaged groups. Since the submission of the 
PEP, the Commission and Turkey has also started drafting a 'Joint Inclusion Memorandum' 
which sets out the main challenges and policy priorities in the fields of social protection and 
social inclusion including the commitment to concrete follow-up actions. 
6.4. Other reform areas 
The programme outlines a broad administrative reform agenda, including the restructuring of 
public administration, review and reorganisation of the functioning of government and reform 
of local administrations among other areas. Special focus is also given to improved financial 
management concerning SEEs and efforts to increase fiscal transparency through improvements 
in accounting and reporting standards. The programme gives a fairly comprehensive overview 
of the problems facing the public administration. The changes will mainly aim at creating a 
smaller and more efficient administration and to increase transparency. The Turkish public 
sector is not large by international standards, but the structures are partly ill suited for the 
changing conditions of the Turkish economy and society. Plans to modernize it are therefore 
important in the overall reform context.  Since the 2003 PEP, a law on the principles of the 
restructuring of public administration which aims at decentralisation and at simplifying 
decision making has been passed by parliament. Several other laws are in the stage of adoption 
or are planned to be adopted. However, implementation, in particular at the local level and 
concerning decentralisation, will be key to the success of reforms. Any expected budgetary 
impacts of the performed of planned reforms has not been outlined.  
Other areas on which the programme focuses are the health care and social security systems. 
The two systems demonstrate various structural problems and are under funded.  Reforms 
carried out in 1999 did not produce the expected positive results. The 2004 programme outlines 
a new round of reform efforts, which includes a draft of the reform of the social security system 
and planned reforms of the general health insurance aiming at increasing efficiency and the 
coverage of the population. Reforms concerning social aid and services are also foreseen. 
Given the present trend of growing expenditure on health care and social protection, reforms to 
make the systems financially sustainable and more efficient is important. However, since the 
reforms are not described in detail, their impact and appropriateness is difficult to assess. The 
presented budget effects of reforms do not include any estimates of costs for social security 
reforms, even though this might be explained by potential costs occurring after the 
programming period.  
Several issues are also planned to be addressed in the areas of agricultural and rural reforms, for 
example reforms on the implementation of the direct income support to farmers and reforms in 
the fields of phytosanitary and plant production. Although many measures and actions are 
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foreseen in order to meet EU commitments (e.g. food safety, organic farming, preparation of 
rural development plan, FADN, animal identification system), the proposal does not give 
adequate information on how Turkey intends to deal with the difficult situation posed in rural 
areas (with regards for instance to unemployment, unpaid employment, illiteracy, low levels of 
human capital, poor opportunities for non-agricultural employment, and low levels of health 
and quality of life). 
Other areas covered in the programme include regional development, information and 
communication technologies and reforms in the areas of transportation and energy.  
7. THE QUALITY AND SUSTAINABILITY OF PUBLIC FINANCES 
7.1. The quality of public finances 
In the past, the Turkish government has often turned to ad hoc measures to achieve its targets. 
The programme states that, in order to reduce the need for such practices in the future, efforts to 
widen the tax base, better capture the unregistered economy, and decrease the number of tax 
exemptions will be intensified.   
Efficiency considerations are considered to be the main priority in public expenditure policies. 
Conversely, the Turkish authorities have embarked in an ambitious reform of the revenue 
administration. To this end, a new law has been prepared, and is expected to be enacted soon. 
This regulation intends to increase the efficiency of tax collection, by means of enhancing 
automation, training staff and improving all underpinning facilities.  In addition, tax laws and 
regulations will be amended in order to re-assess tax exemptions with the objective of 
simplification and rationalization of the tax system. 
Very little information is made available in the PEP 2004 on the fiscal effects of the structural 
reform agenda. The programme would definitely benefit from more explicit links to the 
individual measures, for example the social security reform. In addition, all additional steps 
towards strengthening the quality and transparency of the public finances would positively 
affect expectations, thereby supporting the downward trend in inflation.  
7.2. The sustainability of public finances 
Like in the last PEP, the main fiscal risks are seen to be those related to the debt stock's high 
sensitivity to interest rate and exchange rate fluctuations and a lower than expected primary 
surplus, resulting from higher than expected public spending for wages and transfers to the 
social security institutions. 
Long-term sustainability issues, such as the financial implications related to the demographic 
structure or to pension issue, are not discussed. Accordingly, no quantitative information on 
those issues has been provided. Contingent liabilities and lower than expected privatisation 
revenues appear to be additional risks to the sustainability of public finances. In this context, a 
presentation of potential contingency plans in order to compensate for those risks would have 
been interesting. 
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Annex table 1: Structural indicators
TURKEY EU 25
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
General economic background
Real GDP 1 7.3 -7.5 7.9 5.8 9.0 3.7 1.8 1.1 1.0 2.3
Labour productivity 2 15.0 -7.2 8.3 1.4 6.9 2.1 0.8 0.8 0.8 1.8
Real unit labour cost 3 n.a. 0.0 -12.1 5.7 1.7 0.4 0.4 -0.4 -0.5 -0.9
Real effective exchange rate 4 95.9 78.6 74.1 76.4 82.3 98.7 100.5 103.0 106.1 108.8
Inflation rate 5 54.9 54.4 45.0 21.6 8.6 2.4 2.5 2.1 1.9 2.1
Unemployment rate 6 6.5 8.4 10.4 10.5 10.3 8.6 8.4 8.7 8.9 9.0
Employment
Employment rate 7 48.8 47.8 46.9 45.8 43.7 62.5 62.9 62.9 63.0 63.3
Employment rate - females 8 25.8 26.3 27.0 25.7 22.9 53.7 54.3 54.7 55.1 55.8
Employment rate of older workers 9 36.3 35.8 35.7 33.5 n.a. 36.6 37.4 38.8 40.2 40.5
Long-term unemployment 10 1.3 1.7 2.9 2.4 n.a. 3.9 3.8 3.9 4.0 4.1
Product market reforms 
Relative price levels 11 60.6 48.0 51.9 55.0 n.a. 100 100 100 100 100
Total trade-to-GDP ratio 12 27.5 32.5 30.0 29.0 31.6 : 9.7 9.2 9.0 9.4
Total FDI inflows 13 0.1 2.0 0.5 0.5 0.6 16.0 7.6 8.3 6.1 3.9
Market share electricity 14 75.0 70.0 59.0 45.0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Sectoral and ad-hoc state aids 15 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.3 0.3 0.3 : :
Business investment 16 n.a. 18.1 16.6 n.a. n.a. 18.4 17.9 17.2 16.8 17.0
Knowledge-based economy
Tertiary graduates 17 2.6 2.8 3.1 n.a. n.a. 43.2 47.0 49.0 52.2 n.a.
Spending on human resources 18 3.49 3.65 3.56 n.a. n.a. 4.9 5.1 5.2 n.a. n.a.
Educational attainment 19 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 76.4 76.2 76.5 76.6 76.7
R&D expenditure 20 0.64 0.72 0.66 n.a. n.a. 1.88 1.92 1.93 1.95 n.a.
Internet access 21 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 7.0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 42.0
Source:  Commission services.
1. Growth rate of real GDP in %.  2. Growth rate of real GDP per person employed in %.  3. Ratio of compensation per employee to 
nominal GDP per person employed, total economy, annual percentage change.  4. Vs IC36 (1999 = 100), current year's values are based on 
Commission's forecast deflator figures, nominal unit labour cost deflator.  5. Annual average rate of change in Interim Harmonized Indices 
of Consumer Prices (HICPs).  6. Unemployed persons as a share of the total active population.  7. For Turkey, employed persons 15 years of 
age and over in % of total population of the same age group, for EU refers to population aged 15-64.   8. For Turkey, employed women aged 
15 years of age and over in % of total female population of the same age grouping, for EU refers to employed women aged 15-64.                
9. Employed persons aged 55-64 in % of total population of the same age group.  10. Long-term unemployed (over 12 months) in % of total 
active population aged 15-64.   
f: forecast, e: estimated value, p: provisional value, b: break in series, s: Eurostat estimate, r: revised value, q: estimated from quarterly 
values.
11. Of private final consumption (EU25=100). 12. average value of imports and exports of goods and services in % o GDP; the value for 
EU 15 is the total for the Small Member States. 13. In % of GDP. 14. Market share of the largest generator (% of total net generation).      
15. In % of GDP. 16. Gross fixed capital formation by the private sector in % of GDP.  17.Total tertiary graduates (ISCED 5-6) per 1000 of 
population aged 20-29. 18. Public expenditure on education in % of GDP. 19. Percentage of the population aged 20 to 24 having completed 
at least upper secondary education. 20. GERD (Gross domestic expenditure on R&D) - in % of GDP. 21. Percentage of households who 
have Internet access at home.
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BULGARIA PEP 2004
Annex table 1: Structural indicators
BULGARIA EU 25
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
General economic background
Real GDP 1 5.4 4.1 4.9 4.5 5.6 3.7 1.8 1.1 1.0 2.3
Labour productivity 2 9.2 7.8 3.3 1.0 2.4 2.1 0.8 0.8 0.8 1.8
Real unit labour cost 3 -5.4 0.8 -0.8 5.5 -0.7 0.4 0.4 -0.4 -0.5 -0.9
Real effective exchange rate 4 96.5 103.7 105.8 109.0 113.3 98.7 100.5 103.0 106.1 108.8
Inflation rate 5 10.3 7.4 5.8 2.3 6.1 2.4 2.5 2.1 1.9 2.1
Unemployment rate 6 16.9 19.8 17.8 13.7 12.0 8.6 8.4 8.7 8.9 9.0
Employment
Employment rate 7 50.4 49.7 50.6 52.5 54.2 62.5 62.9 62.9 63.0 63.3
Employment rate - females 8 46.3 46.8 47.5 49.0 50.6 53.7 54.3 54.7 55.1 55.8
Employment rate of older workers 9 20.8 24.0 27.0 30.0 32.5 36.6 37.4 38.8 40.2 40.5
Long-term unemployment 10 9.4 11.9 11.7 8.9 7.1 3.9 3.8 3.9 4.0 4.1
Product market reforms 
Relative price levels 11 37.9 39.6 41.6 42.1 : 100 100 100 100 100
Total trade-to-GDP ratio 12 42.9 43.5 41.8 43.9 48.1 : 9.7 9.2 9.0 9.4
Total FDI inflows 13 8.0 5.9 5.8 10.3 8.4 16.0 7.6 8.3 6.1 3.9
Market share electricity 14 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Sectoral and ad-hoc state aids 15 0.7 0.5 0.2 0.5 : 0.3 0.3 0.3 : :
Business investment 16 12.1 14.7 15.3 16.5 17.8 18.4 17.9 17.2 16.8 17.0
Knowledge-based economy
Tertiary graduates 17 38.1 41.4 44.1 n.a. n.a. 43.2 47.0 49.0 52.2 n.a.
Spending on human resources 18 4.41 3.53 3.57 n.a. n.a. 4.9 5.1 5.2 n.a. n.a.
Educational attainment 19 74.9 78.2 77.5 75.6 76.0 76.4 76.2 76.5 76.6 76.7
R&D expenditure 20 0.52 0.47 0.49 0.50 n.a. 1.88 1.92 1.93 1.95 n.a.
Internet access 21 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 10.0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 42.0
Source:  Commission services.
1. Growth rate of real GDP in %.  2. Growth rate of real GDP per person employed in %.  3. Ratio of compensation per employee to 
nominal GDP per person employed, total economy, annual percentage change.  4. Vs IC36 (1999 = 100), current year's values are based on 
11. Of private final consumption (EU25=100). 12. average value of imports and exports of goods and services in % o GDP; the value for 
EU 15 is the total for the Small Member States. 13. In % of GDP. 14. Market share of the largest generator (% of total net generation). 15. f: forecast, e: estimated value, p: provisional value, b: break in series, s: Eurostat estimate, r: revised value, q: estimated from quarterly 
values.
 
